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ON JUNE 5, 2000, the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
published a notice in the Federal Register requesting public comment
on an unusually broad set of intellectual property policy issues' pursu-
ant to a congressional mandate expressed in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act 2 ("DMCA"). The questions posed by the Copyright Of-
fice focused on the effect of the DMCA and, more generally, on the
1. See 65 Fed. Reg. 35,673 (June 5, 2000).
2. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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practical impact of new technologies upon sections 109(a) and 117 of
the 1976 Copyright Act 3 ("the 1976 Act"). While this subject appears
at first glance to epitomize the kind of technical legal question that
interests primarily an intellectual property law specialist of pedantic
disposition, the issues raised by the DMCA are, in reality, of great eco-
nomic and social importance.
The 1976 Copyright Act is the latest expression of federal public
policy on the protection and distribution of expressive works. The
DMCA was intended to modernize the Copyright Act to account for
the increasingly digitalized world of expression, but Congress, in a dis-
play of foresight and humility, chose to leave some issues open to
study and future rulemaking. In promulgating the DMCA, Congress
recognized the increasing centrality of copyrightable computer
software and other digital expressions in developing new technologies
of potential or realized social benefit. As such new forms of expression
come to replace the traditional, those who create and publish com-
puter software assume augmented economic power and commercial
leverage. Congress designed the aforementioned sections of the Copy-
right Act with the objective of putting the reasonable expectations of
purchasers of such software beyond the reach of this leverage. Thus,
these provisions of the Copyright Act are designed both to protect the
minimum expectations of software purchasers and to preempt certain
practices by software publishers that Congress has deemed to be un-
fair or inefficient.
Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, known as the First Sale Doc-
trine,4 protects the lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work from
infringing the copyright in that work by reselling the copy. Section
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117 (2000).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Actually, the term "First Sale Doctrine" is something of a
misnomer. No actual sale is required for section 109(a) to apply; the copy need merely
have been "lawfully acquired." One can acquire ownership by gift, see, e.g., Walt Disney
Prods. v. Basmajian, 600 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1984), manufacture under license, see, e.g.,
United States v. Sachs, 802 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 1986), or even salvage, see, e.g., United States
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). Because the difficult issues raised by the Doctrine
most often arise in the context of software sales, and for reasons of convenience, we will
generally use the term "purchaser" instead of "lawful owner." For application of the First
Sale Doctrine, see generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1246, 1261, 1267-84 (1995); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright:
Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REv. 569, 593 (1997); Kenneth
L. Carson and Gail E. Horowitz, Software and Comptuer Law: Old Questions to be Answered in
the New Millennium, 43 B.BJ. 10, 18 (1999); Al Harrison and StephenJ. Hyland, High-Tech
Issue: Computer Law, 34 Hous. LAw. 16, 20 (1996).
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117 immunizes the lawful owner of a copy of a computer program 5
from committing infringement by copying the software as a necessary
step in its normal use (for example, by making copies into a com-
puter's random access memory, or "RAM," in the course of executing
the software code). Technological means deployed by the software
publisher can adversely impact these prerogatives of copy ownership,
namely, the rights to copy the software in the course of its normal use
and to resell the copy. For example, a software publisher can insert
into a computer program a mechanism that prevents the program
from running on a computer different than the one upon which it was
originally installed." Of course, such mechanisms can generally be cir-
cumvented by the purchaser's own technological innovations. Yet, sec-
tion 1201(a) (1) (A) of the DMCA forbids such measures, providing
that "no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this title."'7 As a result,
the new legislation protects mechanisms that could potentially pre-
vent software users from exercising their lawful rights under the First
Sale Doctrine and section 117.8
Congress's interest in reconciling licensing practices and new
technologies with sections 109(a) and 117 may be influenced by the
increasingly common practice by courts of rejecting the application of
those sections in deference to the licensing practices of software pub-
lishers. While two decades ago, copy use licensing was relatively un-
common, 9 nearly every commercial transfer of a copy of software is
now accompanied by an explicit license agreement. Such copy use li-
cense agreements are nowhere explicitly recognized in the 1976 Copy-
right Act. In mass-market consumer software transactions, the license
agreement is invariably a shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreement.' 0 In
these agreements, as well as traditionally negotiated contracts,
5. The 1976 Copyright Act defines a "computer program" to be a "set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about
certain results." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
6. See infra note 399 and accompanying text.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)() (A) (2000).
8. See Suellen W. Bergman, Do Anti-Circumvention Laws Clash With First Sale Doctrine?,
E-CoM. L. & STRATEGY (Sept. 22, 2000), at http://www.brownraysman.com/publicafionse
commerce.htm (subscribers only).
9. See David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act
First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRIcsJ. 157, 164 (1990).
10. A shrinkwrap agreement is a license agreement contained inside a box of
software, and is sometimes positioned so as to be readable through the transparent shrink-
wrap packaging. A clickwrap agreement is an agreement that pops up on a transferee's
computer screen, and that must be adhered to (usually by clicking an "Okay" or "I agree"
button) before the software may be downloaded to the transferee's computer.
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software publishers generally desire to impose restraints on the use
and resale of their software in order to optimize the commercializa-
tion of their products, the return on research and development invest-
ments, and exercise some control over their segment of the software
market. Thus, the applicability vel non of the First Sale Doctrine affects
virtually every software transaction.
Almost contemporaneous with the United States Copyright Of-
fice's request for public comment, the Bundesgerichtsof Germany's
highest civil law court, rejected a claim by Microsoft Corporation of
copyright infringement.1' Microsoft filed suit against a German dis-
tributor that had marketed Microsoft products labeled original equip-
ment manufacturer 12 ("OEM"), but had sold them as stand-alone
products to the general public, contrary to Microsoft's license restric-
tions. In order to reach different distribution channels, many software
publishers market virtually identical software programs either as
stand-alone products, or as discounted OEM versions to be sold only
in connection with hardware. By offering the discounted OEM ver-
sions as stand-alone versions, the German distributor was able to un-
dercut prices set by its competitors. Microsoft argued that the
distribution licenses accompanying its OEM versions did not author-
ize the marketing of the software as a stand-alone product. The
Bundesgerichtshof held that the German distributor did not need
Microsoft's authorization to market Microsoft's products because,
under the First Sale Doctrine, Microsoft's exclusive distribution rights
had been exhausted when it transferred the software copies to a dis-
tributor from whom the renegade German distributor had acquired
them.
Both of these recent events have gained publicity in the United
States as well as Europe, and they invite a comparison of the respective
perceptions of a common doctrine-the First Sale Doctrine as it ap-
plies to computer software. It is not unusual that comparative legal
analysis comes to the conclusion that, while concepts and theories of
national legal systems differ substantially, the ultimate answer to a spe-
cific legal question or problem is the same because the perceived pol-
icy interests, whether they be based on perceptions of efficiency or
fairness, are similar. With regard to the application of the First Sale
11. See infra note 431 and accompanying text.
12. An "OEM" is a designation referring to a business that assembles computers di-
rectly from parts for sale to the public. OEM software is software that, according to its
license terms, may- only be sold by a hardware manufacturer in conjunction with the
hardware.
Fall 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Doctrine to the licensing of computer software, however, it seems to
be the other way round. Although the First Sale Doctrine constitutes a
well established principle of United States and European intellectual
property law, 13 the policy results and economic consequences of the
application of the First Sale Doctrine to software licensing agreements
differ substantially in the United States and the European
Community.
The acceptance of any particular interpretation of the First Sale
Doctrine in a legal system's jurisprudence has substantial conse-
quences for individual users of software and weighs heavily in deter-
mining the extent of a licensor's power to define the terms of its
license in any licensing transaction. If the First Sale Doctrine is ex-
cluded, a consumer who buys a computer game violates federal copy-
right laws if she trades the game to her little brother in exchange for
baseball cards. Excluding the First Sale Doctrine would also allow li-
censors to prevent the sale of used software in software stores, book-
stores, flea markets, and over the Internet. Finally, it means that a
business that sells substantially all of its assets to another business may
be prohibited from transferring its software to the second business; it
may be necessary to wipe the transferred computers clean of all
software and sacrifice the price paid for the software. Indeed, the con-
sequences of this legal doctrine transcend these practical considera-
tions; they penetrate the very core of public policy on competition
and consumer protection in the software market.' 4
13. Unlike "tangible property law" (i.e., real estate and personal property law), the
term "intellectual property law" refers to legal rules on exclusivity rights to intangibles,
such as works of authorship. "The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by
the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Commu-
nity of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program
or a copy thereof." Council Directive 91/250, art. 4, 1991 OJ.
Article 7 of the trademark directive provides:
The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to
goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade-
mark by the proprietor or with his consent. 2. Paragraph I shall not apply where
there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercializa-
tion of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or im-
paired after they have been put on the market.
Council Directive 89/104, art. 7, 1989 OJ. (L 40).
14. This is not to say that the policy ramifications of the use of licenses as an "alterna-
tive" to software sales end at sections 109 (a) and 117. Over a decade ago, Professor David
Rice of Rutgers Law School pointed out that copy licensing can be used to leverage the
copyright monopoly to protect trade secrets by prohibiting reverse engineering, and by
creating a contributory infringement right against an innocent renter. See Rice, supra note
9, at 159, 185.
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This Article reviews the origins and functions of the First Sale
Doctrine as it applies to software and attempts to clarify the circum-
stances under which a software transfer constitutes a "first sale."'15 This
Article revisits the concepts of sales and ownership in order to avoid
the common misconception that by labeling a transaction a "license
grant," the final word has been spoken on whether a sale of a software
copy has in fact occurred. By eschewing the common judicial dichoto-
mization of a "license" of software and a "sale" of software, this Article
shows that the form of the license is almost uniformly epiphenome-
nal. This Article argues instead that the gravamen of a software trans-
fer is the license itself and therefore such a transfer can involve either
a sale or a lease of a software copy, but it must always involve a license
in some form. Alternatively, a sale or a lease of a software copy can be
accompanied by a sale or a lease of a copyright itself, but under most
circumstances, the term "license" indicates only if and to what extent
the copyright owner wishes to dispose of some or all of its exclusive
rights to a computer program. This Article concludes that such termi-
nology should have no legitimate legal impact on whether the transac-
tion qualifies as a sale of a software copy for purposes of the First Sale
Doctrine.
I. Sale and Ownership of Property and the Function of the
First Sale Doctrine
The First Sale Doctrine limits certain statutory intellectual prop-
erty rights of the author of a copyrighted work. The author generally
enjoys a number of exclusive rights to his work including the right to
undertake, permit, or prohibit the reproduction, rental, and sale of
his work and copies thereof.' 6 Once the author has first sold a "copy"
of his copyrighted work, the First Sale Doctrine states that the author's
right to prohibit further sales is exhausted. Accordingly, a lawful pur-
chaser of a copy of a copyrighted work is free to resell his copy to a
third party. In order to understand the meaning and repercussions of
this rule, it is helpful to consider more closely the concepts of sale and
ownership, and the rights retained by original owners and subsequent
purchasers with regard to their property.
15. A "first sale" for these purposes means that the acquirer of software qualifies as the
"owner" of the acquired software copy.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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A. Sale and Ownership
The term "sale" is commonly understood to mean a transfer of
property for payment of a certain consideration, usually in the form of
money. Property is commonly conceived of as an object that exclu-
sively belongs to the owner.1 7 Intellectual property is intangible, not a
physical object, but it is considered "property" in a figurative sense.
Ownership is a collection of rights to use, enjoy, and transfer prop-
erty; the complete dominion, title, or proprietary right in a thing or
claim. 8 Under the common law, property, by definition, must have
one or more owners and it is inherent in the ownership that such
owner or owners have a right to transfer that property, by sale or
otherwise.
While there are many differences between tangible and intellec-
tual property, in some ways the legal position of the owner is compara-
ble. As the concept of tangible property is older, and generally more
familiar, it is necessary to briefly sum up the situation of an owner of
tangible property. 19
1. Sale and Ownership of Tangible Property
A creator or other owner of a particular piece of jewelry can de-
cide for himself whether or not he wants to use the jewelry himself,
lend or lease it to others, or sell it outright. As long as he owns the
jewelry, he can prohibit and prevent anybody else from using that par-
ticular piece ofjewelry or melting it down and making something else
out of the metal and gems. 20 Thejewelry is a "chose in possession." If
a thief steals the jewelry and sells it, the purchaser will generally not
acquire ownership; a thief cannot transfer valid title.21 However, if the
owner sells the jewelry, the purchaser can resell the jewelry to a sec-
17. See Black's Law Dictionary 1216 (7th ed. 1999) (defining property as "that which
belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights, which are guar-
anteed and protected by the government .... More specifically, ownership .... ") (cita-
dons omitted).
18. See id. at 1106.
19. To offer one possible example, an article of jewelry. We limit this discussion to
personal property to avoid the idiosyncratic complications of real property law. We also
assume that our exemplary piece of jewelry is valuable, yet so unoriginal and generic in
shape and form that its design is not protected by any intellectual property laws.
20. For example, the German Civil Code states: "The owner of a res may, to the extent
not contrary to the law or the rights of third parties, deal with the res as he pleases and
exclude others from any interference." BGB § 903. The French Civil Code contains a provi-
sion of similar effect. See C. Civ. §§ 537, 544 (1999).
21. See Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 1360-61
(1990); 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 447 (1985).
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ond purchaser, regardless of whether the original owner agrees to
such resale or not. Generally, the ability to transfer title by sale is natu-
rally incident to the ownership of tangible property.
Original Owner - First Purchaser -- Second Purchaser
However, the original owner could attempt contractually to obli-
gate the first purchaser not to resell the jewelry to a second purchaser.
Under the common law, such a nontransferability clause could not
impose an obligation erga omnes, even if its terms purported to do so,
due to a lack of privity between the original owner of the jewelry and
third parties such as a second purchaser. The first purchaser's non-
transferability undertaking would not "run with the goods;" if valid
and enforceable under state commercial law, it would only create per-
sonal obligations between the original owner and the first purchaser.
If the first purchaser resells and transfers title to the jewelry to a
second purchaser, this would constitute a breach of the first sales con-
tract between the original owner and the first purchaser, but it violates
no common law rule. Except in a few rare instances not at issue
here,22 such a subsequent sale would not be theft, conversion, trespass
to chattels, or any other crime, tort, or even a statutory or regulatory
violation. Consequently, the original owner might sue the first pur-
chaser for damages or, with less success, apply for an equitable remedy
based solely on a theory of breach of contract. The court would likely
find, however, that notwithstanding the first purchaser's contractual
agreement not to sell the jewelry, the first purchaser could neverthe-
less go forward with the sale because the nontransferability clause con-
travenes the ancient common law prohibition on unreasonable
restraints on alienation, 23 or even that it violates antitrust rules. 24 Such
22. Obviously, certain kinds of sales of objects to certain kinds of end-users will be
illegal under various laws (e.g., the sale of liquor to minors, or the sale of armaments to an
embargoed country without a license under the Office of Foreign Assets Control regula-
tions, etc.).
23. SeeWildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828, 832 (N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he common-
law rule against unreasonable restraints on the alienation of property, which invalidates
unduly restrictive controls on future transfers ... measures reasonableness of the restraint
by its price, duration, and purpose.") (citations omitted). At common law, a general re-
straint on alienation is ordinarily invalid unless it is reasonable in light of its terms and
purpose. See id. at 832. The rule was firmly established as far back as the seventeenth cen-
tury, when Lord Coke wrote:
If a man be possessed.., of a horse or of any other chattel, real or personal, and
give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the donee
or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because the whole interest
and property is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of a reverter; and it is
against trade and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man.
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a clause violates one of the fundamental attributes of property (its
alienability) and would be void under the common law and void for
reasons of public policy. Nonetheless, under no circumstance could
the second purchaser be bound by the nontransferability agreement
between the original owner and the first purchaser. 25 If the first pur-
chaser, in breach of the contract between the original owner and him-
self, sold and transferred title to the jewelry to the second purchaser,
the second purchaser would generally acquire valid title to thejewelry,
become its owner, and be free to resell as he chooses.
2. Sale and Ownership of a Traditional Copyrighted Work
Let us now assume that the original owner instead owned a form
of intellectual property; instead of creating unoriginal jewelry, he
wrote a book. Generally speaking, an owner of intellectual property
can also decide for himself whether or not to sell his intellectual prop-
erty.26 Like the creator and original owner of jewelry, the author of a
book could keep the book to himself or sell it to others. If a thief
steals the book from the author's house, the thief could not transfer
title to a purchaser, just like with jewelry. If the author sells the book,
2 EDWARD COKE, COKE ON LITLETON § 360 (1794). Similarly, the Supreme Court pro-
claimed: "The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as ob-
noxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things
as pass from hand to hand." Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,
404 (1908) (citation omitted). See also Ford v. Yost, 186 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Ky. 1944) ("[T]he
rule against.., restraints on alienation of property is one of high public policy. Society is
concerned more [with freedom to dispose of one's lawfully acquired property] than are
the individual parties.").
24. A contractual provision preempting a purchaser's ability to resell a product might
violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000), if the provision contributed to
the seller's monopolization of a market (or the joint oligopolization by the seller and the
purchaser).
25. The seller could conceivably bring an action for tortious interference with a con-
tract against the third party purchaser, but even assuming that the seller's underlying right
to prevent resale to be established, the seller would have to show that the third party knew
of the seller's contract with the purchaser (and its terms), intentionally interfered with this
agreement, and thereby caused the seller damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766 (1979). In a common resale context where the purchaser makes no investigation
into how a distributor or other seller acquired the goods, knowledge of a contract and its
terms would be exceedingly difficult to prove.
26. There are limitations to this rule. For example, sections 107 to 122 of the United
States Copyright Act provide for numerous limitations to the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner, including compulsory licenses for making and distributing phonorecords (§ 115).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000). According to the United States Lanham Act, a registered
trademark that goes unused by its registrant may be canceled or renewal of registration
may be refused. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(d), 1058(a) (2000).
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however, a purchaser could resell it. The rules outlined above under
Part I.A.1 apply to the book just as they apply to jewelry.
However, with respect to a copyrighted work of authorship, addi-
tional rules apply. Unlike jewelry, a copyrighted work is intangible,
even though it may be embodied in a tangible carrier medium. Intel-
lectual property is generally sold on a carrier medium of some kind.
Just as it is theoretically possible to separate the notion of the book
itself (i.e., paper, glue, and ink) from the intangible words contained
in the book (i.e., the expressions that may be memorized and recited
without the need for any carrier medium other than the human
brain), it is equally possible to separate intangible music (i.e., the
sounds expressed in waves or particles through the air) and its carrier
medium (e.g., a phonograph record or CD), and intangible software
(i.e., machine readable object code) from its carrier medium (e.g.,
CD, floppy disk, ROM chip).27 Only the intangible property is pro-
tected by copyright. This distinction, between carrier media and pro-
tected intellectual property is crucial, 28 as acknowledged by section
202 of the United States Copyright Act, which provides that
" [o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied."29 Another important distinction is the differ-
ence between the intellectual property itself (e.g., words, music, ob-
ject code) and the right to use or copy the intellectual property (i.e.,
the license). These distinctions are critical analytical components
often missing from an analysis of the sale of a copy of intellectual
property. In any "sale" of such a copy, there are three components:
(1) the relatively unimportant sale of the media (e.g., blank CD,
ROM chip, blank paper book);
(2) the sale of the intangible "copy" of the intellectual property
itself (for software, in the form of a mathematical algorithm
in object code; for a novel, the words); and
(3) the legal rights to use, reproduce, etc. the intellectual prop-
erty, which are granted to the copyright owner pursuant to
section 106 of the Copyright Act, and which may be licensed
in whole or in part, or assigned.
27. See United States v. Goss, 803 F.2d 638, 643 (11th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing be-
tween the copyrighted "work"-the intangible programming-and the tangible "copy"
owned by the defendant).
28. See Rice, supra note 9, at 166.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
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The importance of these distinctions can be seen when each ele-
ment of a sale of a copy of intellectual property is separated. There
can be a sale without a license (e:g., the sale of a blank paperback, just
like the sale of jewelry), and a license without a sale (e.g., the license
of rights to manufacture a copyrighted or patented product in which
no ownership rights change hands).
Book Manuscript - Purchaser I
Manuscript
Author/
Copyright Owner
Copyright in Book Contents . Purchaser 2
The author of a book not only has exclusive rights to the original
physical manifestation of the book he created-the original manu-
script-he also has exclusive rights to the intangible value contained
therein-the content of the manuscript. If such content qualifies as
an original work of authorship, its author has the sole and exclusive
rights to permit, prohibit, and undertake the reproduction, sale, and
importation of the book.30 Therefore, if a thief refrains from stealing
the physical manifestation of the author's work, but "steals" the intan-
gible content of the author's book by making copies and selling such
copies, the author and original owner of the book has a statutory right
to prohibit the thief from doing so.3' According to the 1976 Copyright
Act, the author can further sue for considerable statutory damages
and attorneys' fees for infringement,3 2 and request that the court or-
der the thief, and anyone who purchased from the thief, to impound
or destroy the illegal copies. 33 For further deterrent effect, there is
also a possibility of criminal proceedings being instituted against the
thief.34
A sale of a copy only involves a transfer of ownership rights to that
copy. A sale of the underlying work protected by the copyright (in-
cluding all rights to reproduce that work) involves an assignment of
the copyrights. While the copyright laws of the United States and most
countries in continental Europe differ with respect to some indis-
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
32. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(1)-505 (2000).
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) (civil forfeiture), 506(b) (criminal forfeiture) (2000).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 506.
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posable, non-waivable "moral" rights, authors are generally able to as-
sign or otherwise transfer all commercialization rights with respect to
their works of authorship. Therefore, the author of a copyrighted
book could sell and assign his exclusive rights to a purchaser, e.g., a
commercial publisher. Upon such assignment, the purchaser and as-
signee alone enjoy the aforementioned exclusive rights to undertake,
permit, or prohibit the reproduction, sale, and importation of the
book. The assignment of the rights is entirely separable from the sale
of the original manuscript, as expressly acknowledged in section 202
of the United States Copyright Act.35 As the owner of that particular
copy of the work, the author may choose to keep his original manu-
script for sentimental purposes and assign his copyright together with
a copy of the manuscript to a purchaser. The author could alterna-
tively sell the original manuscript to one purchaser (e.g., a collector),
and assign the copyrights to the content of the book to another
purchaser.
If, after the author sold his copyrights to a purchaser, a thief stole
the author's original manuscript and created copies thereof, the thief
would infringe upon the author's tangible property rights to the man-
uscript (state law trespass to chattels) and the purchaser's copyright to
the content of the manuscript (federal copyright infringement). Even
the author could infringe upon the purchaser's rights if the author
made additional copies of his original manuscript after he sold and
assigned his copyright to the purchaser.
The author might also decide to retain his copyright and create
and market copies of his book himself. If the author creates the first
copy of his original manuscript himself, and sells and transfers title to
a purchaser of the copy, then the purchaser will become the lawful
owner of the book.
Author/Copyright Owner -- First Purchaser (Owner of Copy of Book)
As the owner of the book, the purchaser would normally have the
common law right to do whatever he pleases with the book. The pur-
chaser could merely use it, by reading it. With modern technology,
however, the purchaser could also easily produce and market a large
number of copies of the book in paper, electronic, or other forms and
deprive the author of some of his potential market opportunities. It
would have similar detrimental effects on the author's marketing
chances if the purchaser, without making any copies, rents the book
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
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to numerous third parties, or exploits its contents by public theater
performances (e.g., if the book contains a theatrical work). The au-
thor would also lose potential marketing chances if the first purchaser
merely sold the book to a second purchaser after he read it. Thus, in
the absence of laws granting the author exclusive rights to the intangi-
ble value represented by the intangible contents of his manuscript,
the author would be unable successfully to exploit it commercially.
The author would feel less economic incentive to write or publish the
book in the first place, and consequently, society would be deprived of
at least some valuable works of authorship. 36
Copyright law is designed to prevent this unhappy result by grant-
ing certain exclusive rights to the creators of intangible values. For
this reason, copyright law limits a book purchaser's rights to the intan-
gible value contained in the book. A book purchaser may not create
any copies of the book without the author's consent.37 A book pur-
chaser is also prohibited from renting or leasing the book or from
exploiting it in public performances. 38 However, in order to accom-
modate other valid economic interests, copyright law does not grant
the author a proprietary right to prohibit a book purchaser from
reselling his book.39 This is where the copyright law-in the form of
the First Sale Doctrine-draws the line. According to this doctrine,
after the author has sold a copy of his manuscript, his rights to pro-
hibit the sale of this copy are exhausted.
Author/Original Owner -- First Purchaser -- Second Purchaser
The term "copy" is defined as "material objects, other than pho-
norecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device."40 The first lawful purchaser, i.e., someone who ac-
quired the copy with the author's consent, becomes the lawful owner
of such copy. According to the First Sale Doctrine, incident to any sale
36. It has been observed that this issue has been thus far addressed only at a theoreti-
cal level, with very little empirical evidence adduced to support or refute the notion of
excludability as a necessary or adequate incentive to spur the creation of patentable or
copyrightable works. SeeJames Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish ? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimi-
nation and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2016-17 (2000); Harvey S.
Perlman, Taking the Protection-Access Tradeoff Seriously, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1837 (2000).
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
38. See id.; 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b) (1) (A), 110 (2000).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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of a copy of a copyrighted work, the purchaser automatically acquires
the right to resell the book to a second purchaser for the first pur-
chaser's own profit.41 This doctrine has been applied consistently to
confer resale rights on purchasers of intellectual property for over
one hundred years.42
The First Sale Doctrine does not apply to a license where no sale
occurs, such as a "pure" publishing43 or other license. Thus, if a book
author loaned a copy of his book to a vanity publisher and conferred a
license upon the publisher to reproduce the book solely to create cop-
ies of the book for the author herself, no sale of a copy has taken
place. Should the vanity publisher choose to sell any additional copies
of the work, that sale would constitute copyright infringement. Where
the possessor of protected work is not its lawful owner, as the case
where the publisher merely performs a service and does not publish
the copies for sale by the publisher, section 109(a) of the Copyright Act
does not apply. 44 Thus, a pure license unaccompanied by a sale of a
copy of the work does not implicate the First Sale Doctrine. However,
the First Sale Doctrine applies to a sale by a publisher if made with the
consent of the copyright owner.
3. Sale and Ownership of a Copyrighted Computer Program
Turning to the focus of this Article, software is a relatively new
subject for protection under the First Sale Doctrine and, relatively
speaking, copyright law. 45 As with books, a "copy" is defined as a "ma-
terial object" in which a copyrighted work is fixed. 46 With respect to
the media, the author again enjoys exactly the same tangible property
rights as the owner ofjewelry or a book, as outlined above. The author
of a copyrightable computer program also enjoys the same intellectual
property rights as the author of a book. The software author can keep
the program to himself, assign the copyrights to the program to an-
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
42. See, e.g., Harrison v. Maynard Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894).
43. A publishing license conveys to the publisher of a work the right to make copies of
the work, but does not necessarily grant any ownership interest in the resulting copies.
44. The general practice in most publishing industries is that the publisher obtains a
license from the copyright owner (or owns the copyright itself) and pays royalties to the
copyright owner based on the real or expected sales of the copies of the work. This identity
of copy creation and ownership does not apply, however, in the uncommon case where a
copyright owner has outsourced publishing duties but sells the copies himself.
45. Consider the situation of an author of a copyrighted computer program: a com-
puter program consists of data stored on some electronic medium, e.g., a compact disc
("CD") or digital versatile disc ("DVI)").
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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other party, or retain the copyrights and create and sell copies of the
program.
However, if the software author creates and sells a copy of the
program, the purchaser usually finds himself in a significantly differ-
ent situation than the purchaser of a book. While the purchaser of a
book only needs title to the book to enjoy its use, the purchaser of a
software copy has to create at least one additional copy of the program
before he can use it. In order to use software, a purchaser must
upload it from the storage medium-be it a CD, a DVD, or a com-
puter's hard drive-to the temporary random access memory
("RAM") of the computer.47 By uploading the electronic data in a dif-
ferent storage unit of the computer, the software purchaser creates a
second physical manifestation of the computer program, and courts
in the United States qualify such physical manifestation as a copy for
purposes of copyright law.48 Therefore, in the absence of special ex-
ceptions, the purchaser of a copy of software needs the permission of
the copyright owner before he can actually enjoy his tangible property
rights to his software copy. Because the copyright owner retains all
rights to copy the program, the first purchaser is not alone in needing
this permission-any subsequent purchaser must obtain it as well.
While the First Sale Doctrine may provide that the software author has
no right to prohibit resale of the software, the doctrine does not pre-
vent the software author from prohibiting copying of the software he
sold. If it did, a second purchaser could create multiple copies of the
software, sell them to numerous potential purchasers of the author's
software, and deprive the author of the profits of his intellectual prop-
erty rights.
While the First Sale Doctrine effectively immunizes the purchaser
of most forms of copyrighted works from accusations of infringement
47. The random access memory, or RAM, consists of a set of microchips that are ac-
tive and contain information only when the computer is powered on. For a computer to
function, the computer program information must be copied from the storage media to
the RAM, where it is immediately accessible to the computer's central processing unit.
48. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
The final report of the Congress-appointed Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") has taken the position that "[t]he text of the new copy-
right law makes it clear that the placement of a copyrighted work into a computer... is the
preparation of a copy .... Because works in computer storage may be repeatedly repro-
duced, they are fixed and, therefore, copies." CONTU, Final Report 22 (1978). It is interest-
ing to note that this position would seem to lead to the conclusion that electronic
transmission of software is a "sale of a copy" if it is ultimately stored on a fixed media (e.g.,
a computer's hard disk drive). At least one German court came to a different conclusion,
1999 LG Mannheim, CR, 360-62, as further discussed infra note 306 and in the accompa-
nying text.
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upon resale of the purchased work, it is-by itself-not sufficient to
ensure the transferability of computer software. This is where section
117 comes into play.49 Section 117 allows the lawful owner of a copy-
righted computer program to create copies necessary to using the pro-
gram without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner.50
While the First Sale Doctrine exempts the second purchaser of a
software copy from infringement, section 117 attempts to ensure that
a second purchaser will also be entitled to use the copy he purchased.
Thus, if a software publisher sells a copy of a computer program (e.g.,
a word processor) to a purchaser (e.g., a software distributor), the
purchaser can effectively resell the copy to a second purchaser (e.g.,
an end-user such as a consumer), and under sections 109(a) and 117
of the Copyright Act, the second purchaser does not infringe the cop-
yright in the software by purchasing or using the software.
In practice, an end user of a computer program is usually
prompted to accept an end user software license agreement ("EULA")
49. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) provides:
Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs (a) Making of Additional
Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essen-
tial step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a ma-
chine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or
adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed
in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to
be rightful. (b) Lease, Sale, or Other Transfer of Additional Copy or Adaptation.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may
be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the author-
ization of the copyright owner. (c) Machine Maintenance or Repair. Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner or
lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer
program if such copy is made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine that
lawfully contains an authorized copy of the computer program, for purposes only
of maintenance or repair of that machine, if (1) such new copy is used in no
other manner and is destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is
completed; and (2) with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is
not necessary for that machine to be activated, such program or part thereof is
not accessed or used other than to make such new copy by virtue of the activation
of the machine. (d) Definitions. For purposes of this section (1) the "mainte-
nance" of a machine is the servicing of the machine in order to make it work in
accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications
authorized for that machine; and (2) the "repair" of a machine is the restoring of
the machine to the state of working in accordance with its original specifications
and any changes to those specifications authorized for that machine.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 117.
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between himself and the software publisher before he may use a
software copy acquired from a distributor. The end user is confronted
with the EULA either when he opens the packing material (shrink-
wrap license) or as a first screen when he installs the software (click-
wrap license). In the software license agreement, the software
publisher typically purports to grant to the end user the right to use
the software program in consideration of the end user's acceptance of
numerous restrictions, often including an agreement not to resell, re-
verse engineer, or copy the software program (other than a single
backup copy in case the original is destroyed), and it also requires the
user to waive certain statutory warranty rights. In the shrinkwrap or
clickwrap business model, the software publisher usually does not re-
quire the end user to send an express confirmation of acceptance of
the software license agreement to the publisher. Instead, the software
author seems to rely on a theory of implied consent by unilateral of-
fer. The legal theory, explicitly accepted only by a few courts, is that
the end user impliedly accepts the software license agreement by un-
wrapping the packaging materials or by proceeding with the installa-
tion procedure. 51 Although silence cannot be construed as consent in
a commercial context, the purchaser is assumed to have the option of
returning the software at no cost if he rejects the terms of the license
agreement.52 Ironically, the protections under sections 109(a) and
117 against copyright infringement by using or reselling the software
may now have been undermined by the terms of the license agree-
ment (i.e. under the state law of contract), but only if these protec-
tions can be waived by agreement. Would such a contractual
provision, which prohibits the exercise of a right clearly protected by
statute, be valid and enforceable? If so, on what legal theory? Part
III.A addresses these questions.
51. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. See id. Of course, if an end-user already acquires all necessary rights by sections
109 and 117 of the Copyright Act, it appears very doubtful whether he can be deemed to
impliedly accept a license agreement under which he does not acquire any relevant rights
but primarily accepts disclaimers and waives rights. Also, the widespread use of "restocking
fees" by retailers undermines this legal theory, but no court has so far addressed this obvi-
ous problem. With ProCD, the Seventh Circuit even seemed unaware of this common busi-
ness practice. In any case, the theory of unilateral offer does not traditionally work in such
a situation because, in order to accept a unilateral offer, the offeree must eventually notify
the offeror of his acceptance (unless the offer explicitly waives such notice, which rarely
occurs in software sales offers). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54(2) (1979). It
may be this failure that has caused courts such as ProCD to attempt to salvage the contract
by characterizing the sale of software as a sale of goods subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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B. Sale Versus Other Forms of Commercialization
Like the jewelry owner, the owner of a copyright to a computer
program can "sell" (i.e., assign) his copyright to another person. Alter-
natively, the owner of the copyright on a computer program can also
retain his copyright and merely sell the right to make a certain num-
ber of additional copies of the program. For example, an author and
owner of a word processing program can sell ten copies of the pro-
gram on ten CDs, each containing one copy of the software, to a com-
pany for a fixed fee. When the company expands, it may require five
additional software copies. Instead of shipping additional copies, the
company can buy the right to create five additional copies for an addi-
tional fixed fee. Given the negligible value of the carrier media, in this
case, CDs that may cost twenty cents each, the purchase price is un-
likely to depend on whether the software owner ships additional CDs
or merely grants the right to make five copies. 53 From a commercial
perspective, the software seller and the software purchaser reach ex-
actly the same result: they exchange five software copies for a fixed
fee. In one alternative-shipment of the multiple CDs-the software
owner sells a tangible good containing software, and in the other al-
ternative-granting of the right to make a certain number of addi-
tional copies-the software owner sells an intangible right only.
The question, then, is whether the First Sale Doctrine applies to
both transactions, or whether, in drafting section 109(a), Congress in-
tended only a "material object"5 4 to qualify as a "copy," the resale of
which is protected by the First Sale Doctrine. Analytically, both are
"copies" because both must ultimately be fixed in a material object,
generally the hard disk drive (or at least the RAM) of an additional
computer. To apply the First Sale Doctrine does not require the sale
of a material object containing the work; it requires lawful ownership
of such an object. It is very possible that a software purchaser does not
receive multiple CDs in the mail, in spite of receiving a license to use
multiple copies of the work, but he does ultimately receive those cop-
ies, which he makes himself, and that are finally embedded on multi-
ple material objects, whether they be computer hard disk drives or
RAM chips in various computers. The only other difference between
the transactions is the pro forma exchange of a nearly valueless carrier
media. It does not appear that the First Sale Doctrine applies. Yet, as
53. Actually, the primary costs of selling additional copies of software come from the
cost of printing manuals and attractive boxes, and from overhead (e.g., shipping, shelf and
storage space, etc.).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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discussed below, the great majority of courts in the United States seem
to take a different perspective on this issue by characterizing the
software transfer alternatively as a "sale" or a "license."
Traditionally, the term "license" describes the granting of certain
rights that the licensor has the power to withhold, e.g., the right to
enter upon real property, or the right to exercise certain regulated
privileges such as driving. 55 The generality of the term "license"
means that it does not normally imply any particular manner of use,
exploitation, or commercialization. Therefore, a "license" and a "sale"
are not opposite terms. Rather, their difference is a matter of either
nature or scope. A license can be a grant of rights unrelated to any
transfer of property rights (e.g., the right to drive). In this case, a li-
cense transfers nothing except the privilege not to be encumbered
with an action at law (e.g., for driving without a license). Alternatively,
a license can be a grant of limited property rights; limited, because a
full grant of property rights is a sale. But here, with the exception of
real property,56 the limited scope of the license must be temporal.
Thus, if the nature of a sale is that property is permanently exchanged
for a consideration, then the primary alternative concept with respect
to tangible property seems to be that of a lease.57
In a lease, property is transferred only temporarily. Originally,
the 1976 Copyright Act provided that renting a legally owned copy of
a copyrighted work to another party is not infringement.58 The rental
of software could only result in contributory infringement of the copy-
right if the lessor knew that the lessee would use the leased copy to
infringe.59 Otherwise, the purchaser of a copy of software was free to
resell, rent, or otherwise dispose of that particular copy as he or she
saw fit,6° However, the 1990 Computer Software Rental Act 61 over-
turned that rule by amending section 109(b) of the Copyright Act to
55. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 919-20 (7th ed. 1999).
56. A license with respect to real property can be limited with respect to scope without
limiting the period of the license. For example, one can grant a perpetual easement, i.e.,
the right to traverse one's real property but not to create or leave any structure on it.
57. To the best knowledge of the authors, this point was first made in Rice, supra note
9, at 167, 186-87. As Rice put it, "the existence or nonexistence of a temporal limit is a
critical factor in determining if a copy transfer was effected by a sale or involved the trans-
fer of a lesser possessory interest." Id. See also id. at 170 ("If the outcome of a negotiation is
in fact a lease, the customer will not acquire the status and privileges of a copy owner.").
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
59. See Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000).
61. Pub. L. No. 101-650 Tit. VIII, § 802, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 (1990).
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prohibit any owner of a copy of software to rent or lease that software
to a third party without permission of the licensor, if the copy owner's
purpose is to compete directly or indirectly with the owner of the cop-
yright.62 Copyright owners remain free to "lease" their software and
define the license terms accordingly. But the fact that a license accom-
panies the lease of the software copy does not turn the lease into
"nothing but a license." The transaction will presumably retain all the
characteristics of a lease, and be referred to accordingly as a "lease of
a copy under a license."
The "rental" (i.e., lease) of certain types of software is fairly com-
mon. Some businesses rent computers that are preloaded with an op-
erating system that the businesses lease from the computer rental
company. A "rental" or "lease" of a copy of software is different from a
sale for three reasons. First, the lessee must return or destroy the
rented copy of software (i.e., the program code and often the carrier
media as well) after a period of time determined by contract, while
the purchaser of a copy of software owns that copy in perpetuity. Sec-
ond, the lessor retains tide to the rented "copy" of software through-
out the period of the lessee's possession of it (again, the program
code and often the carrier media as well). Third, payment for a sale of
a software copy is almost always in the form of a one-time fee, while
payment for the lease of software usually corresponds in magnitude to
the duration of the lease.
These characteristics of a lease tell nothing about the license to
use the software. A license can have almost any attributes; the im-
mense flexibility of the license, which allows the licensor to fashion his
own terms while maintaining his statutory rights, is one of the primary
characteristics of intellectual property protection. Placing limitations
upon the licensee's or lessee's use of the work is inevitable in both
license and lease. A lessor generally restrains the lessee from selling
the copy without his permission, and because the lessee never takes
title to the copy, this restraint does not implicate the common law
hostility to restraints on alienation or the First Sale Doctrine. In prac-
tice, most software licenses accompanying the transfer of a copy of a
work (e.g., mass market consumer software licenses) are perpetual
and never require the licensee to renew the license or else return or
destroy the copy of the program or the carrier media upon which it
was originally encoded at the time of sale. On the other hand, some
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (A). The Act did make exceptions for educational and
library rentals, firmware not copied in the ordinary use of the hardware, and software for
video game consoles.
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licenses, usually for business-to-business software sales, terminate after
the expiration of a predetermined period of time. In such cases, the
terms of the license will almost always require the licensee to return or
destroy all copies of the work, just as if the software were leased and
no transfer of title to either the carrier media or the software copy
itself occurs.
To the extent that courts have distinguished between a "sale" and
a "license" based upon the perpetuity vel non of the transfer of posses-
sion of the software copy or the one-time (as opposed to recurring)
payment of a lump sum fee (as opposed to royalties calculated based
on revenue percentages, or the length of the time period of use), it is
unclear how courts would then differentiate a "license" of software
from a "lease" of software. For if a sale is perpetual, a lease is tempo-
rary, and a license can be temporary or perpetual, a court must look
to other factors to determine when a temporary transfer of rights con-
stitutes a license and when a lease.
II. Applicability of the First Sale Doctrine to Software
Transfers Under United States Law
Thus, the main questions addressed in this Article are: (1) What
is the effect of a contractual agreement between two parties that states
neither the purchaser nor licensee may resell its copy of the software?
And, more fundamentally: (2) Under what circumstances does the
transfer of the right to make a copy of computer software qualify as a
"sale of a copy" for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine?
A. The First Sale Doctrine in the United States Copyright Acts
Under section 202 of the Copyright Act,63 the transfer of owner-
ship of "any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyrighted work embodied in the object" or transfer ownership of
the copyright.64 Similarly, as described above, the transfer of the copy-
right (or exclusive rights in the copyright) does not necessarily trans-
fer ownership of any material object in which the copyright is
expressed or embodied. The First Sale Doctrine applies to sales of
63. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. chs.
1-8, 10-12 (2000)). Section 117 was amended four years later to clarify that copies of
computer software necessary for use of that software by the lawful owner of a copy of the
software does not constitute infringement. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000)).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
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copies of a copyrighted work, as long as the copies are ultimately fixed
in a material object.65 The modern expression of the Doctrine is set
forth in section 109 of the 1976 Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.
66
As noted above, 67 the First Sale Doctrine was well established in
the common law long before its present incarnation in the 1976 Act.
It was first codified in the 1909 Copyright Act as section 27, in re-
sponse to a Supreme Court ruling. In that case, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus,68 the plaintiff had sold books to R.H. Macy & Co. with a mini-
mum resale price restraint of one dollar per book. A notice was
printed on each book stating that any violation of the resale price
maintenance provision would constitute infringement of the book's
copyright.69 When Macy's sold the book at a lower price, the copyright
owner sued for infringement. In upholding Macy's First Sale defense,
the court rejected the infringement claim, reasoning that the right to
vend only encompasses the right to set the terms of the initial sale and
not the right to control the terms of future sales.70 The Bobbs-Merrill
Co. decision effectively immunized a distributor (and any subsequent
purchaser) from copyright infringement for reselling a book contrary
to a provision of the original or prior sales agreement.
One year after the Bobbs-Merrill Co. decision was published, Con-
gress enacted a new copyright law. The 1909 Copyright Act, upon
which the 1976 Copyright Act is based, had a provision similar to the
First Sale Doctrine in section 27: "[N]othing in this title shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work, the possession of which has been lawfully ob-
65. See supra text accompanying note 54.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). Section 109(b) of the Act forbids the commercial lease
or lending of copies of computer programs or phonorecords by owners of copies without
authorization from the copyright owner. See id.
67. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
68. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
69. Resale price maintenance is the practice of a manufacturer or upper tier distribu-
tor setting a maximum or minimum price restraint on the resale of its goods to a lower tier
distributor. The use of resale price maintenance generally carries antitrust consequences.
See generally Peter Sullivan, Albrecht Is Finally Overruled: So What's the Big Deal?, ANTIrRUST
REP.,Jan. 1998, at 2; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Oil Co. v. Khan: A New Regime for Resale
Price Maintenance?, ANTITRUST REP., Jan. 1998, at 14.
70. See Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 351.
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tained."'71 The phrasing of the 1909 Act appeared neutral regarding
contractual restrictions on the disposition of copies that had been pre-
viously sold, but the purpose of the provision was stated in the House
Report. The codification was "not intended to change in any way the
existing law, but simply to recognize the distinction, long established,
between the material object and the right to produce copies
thereof."72 The repugnance at the attempts by copyright owners to
control the disposition of copies after their initial disposition was pal-
pable: "[I] t would be most unwise to permit the copyright proprietor
to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject of
copyright after said proprietor has made the first sale." 73 Thus, the
legislative history seems to indicate that the 1909 Act was intended to
preempt any attempt to limit the right of resale by contract. Thus,
under the 1909 Act, the First Sale Doctrine would apply regardless of
any contractual agreements.
It was not until 1967, when Congress began reconsideration of
the 1909 Act, that a need for a more modern copyright statute that
would encompass new media such as television and consumer tape
recorders was perceived. To ensure that the Copyright Act adequately
dealt with new technology, Senator John McClellan introduced a bill
to establish a National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyright Works74 ("CONTU"). Congress passed the bill in 1974, es-
tablishing a three year mandate for CONTU to study how the 1909
Copyright Act should be revised to accommodate new technology
such as photocopying and computer use. 75 Although a new Copyright
Act was passed with a revised First Sale Doctrine in 1976, the Act was
amended in 1980 to incorporate two significant changes suggested by
CONTU. 76 One change was the addition of a definition of "computer
program" in section 101, 7 7 and the other change was the creation of
the new section 117, ensuring a right to make copies of software nec-
essary for the use of the software.
In contrast to the 1909 Act's neutral wording regarding contrac-
tual restrictions on the resale of used copyrighted works, the 1976 Act
states affirmatively that the lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted
71. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909).
72. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 19 (1909).
73. Id.
74. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
75. See CONTU, Final Report 4 (1978).
76. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2000)).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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work "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."78 The 1976 Act is
more explicit in endowing the copy owner with a positive right to sell
the copy. The new language implies that Congress would consider
void any contractual restraints on the disposition of a lawfully ac-
quired copy, i.e., a "material object ... in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device." 79 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee apparently did not wish to make any radical changes in the law,
but did wish to ensure that the Doctrine applied to future technolo-
gies. "As a basic condition of copyright protection, the bill perpetuates
the existing requirement that a work be fixed in a 'tangible medium
of expression,' and adds that this medium may be one 'now known or
later developed' . "... .8 However, unlike the legislative history of the
1909 version of the First Sale Doctrine, the House Report on section
109 states that the First Sale Doctrine does not mean that conditions
on future disposition of copies, imposed by a contract between their
buyer and seller, would be unenforceable under state commercial law
or the common law of contracts. Instead, the House Report suggests
that the seller would need to enforce the restrictions under a theory
of breach of contract, rather than copyright infringement.8 ' While a
copyright owner is thus not able to agree with a first purchaser that
the First Sale Doctrine shall not apply, the 1976 Copyright Act appar-
ently is not intended to prevent the first purchaser from promising
not to resell the copy.
If the House Report were considered the definitive interpretive
resource, the result would be that parties could agree in a contract
that-as between them-the purchaser is obligated to refrain from
reselling a copy of a computer program. The inapplicability of a copy-
right infringement remedy has several important implications. First,
equitable remedies such as an injunction are generally not available
for a breach of contract where money damages would remedy the
harm.8 2 Nevertheless, the Copyright Act confers an automatic right
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
80. H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 52 (1976).
81. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 5693 (1976). See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4 at 1282;
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180,1187 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1977) ("If a vendee breaches an
agreement not to sell the copy, he may be liable for the breach but he is not guilty of
infringement.").
82. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974).
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upon copyright owners to enjoin infringing acts.8 3 Second, damages
for breach of contract generally include only actual direct and indi-
rect damages, while the copyright owner may recover high statutory
damages and attorneys' fees from an infringer. 84 Third, intentional
infringement of a copyright raises the possibility of criminal proceed-
ings being instituted against the infringer,85 while breach of contract
provides no such possibility. Finally, any party that violates the license
terms of a copyright infringes that copyright and thereby incurs liabil-
ity to the copyright owner. Alternatively, a contract can only bind par-
ties in privity, therefore a third party that purchases from a seller in
violation of the seller's contractual obligations to the copyright owner
incurs no liability to the copyright owner whatsoever. Of course, the
first seller may have a claim against the second purchaser for tortious
interference with a contract, but this claim does not give rise to statu-
tory damages and the plaintiff (the first seller) must show that the
defendant (the second purchaser) knew of the contract provision at
issue and intentionally induced the breach. 86 For example, if the first
purchaser resold his software copy in breach of contract, the second
purchaser would acquire the ownership to the software copy even
against the will of the copyright owner and such second sale would not
constitute an infringement of the copyright owner's copyright or give
rise to any cause of action by the copyright owner against the second
purchaser. Notwithstanding the importance of the difference between
copyright infringement and breach of contract, as discussed below in
Part III.A, the First Sale Doctrine is important because it excludes any
action by the copyright owner for breach of contract by virtue of a
resale of a lawfully owned copy of software.8 7
This will answer the first question posed in Part I.B above: The
copyright owner and the first purchaser of a software copy cannot val-
idly agree that the First Sale Doctrine will not apply. However, the
second question remains: under what circumstances does the First
Sale Doctrine apply? If a software manufacturer labels the standard
contract as a "license agreement" containing a clause to the effect that
"the parties agree that this is a license and not a sale," should the
characterization of the agreement by the parties govern, or should
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
84. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-505 (2000).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000).
86. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
87. Cf Rice, supra note 9, at 170 ("What is effectively foreclosed [by the First Sale
Doctrine] is only the use of the contract to expand the statutory copyright monopoly and
the transformation of breach of contract into copyright infringement,").
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some objective criteria be applied to determine whether the Copy-
right Act mandates that the license agreement be treated as a "sale of
a copy" for First Sale Doctrine purposes?
The answer to this question is not obvious. "License agreements"
usually contain clauses that are familiar from a sales context as well as
their own unique terms. Usually, as with a sales contract, the end user
may keep his copy perpetually and pay a lump sum for the software.
However, the software manufacturer normally limits the way the user
may utilize his software copy and prohibits the user from selling his
copy. Neither the Dictionary Act 88 nor the Copyright Act defines the
term "license agreement." Before focusing on the few efforts under-
taken by United States courts to resolve this issue, it may be helpful to
examine the substantial case law in other fields ofjurisprudence: com-
mercial law and section 117.
B. Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence of Software
Transfers
The issue of what constitutes a sale of a software copy, as opposed
to a license of software, has arisen in many contexts. A common and
critical distinction that courts have made in this regard is whether a
sale of a copy of software is a "sale" or a "license" for several purposes:
determining the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code; ap-
plying "sales tax" or "royalties tax" or gaining the investment tax
credit;89 applying strict product liability law;90 applying bankruptcy
laws, 91 and determining patent and trademark exhaustion. Not sur-
prisingly, given the different purposes of the underlying statutes,92 the
88. See 1 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2000).
89. See, e.g., Comshare Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 1994).
90. See, e.g.,James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 810-11 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
91. Microsoft v. DAK, 66 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining that a distribu-
tion license agreement, under which a licensee has to pay a lump sum amount for every
copy of Word 95 that the licensee creates, is "basically a sale, not a license to use."). See also
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY §§ 7.40-7.173 (3d ed. looseleaf,
current as of 2001).
92. The Uniform Commercial Code was designed to facilitate commercial transac-
tions by implementing a legal regime that reproduces, to the extent feasible, the customs
of purchasers and sellers of goods. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 302-40 (1973); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN L. REV. 621, 626 (1975). In defining what constitute "goods" for
purposes of applying the UCC, courts have properly focused on traditional legal principles
of personal property. The First Sale Doctrine, by contrast, has the wholly different statutory
purpose of limiting the copyright owner's ability to constrain the resale of a copy of com-
puter software, thereby protecting the purchaser's expectation of continued ownership
and alienability of the software. The UCC definition of goods embodies custom, while the
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criteria behind judicial determinations of what constitutes a "sale" and
a "license" differ in these analyses from that undertaken for First Sale
Doctrine purposes. This subsection will briefly examine the most volu-
minous area ofjudicial analysis-the application of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code-in order to reveal the reasoning that motivates the
distinction between sale and license, and to determine whether that
reasoning may equally apply to, or otherwise illuminate, section
109(a).
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") applies
mainly to sales of "goods" in commerce. It is therefore interesting to
consider how courts have applied the UCC to transfers of software
copies that the parties call (or, more often, the transferring party
calls) a "license."93 If it is true that a software license agreement con-
stitutes a sale of goods for UCC purposes, then the reasons for this
designation may aid in deciding whether such transactions also consti-
tute a sale for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine. 94
Of course, the cases applying the UCC and the First Sale Doctrine
base their holdings on legal doctrines existing within differing statu-
tory frameworks. When determining whether to apply the UCC, the
pertinent issue is usually whether the transfer of a software copy is a
"sale of goods" or a "sale of a service" or a "lease of goods." More
precisely, the UCC uses the term "transaction" in section 2-102, which
seems to imply that Article 2 applies to any transaction involving trans-
First Sale Doctrine is a purchaser protection measure. The former attempts to increase the
efficiency of commercial transactions by arriving at the solution the parties would have
negotiated in the absence of the statute, while the latter attempts to put certain aspects of a
sale beyond negotiation.
93. The question of whether the UCC should apply to software has received extensive
treatment in scholarly literature. See, e.g., Douglas E. Phillips, When Software Fails: Emerging
Standards of Vendor Liability Under the Uni[orm Commercial Code, 50 Bus. LAw. 151 (1994);
Amelia H. Boss et al., Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code: Survey of Computer Contracting
Cases, 43 Bus. LAw. 1513 (1988); David A. Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code to Computer Contracts, 14 N. Ky. L. REV. 277 (1987); Andrew Rodau, Com-
puter Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply , 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986);
Robert A. Holmes, Application of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer Systems
Acquisitions, 9 RUTCERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1982).
94. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229-30 (D.
Utah 1997) (vacated in part on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999)) ("This Court
holds that transactions making up the distribution chain from [plaintiff/licensor] through
[defendant/licensee] to the end-users are 'sales' governed by the U.C.C. Therefore, the
first sale doctrine applies.").
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fer of title,9 5 except this does not include assignments of intangibles
such as copyrights and patents.
Insofar as a "software copy" is itself a "good," it can be sold.
Goods are defined in the UCC as "all things ... which are movable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale. ''9 6 All carrier media
(such as DVDs, CDs, and diskettes) and data in the form of electronic
or optical pulses can be moved. Thus, the transfer of a software copy
could also theoretically qualify as a sale of goods for purposes of the
UCC and most jurisdictions do in fact apply the UCC to software li-
cense agreements in most cases.9 7 As one court put it, software is gen-
erally considered a "good" for UCC purposes "even though a finished
software product may reflect a substantial investment of programming
services."98 Courts that have interpreted software licenses to be subject
to the UCC have not always conditioned that treatment upon the si-
multaneous sale of hardware or tangible media.99 In other words, it is
possible that a court would hold that a "sale" of a copy of software
downloaded from the Internet or a bulletin board server ("BBS")
would constitute a "sale of goods" for UCC purposes, even though the
software was not sold on a diskette, compact disc, DVD, or other tangi-
ble media, and even though no hard copy of any manual accompa-
nied the sale.100 However, the issue remains judicially undecided.
In two 1991 cases, Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.10 1 and Step-
Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology,10 2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Pennsylvania UCC to
software licenses. In Advent Systems, the plaintiff, a computer software
publisher, agreed to provide software, hardware, and certain sales and
95. See Hertz Comm. Leasing Corp. v. Transp. Credit Clearing House, Inc., 298
N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (lst Dep't
1970).
96. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2001).
97. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), rev k908 F. Supp. 640
(W.D. Wis. 1996); StephenJ. Sand, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Com-
puter Software Licensing Agreements, 38 A.L.R. 5th 1, 20-21 (1998) (citing 20 cases in which
the UCC was either directly or indirectly held to apply to agreements involving computer
software licenses); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986).
98. Comm. Groups, Inc. v. Warner Comm., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
99. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-54.
100. This would change if a state were to adopt the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act ("UCITA"). See National Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State L., Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act § 103 (July 29, 1999), at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucitaAMD.htm.
101. 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
102. 939 F.2d 91, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1991).
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marketing services to the defendant in a pair of contracts. 10 3 Later,
the defendant determined that it would prefer to develop its own
software and, accordingly, terminated its agreements with the plain-
tiff. 10 4 The district court had ruled that UCC Article 2 did not apply to
the agreements. 10 5 Instead the court found that the centrality of the
provision of services in the agreements outweighed the provision of
goods. The software, customized to a significant degree for the defen-
dant's needs, derived most of its value of the customization service
that the plaintiff had provided to the defendant.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. The appellate court first
noted that the agreement provided that the defendant "desires to
purchase" and the plaintiff "desires to sell . . . certain . . . software
licenses." 106 The court then explained that the UCC defines "goods"
as all things moveable at the time of identification for sale.10 7 Because
the software at issue was encoded on carrier media, it was movea-
ble. 108 The court analogized the "sale" of software on a carrier media
to the sale of a music CD or book. For example, live music or a live
lecture, not being fixed on a carrier medium, is not a good, but it
becomes one when fixed on a CD or book. Thus, the court reasoned
that software is not a "good" until fixed on a diskette or CD.1t19 The
district court erred, in the Third Circuit's view, by assuming that spe-
cific tailoring of the software for the defendant's purposes constituted
a "service," because the UCC defines "goods" to include "specially
manufactured goods." 110 Although the court claimed that it was not
departing from the traditional practice of determining whether
"goods" or "services" predominated in a contract as a precondition to
applying the UCC, its holding seemed to imply that computer
software, no matter how customized it may be, is a UCC "good" as
long as it is fixed in a tangible carrier medium. The question of
whether software downloaded electronically is a "good" was left open
by the court.
In Step-Saver, a commercial purchaser had placed telephone or-
ders with the software publisher and followed with written purchase
103. See Advent Sys., Ltd., 925 F.2d at 671.
104. See id. at 672.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 674.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 675 (citing UCC § 2-105).
109. See id.
110. Id.
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orders."' The publisher sent the software with shrinkwrap licenses
containing a highly limited warranty. The purchaser read the licenses,
but ignored them. When the software proved defective, the purchaser
sued. In its own defense, the publisher pointed to the limited warranty
incorporated into the shrinkwrap license. If the license bound the
parties, the copyright owner could minimize its liability. However, if
the contract was formed at the time of sale (before the purchaser had
read the shrinkwrap license), the normal UCC contract remedies
would apply. The preliminary issue was what body of law governed the
decision of when the contract was formed-during the course of the
telephone ordering conversation or upon opening the box? If the
transfer of the software copy was a sale of goods, then the UCC would
govern. Otherwise, the transaction may have constituted a sale of ser-
vices or another form of commercial transaction governed by the state
common law of contracts. The Third Circuit briefly noted that a
boxed copy of a program had been transferred for a payment and it
therefore held that the contract was formed under UCC section 2-207,
which meant that material terms were not modifiable in the "last shot"
standard form. In other words, the court affirmed that the contract
was a sale of a copy of software for UCC purposes. While the parties
argued mainly about the distinction between a sale of goods and a sale
of services, the holding implies that the transaction could not fall
under any other additional category such as a lease, to which UCC
Article 2 does not apply. For purposes of the UCC, the software trans-
fer constituted a sale as opposed to a license.
That holding has been repeated widely outside the Third Circuit
since 1991.112 However, in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,"1 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a different
approach, affirming the applicability of UCC Article 2 to software
transfer transactions in which the provision of goods predominate
over services. In ProCD, the software acquirer read a shrinkwrap li-
cense agreement that instructed the acquirer to return the product if
he did not agree to the terms of the license.' 14 The acquirer did not
agree, but kept the software on the theory that the license agreement
was an unenforceable contract of adhesion. 15 The district court held
that the acquirer rightfully rejected the shrinkwrap license agreement.
111. See Step-Saver v. Wyse, 939 F.2d 91, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1991).
112. See, e.g., NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D.
Okla. 1997); VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 610 n.1 (1994).
113. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), revg 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
114. See id. at 1452-53.
115. See id. at 1453.
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According to that court, a sale of the software copy occurred at the
time of payment, before the purchaser had even read the terms of the
license agreement. Crucial to this holding was the court's finding that
the UCC governed the transaction in question. The court tried to dis-
tinguish between a UCC "sale" and a non-UCC "license" of software
based upon the characteristics of the transaction. The district court
concluded that a sale has the following characteristics:
1. Purchasers of mass-market software pay a single purchase price
rather than a series of royalties;
2. The software publisher does not retain title to the "product" as a
security interest; and
3. The rights of the licensee to the software copy are perpetual,
like the rights of a purchaser pursuant to a sale.1 16
Because the transaction at bar was a sale, the UCC applied, and any
act manifesting assent to the offer (i.e., the failure to return the
software) constituted assent to all the terms of the offer. 1 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.' 18 While the circuit
court upheld the district court's application of the UCC, it differenti-
ated between the commercial (business to business) settings in other
cases, that had almost uniformly invalidated shrinkwrap license agree-
ments, and the consumer setting in the case before it. Without provid-
ing a detailed explanation, the court ruled that commercial license
agreements, in which the bargaining power of parties is more likely to
be equal, should afford the licensee greater protection than consumer
license agreements, in which the licensee is generally at a disadvan-
tage in bargaining power. The court further stated that shrinkwrap
agreements are "private transactions" that "affect only their
parties." 119
116. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
117. The Seventh Circuit's decision in ProCD has been praised for injecting "commer-
cial reality" into software sales. See Darren C. Baker, Note, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial
Reality, flexibility in Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrink-
wrap Licenses, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 379 (1997). However, the true commercial reality is that a
purchaser of a software copy who, after reading the undesirable license terms, returns the
software, must generally pay a "restocking fee" of some 5%-25% of the purchase price to
the retailer, who acts on the theory that a sale was made at the time of payment. Moreover,
even if returning the software were a cost-free option, virtually all of the licensor's competi-
tors impose identical license provisions, leaving consumers with no choice but to comply
with the shrinkwrap provisions regardless of whether they agree with them. It would be
strange to conclude that this is either an efficient or an equitable result.
118. See ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996), rev' 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.
1996).
119. Id. at 1454.
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The Seventh Circuit has not ruled on whether a software license
that was a sale for UCC purposes could nonetheless evade the First
Sale Doctrine. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, merely stated
that "[w]hether there are legal differences between 'contracts' and
'licenses' (which may matter under the copyright doctrine of first
sale) is a subject for another day."1 20
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has specified a transfer of a software
copy as a sale of goods subject to UCC in the much-cited case, RRX
Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. 121 In that case, the purchaser of a com-
puter software system brought an action for breach of contract against
the seller based on defects in the system.1 22 After finding that the
software was so defective as to constitute a breach of contract, the dis-
trict court looked to the California Commercial Code to determine
whether to award consequential damages to the purchaser. a23 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit called upon Seventh Circuit precedent to es-
tablish that it should look to "the essence of the agreement" to
determine whether it was a sale of "goods" rather than "services."1 24
The court followed the tradition of weighing whether the sale aspects
or the service aspects of the contract predominated. 125 A fact-based
analysis, taking into consideration the pre-established nature of the
software programs, led to the conclusion that the provision of training
and other services was incidental to the sale of the software as
goods. 126 The court therefore held that the UCC applied to the con-
tract.127 District courts throughout the country agree with this inter-
pretation. For example, when a copyright holder argued that it sold a
nontransferable license, not "the software itself," and therefore should
not be subject to the UCC, an Arizona district court responded that
120. Id. at 1449. In the view of at least one publicist, the result of the court's ruling, and
in particularJudge Easterbrook's bizarre implication that the characterization of copyright
license agreements for UCC purposes has no broad social effects, is to encourage courts to
overlook the potential for undermining the Copyright Act's careful balance between the
protection of intellectual property as an incentive for its creation and the freedom of pub-
lic access to information for the good of society. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copy-
right and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283, 383-85 (1996).
121. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 546.
124. Id. (citing Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572, 581 n.6 (7th Cir. 1976)).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 546-47.
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the UCC applies to software licenses just as much as it applies to sales
of goods.128
The cases where courts have reasoned that a "license" is a "sale"
for purposes of the UCC due to policy considerations that are com-
mon to both the UCC and the Copyright Act are noteworthy because
they may shed light on when and why an agreement should be consid-
ered a sale or a license (or both) for First Sale Doctrine purposes. The
consensus of courts assessing the applicability of the UCC to software
transfers base their analyses upon whether support services accompa-
nying the software sale outweigh the software sale itself, or if the provi-
sion of services otherwise dominated the contract, or whether the
software was sold as a prepublished package (i.e., as a good). It is as
yet unclear whether courts would apply this same distinction for First
Sale Doctrine purposes, but .at least one court has assumed that what
must be a sale of software as goods under the UCC must be a sale of
copies of software for First Sale Doctrine purposes as well. 129 The ma-
jority of courts continue to base their analyses on the relative impor-
tance of the "services" and "goods" components of the contract, which
seems largely irrelevant for First Sale Doctrine purposes. This is all the
more evident because the applicability of the UCC and the First Sale
Doctrine are governed by different policy considerations.
The consequences to the licensor's avoidance of characterizing
the transfer of a copy of software as a UCC sale of goods are very
significant. First, as in Lab-Con, damages (such as, in that case, conse-
quential damages) provided for in the UCC but not in the common
law of contracts become unobtainable. Perhaps more seriously for
consumers of mass-market software, the general UCC provisions that
ensure a balanced interpretation of the contract and negate under-
handed attempts to disclaim liability for wrongful acts would not pro-
tect purchasers.130  Moreover, the Magnuson-Moss Consumer
Warranty Act 31 may be held inapplicable, as it only applies to warran-
ties for the "sale of a consumer product," which is defined as "tangible
personal property which is distributed in commerce."132 Software con-
sidered a sale of services for UCC purposes may not qualify as a sale of
128. See Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 761-63 (D.
Ariz. 1993).
129. SeeNovell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229-30 (D. Utah
1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999).
130. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (2001) (providing that a warranty of merchantability is
implicit in any sale contract unless explicitly disclaimed).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1)(6).
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goods under the Magnuson-Moss Act because it does not fit within the
definition of a "sale of a consumer product."
On the other hand, if a court infers from the characterization of
a software transfer that it is a "sale of services," then the First Sale
Doctrine does not apply, 133 and the transferee becomes liable for cop-
yright infringement by selling the software contrary to the terms of
the license. These two areas of the law have one similarity: software
manufacturers are trying to avoid the characterization of the transfer
of software copies as a sale, because such characterization leads to the
applicability of potentially disadvantageous laws such as implied war-
ranty and liability provisions under the UCC, the Magnuson-Moss Act,
and the First Sale Doctrine under copyright laws. It is therefore worth
noting that courts applying the UCC seem to assume a sale of goods
whenever a software copy is transferred perpetually against a lump
sum payment, regardless how the parties to the transfer agreement
label the transaction. Whether it is titled "License Agreement" or
"Purchase Agreement," courts usually assume that a sale occurred for
purposes of the UCC if a physical software copy is transferred in
perpetuity for a lump sum payment.
C. Software Transfers Under Section 117 of the 1976
Copyright Act
Section 117 provides that it is not an infringement of a copyright
to make an unlicensed copy of a software program "as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine." 134 The section was added to the code in 1980 to prevent
the loading of a software program into random access memory, which
creates a copy of the program as recorded either on the CD, hard disk
drive, read only memory ("ROM") chip, or other media, from infring-
ing the copyright. 135 Similar to the First Sale Doctrine, section 117
applies only to "owners of a copy" of software. According to that
section,
It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or ad-
aptation of that computer program provided: ... that such copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
133. See e.g., Novell 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
135. A typical case applying section 117 is Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 857 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner.1 36
In order to determine the applicability of this provision, courts
have asked "whether end-users . .. are 'owners' of the software, or
merely 'licensees' thereof."'13 7 Courts applying the UCC tend to find
that the transferees are "owners of a copy" for purposes of section 117
as well as section 109.138
In MA! Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,'3 9 MAI, a computer
manufacturer that published its own proprietary operating system, in-
cluded with the software a license agreement prohibiting its custom-
ers from making the software available to any third party. 140 At some
point, some of MAI's customers switched from using MAI's services
for repair and maintenance of the hardware to those of an indepen-
dent service provider, Peak. Knowing that Peak had to use MAI's oper-
ating system to boot the computer, MAI sued Peak for infringement of
the software copyrights, claiming that the copy made into RAM consti-
tuted an unlawful copy.' 4' In spite of section 117, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld MAI's contention, finding Peak to have in-
fringed the copyrights. Citing a prior lower court decision, 42 the
Ninth Circuit stated in a footnote that, because MAI "licensed its
software, the Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software
and are not eligible for protection under section 117."'4 3 The court
made no attempt to determine whether the transaction between MAI
and the acquirers of copies of MAI software constituted a sale. 144 In-
stead, the court relied exclusively on the fact that MAI labeled the
standard agreement under which it transferred its software as a "li-
cense agreement," not as a "sales agreement.' 145 Yet, because the use
of the term "license agreement" is a much more common practice in
the industry than the use of the term "sales agreement" or "purchase
agreement," the practical effect of the Ninth Circuit's holding was to
136. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
137. Novell, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
138. See, e.g., id. at 1230.
139. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See id. at 517.
141. See id. at 518.
142. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
143. MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
144. See id. at 517.
145. Id.
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nullify section 117 except in those relatively rare cases where the par-
ties had not termed the contract a "licensing agreement."146
The MAJ decision was not the last word on the application of
section 117 to license agreements. In DSC Communications Corp. v.
Pulse Communications, Inc.,147 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia expressly disregarded such labeling.' 4
The facts of the case involved a transfer of "POTS-DI" software copies
from the plaintiff DSC to a number of Regional Bell Operating Com-
panies ("RBOC").149 Defendant Pulse and the RBOCs had made cop-
ies of plaintiff DSC's POTS-DI software in connection with replacing
certain hardware supplied by DSC with hardware supplied by Pulse.' 50
Pulse argued that the defendants had the right to make such copies
146. Moreover, because federal law does not distinguish between a "license" and a
"sale" (indeed, does not directly govern matters such as sales), the court used state law to
preempt federal policy in contradiction to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Ac-
cording to the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and the laws of federal government are
the supreme law of the land. Conflicting state legislation must give way in an area of fed-
eral competence, such as the protection of intellectual property. The congressional objec-
tive in promulgating section 117 was to ensure that owners of intellectual property could
not indirectly tie the market for their software to the market for hardware or repair services
by prohibiting otherwise lawful copies to be made. By calling upon a state law distinction
(which is in any case fictitious) between a contract for the "sale of a copy of software" and a
"software license," the Ninth Circuit completely ignored a consequential constitutional in-
firmity in its ruling.
However, this was touched on obliquely in Central Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software
& Accessories, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). In that case, a licensee of certain
software, prevented by the Computer Software Rental Act from renting his software, sold it
to customers at a low fee, then bought it back when the customer finished using it. Upon
suit for copyright infringement, the licensee claimed that, under pertinent state law, the
sale was a true sale and not a rental or disguised lease. The court refused, however, to
examine the state law issue. The court would not let state law determine the outcome of an
infringement action brought under a federal statute. See id. at 964-65.
147. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359
(E.D. Vir. 1997), afrd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 923 (1999).
148. See id. at 362-63.
149. DSC sued its competitor, Pulse, on a theory of contributory copyright infringe-
ment. DSC manufactures telephone routing hardware and software, particularly digital car-
rier loop systems ("DCL"). DCLs are composed of a backplane, which holds expansion
cards and uses a software operating system to route and convert telephone signals. Pulse
manufactured expansion cards for DSC's hardware systems and competed with DSC in the
expansion card market. To avoid competition in the expansion card market for its DCLs,
DSC had inserted a provisions in its license that forbade its licensees to: (1) use DSC
software on hardware created by a party other than DSC, or (2) transfer their copies of
software to a third party. When DSC customers purchased Pulse cards and used them in
DSC systems, DSC sued Pulse because every time the owner of DSC's operating system uses
a Pulse expansion card, the DSC software is loaded into the Pulse card's memory, creating
a "copy." See id. at 362.
150. See id. at 361.
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under section 117, which permits copying by the lawful owner of the
software copy if such copying constitutes an essential step in the utili-
zation of the copy.'5 1 Plaintiff DSC contended that the defendants did
not have any such right because they did not become owners of the
POTS-DI software copies. DSC claimed that it merely licensed such
copies; no sale had occurred. The district court rejected this conclu-
sion, however, finding:
[T]he existence of a license agreement between DSC and its cus-
tomers does not preclude a finding that the RBOCs are "owners of
a copy" for the purposes of Section 117.... It is necessary to deter-
mine ownership of the copy, not whether the transaction with DSC
involved a license to use the program .... In this case, the transac-
tion involves a single payment, giving the buyer an unlimited pe-
riod in which it has a right to possession, making [the] transaction
a sale. The RBOCs make a single payment for the Litespan software
and obtain a perpetual license to use and maintain the same. It is
clear that Section 117 was intended to encompass the RBOCs as
legitimate holders of copies of the DSC POTS-DI software. 152
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found this approach "overly simplistic.' 153 The appeals court
disagreed with both the district court and the Ninth Circuit's MAIde-
cision and tried instead to develop a more differentiated approach to
characterizing software transfers for purposes of federal copyright
law. 154 The appellate court first rejected the MAIapproach, according
to which a transfer labeled "license" could never qualify as a sale for
purposes of copyright law:
The Ninth Circuit stated that it reached the conclusion that Peak
was not an owner because Peak had licensed the software from
MAI .... That explanation of the court's decision has been criti-
cized for failing to recognize the distinction between ownership of
a copyright, which can be licensed, and ownership of copies of the
copyrighted software. Plainly, a party who purchases copies of
software from the copyright owner can hold a license under a copy-
right while still being an "owner" of a copy of the copyrighted
software for purposes of Section 117. We therefore do not adopt
the Ninth Circuit's characterization of all licensees as non-owners.
Nonetheless, the MAI case is instructive, because the agreement
between MAI and Peak, like the agreements at issue in this case,
imposed more severe restrictions on Peak's rights with respect to
the software than would be imposed on a party who owned copies
of software subject only to the rights of the copyright holder under
151. See id. at 362-63.
152. Id.
153. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 1999). It should be noted that the court was applying Fourth Circuit law.
154. See DSC Comunications Corp., 976 F. Supp. at 360-61.
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the Copyright Act. And for that reason, it was proper to hold that
Peak was not an "owner" of copies of the copyrighted software for
purposes of Section 117.155
The original draft of section 117 that was presented to Congress
provided that it was not an infringement for the "rightful possessor of
a copy" of a work to make additional copies of the software.1 56 During
the legislative proceedings, Congress changed section 117 to exempt
the "lawful owner" from liability. Thus, in the court's view, "Congress
must have meant to require more than 'rightful possession' to trigger
the Section 117 defense. ' 157 The court then rejected the approach of
the district court, according to which a transfer would always qualify as
a sale for purposes of copyright law if it involved perpetual rights of
the software acquirer against payment of a lump sum. The court
stated:
In finding that the RBOCs were owners of copies of the POTS-DI
software, the district court relied heavily on its finding that the
RBOCs obtained their interests in the copies of the software
through a single payment and for an unlimited period of time. It is
true that the transfer of rights to the POTS-DI software in each of
the agreements did not take the form of a lease, and that the trans-
fer in each case was in exchange for a single payment and was for a
term that was either unlimited or nearly so. One commentator has
argued that when a copy of a software program is transferred for a
single payment and for an unlimited term, the transferee should
be considered an "owner" of the copy of the software program re-
gardless of other restrictions on his use of the software .... That
view has not been accepted by other courts, however, and we think
it overly simplistic. The concept of ownership of a copy entails a
variety of rights and interests. The fact that the right of possession
is perpetual, or that the possessor's rights were obtained through a
single payment, is certainly relevant to whether the possessor is an
owner, but those factors are not necessarily dispositive if the posses-
sor's right to use the software is heavily encumbered by other re-
strictions that are inconsistent with the status of owner. 15 8
155. Id. at 361 (citation omitted).
156. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2565 (October 19, 1976).
157. DSC Communications Corp., 170 F.3d at 1360. The Federal Circuit's interpretation
of congressional intent is highly speculative. A more likely interpretation of Congress's
reason for the change is that the original wording was vague and not a term of art, and that
Congress wished to avoid giving use or reproduction rights to lessees or borrowers (both of
whom would be rightful possessors) without permission of the owner of the copy. The term
"rightful," not being a modern legal term, has a vaguely moral denotation, whereas "law-
ful" clearly means "in accordance with lawful rights." "Possessor" conveys no implication of
legal right to title (a thief, lessee, or bailee using software is a possessor), whereas the
concept of "ownership" entails a right permanently to possess. Congress undoubtedly in-
tended to avoid bestowing a right to use the copy to any possessor, but instead to limit that
fight to the lawful owner.
158. Id. at 1362 (citation omitted).
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The court further analyzed the transfer agreement under its own
test, according to which a software transfer qualifies as a sale pursuant
to which the acquirer becomes the owner of the copy for purposes of
copyright law if the acquirer obtains rights to the software copy that
are comparable to the rights a purchaser obtains under the traditional
concepts of sales and ownership of personal property. 159 In the course
of this analysis, the court noted that:
[t]he licensing agreements severely limit the rights of the RBOCs
with respect to the POTS-DI software in ways that are inconsistent
with the rights normally enjoyed by owners of copies of software
.... Each of the DSC-RBOC agreements limits the contracting
RBOC's right to transfer copies of the POTS-DI software or to dis-
close the details of the software to third parties .... Such a restric-
tion is plainly at odds with the Section 109 right to transfer owned
copies of software to third parties. The agreements also prohibit
the RBOCs from using the software on hardware other than that
provided by DSC. If the RBOCs were "owners of copies" of the
software, Section 117 would allow them to use the software on any
hardware, regardless of origin. Because the DSC-RBOC agree-
ments substantially limit the rights of the RBOCs compared to the
rights they would enjoy as "owners of copies" of the POTS-DI
software under the Copyright Act, the contents of the agreements
support the characterization of the RBOCs as non-owners of the
copies of the POTS-DI software.' 60
In applying an objective test and rejecting the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach of relying entirely on the label of a software transfer agree-
ment ("license" or "sale") in determining its character, the Federal
Circuit gave a possible answer to the second question posed above-
"Under what circumstances does the transfer of the right to make a
copy of computer software qualify as a 'sale of a copy' for purposes of
the First Sale Doctrine?"-their answer was that a sale of a copy occurs
when the terms of the agreement are consistent with the sale of a
copy. Based on this general approach, in accordance with the analysis
of the district court, the Federal Circuit deemed it relevant whether
the acquirer obtained rights to a software for a limited period of time,
as in a lease transaction, or perpetually, as in a sales context. 161 The
Federal Circuit's use of an objective test and distinction between trans-
fers for a limited period of time versus permanent transfers in particu-
lar are the best approach to this problem.
However, the Federal Circuit ultimately based its decision on the
fact that the transfer agreement prohibited the acquirer from copying
159. See id. at 1360-62.
160. Id. at 1361-62.
161. See id. at 1362.
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the software onto different hardware and from transferring the
software copy to a second purchaser. 62 This surprising use of tautol-
ogy by the Federal Circuit turned sections 109(a) and 117 of the Copy-
right Act from mandatory law back into optional rules to be decided
by contract and does not differ too much from the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach in M. Under MA, if the agreement calls itself a license
agreement and not a sale agreement, then it is one. 163 Under DSC
Communications, if the license prohibits the exercise of the very rights
that the First Sale Doctrine and section 117 afford to the software pur-
chaser, then the statutes providing for such rights in the interest of
public policy will not apply. 164 In other words, if the copyright owner
imposes a contract clause that undermines the policy behind the stat-
utory First Sale Doctrine, then the First Sale Doctrine simply does not
apply to the contract.
Contrary to the holdings of the Ninth and Federal Circuits,
neither contractual restrictions on statutory rights nor pro forma labels
should govern whether these statutory protections apply. The use of
objective factors by the Federal Circuit was correct: the transfer of per-
petual user rights characterize a "sale" of a copy of software. Conse-
quently, in order to determine whether a transfer of a copy occurred
for purposes of copyright laws, courts should determine whether the
transaction between the copyright owner and the first acquirer of a
certain copy involves an assignment of the copyright itself (sale of the
copyrights) or a lease of the individual copy (lease of a software copy).
If neither is the case, then the transaction seems to be properly char-
acterized as a sale of a software copy, which should trigger the First
Sale Doctrine and section 117. In the course of this determination,
courts should disregard the copyright holder's interest and attempts
to preclude the applicability of aforesaid statutes. Contractual resale
prohibitions or restrictions of the rights contained in section 117
should be irrelevant for purposes of analyzing whether a software
transfer qualifies as a sale for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine.
Instead, courts should determine whether a license involves ei-
ther (i) a grant to a transferee of software copies of the additional
rights that are not generally implied in a sales context (e.g., the right
to create and distribute an unlimited number of additional copies or
162. Some publicists have been beguiled by this tautology as well. See, e.g., Rice, supra
note 9, at 173 ("Nonsale transactions, in addition, differ from ownership transfer with re-
spect to the transferee's capacity to alienate possession.").
163. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993).
164. See DSC Communications Corp., 170 F.3d at 1361-62.
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the right to create derivative works), or (ii) an agreement by the trans-
feree of software copies to use the copyrighted work only to a limited
extent in order to obtain price reductions (e.g., a licensee agrees to
use the software only in certain fields, on certain designated hard-
ware, in CPU performance categories, or through a defined number
of authorized users). To the extent that such additional rights or re-
strictions are present in a software transfer (assuming, of course, that
they are otherwise valid under antitrust or other laws), they may alter
the overall "sales character" of the transaction. As a consequence, the
First Sale Doctrine should not apply, and the transferee will accord-
ingly not enjoy the rights granted by sections 109 and 117 of the Copy-
right Act unless such rights are granted contractually. However, it
would be circular to conclude merely from the fact that the transferor
tried to exclude the rights granted by sections 109 and 117 of the
Copyright by contract, that the transaction does not qualify as a sale of
a copy and, therefore, the transferee does not enjoy the statutory
rights. If courts wish to treat the First Sale Doctrine as a non-
mandatory "fallback" provision, which can be derogated from contrac-
tually, courts need not expend the time of analyzing objective factors
as proposed by the Federal Circuit. Instead, courts could return to the
jurisprudence of MAI and merely consider the label of the agreement
as the decisive factor.
In 1998, as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Con-
gress narrowly overruled MAI by providing in new subsection (c) of
section 117:
[I] t is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to
make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if
such copy is made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine
that lawfully contains an authorized copy of the computer pro-
gram, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that machine,
if-(1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed
immediately after the maintenance or repair is completed; and (2)
with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is not
necessary for that machine to be activated, such program or part
thereof is not accessed or used other than to make such new copy
by virtue of the activation of the machine. 165
It remains to be seen whether this narrow legislative change con-
firms the Federal Circuit's interpretation in DSC Communications
(which was still based on the pre-1998 version of section 117 even
though the case was decided in 1999).166 Possibly, Congress con-
165. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000).
166. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title III, § 302, 112 Stat. 2887 (1998). Amended section
117 and designated the sentence beginning "Notwithstanding the provisions..." as Sub-
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strained itself to a narrow change because the lawmakers were unde-
cided and insecure regarding the consequences following any change
in this area of the law, as evidenced by the current request for public
comment on intellectual property law issues including the First Sale
Doctrine.
D. Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine
1. Drebin and Wise: Precursors to the "Sale of a Copy" Definition
The modern application of the First Sale Doctrine to software be-
gan with other, more traditional kinds of media. Thus, although the
issue of how to define a "sale of a copy" for purposes of the First Sale
Doctrine today arises regularly in software transfers, "sale of a copy"
problems actually predate the application of the doctrine to computer
software. To understand how the use of software licensing has
changed and undermined the First Sale Doctrine, it is helpful to com-
prehend how courts have treated licenses of other media.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at-
tempted to distinguish between a "license" and a "sale of a copy" in
two 1977 cases, United States v. Drebin167 and United States v. Wise.168 In
both Drebin and Wise, the defendants were convicted of willful copy-
right infringement for selling allegedly unauthorized copies of motion
pictures. 169 The defendants appealed the convictions, arguing that
sales of film prints did not infringe a copyright because the film prints
had been previously licensed for distribution and exhibition.1 70 After
section (a), then inserted the heading; designated the sentences beginning "Any exact
copies ..." and "Adaptations so prepared ..." as Subsection (b) and then added subsec-
tions (c) and (d). See Mark A. Lemley et al., Exclusive Rights in Computer Programs, in
SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAw 201-05 (Mark. A. Lemley et al. eds. 2000).
167. 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977).
168. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929, reh'g denied 434 U.S. 977
(1977). The Ninth Circuit also mentioned this distinction in passing in Triad Systems Corp.
v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
Triad involved an appeal from the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against
an alleged copyright infringer. The owner ("Triad") of copyrighted diagnostic software for
Triad's own computer system sued an independent service organization ("ISO") for copy-
right infringement when the ISO used Triad's software to repair Triad machines. Under
the license agreement between Triad and its licensees, the licensees could not duplicate
the software or allow it to be sold to or used by third parties. After noting that Triad
licensed, rather than sold its software, the court upheld the injunction on the grounds that
when the ISO turned on Triad machines, a copy of Triad's operating system was made in
the RAM, thereby infringing Triad's copyright. Because Triad never purchased the
software, the Doctrine of First Sale issue did not arise. See id. at 1333.
169. See Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1321; Wise, 550 F.2d at 1183.
170. See Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1322; Wise, 550 F.2d at 1189.
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analyzing the agreements, the court found that they were "true licens-
ing agreements" on the grounds that they reserved title to the copy-
right owner and required return of the film prints. The court
therefore concluded that no sale had occurred because the films had
been presumably leased. 171 However, in Wise, which involved a crimi-
nal indictment for copyright infringement, the court noted that one
license agreement appeared to constitute a sale because title to the
film reel changed hands, and the district court had therefore found
the defendant not guilty on that count.172 The court examined the
licenses to determine, not whether title to the underlying copyright
had passed, but whether title to the particular copy of a film print had
passed. 173 Finding that title had passed on that copy, the court exon-
erated the defendant from copyright infringement for that sale.
174
The interpretation of the meaning of "sale of a copy" set forth by
the Ninth Circuit in Drebin and Wise follows a long line of First Sale
Doctrine cases making a distinction between a "sale" and a "license"
based upon whether title to the carrier media had passed. This distinc-
tion is rooted exclusively in the federal common law of copyright. As
noted above, the Copyright Act does not expressly define the term
"license," although section 101 explains that an exclusive license qual-
ifies as a "transfer of copyrights," while a non-exclusive license does
not:
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothe-
cation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect,
but not including a non-exclusive license.175
Indeed, while the Copyright Act uses the term "license" and ad-
dresses the concept of non-exclusive licenses in many different sec-
tions, section 106, which lists the exclusive rights of a copyright owner,
does not explicitly mention the copyright owner's power to grant non-
exclusive licenses to the copyrighted work. Rather, the Act grants the
exclusive right to "distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing.' 76 This supports the view that the granting of a non-exclusive
license does not constitute an additional, alternative means of com-
171. See Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1326; Wise, 550 F.2d at 1190-91.
172. See Wise, 550 F.2d at 1183 n.2, 1184 n.6.
173. See id. at 1191.
174. See id. at 1191-92.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
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mercialization. Instead, a non-exclusive license accompanies every
commercialization by sale, rental, lease, or lending of a copy of the
copyrighted work.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of a
"license" in the patent and copyright context, but the result has been
far from satisfactory. Specifically, in several cases, the Court stated that
a non-exclusive license amounts to nothing more than "a mere waiver
of the right to sue" the licensee for infringement of the licensed
rights. 177 This accurately describes the barest possible non-exclusive
license; in reality, a license agreement can and usually does cover
much more ground. 178 License. agreements often grant exclusive
rights by use, territory, or customer.179 More importantly, an exclusive
right confers something beyond a right not to be sued;180 it trans-
fers-temporarily or permanently-some or all of the monopoly
rights conferred by the Copyright Act, which necessarily entails an
agreement by the licensor itself to refrain from undertaking the li-
censed activities. Thus, while the essence of a non-exclusive license is
an agreement not to sue the licensee for undertaking the licensed
activities, the essence of an exclusive license is an agreement not only
to refrain from suing, but an agreement not to participate in the li-
censed activities as well. In any case, neither definition speaks to the
issue of what rights accompany a transfer of a copy of an intangible
work such as software.
The license and the sale are entirely different beasts. But courts
and scholars still often speak of a "license of a copy" of a work. This
means that the licensor will not sue the licensee for copyright in-
fringement by virtue of the licensee using the copy in some way. How-
ever, there is a separate question as to whether title to something has
177. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 546 (1938); De
Forest Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927). See United States v. Studiengesell-
schaft Kohle, mbH, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (1981) ("A license is an agreement by the paten-
tee, usually for a consideration, not to sue the licensee of the patent for infringement of
the patent.").
178. A non-exclusive license agreement, like an exclusive agreement, may of course
confer ancillary rights to service or warranties, requirements for cross-licensing, and all
other manner of contractual undertakings.
179. However, some courts, including the Federal Circuit, have extended this assertion
to cover all license agreements indiscriminately. See, e.g., Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr
Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik AG, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081
(Fed. Cir. 1987) ("As a threshold matter, a patent license agreement is in essence nothing
more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee.") (citation omitted).
180. Cf Shell Oil Co. v. Shering AG, 1997 WL 86414 (D. Del.) ("[T]he parties agree
that the Exclusive License is something more than a mere 'waiver of the right to sue."')
(citations omitted).
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passed, i.e., whether a "sale," or some other kind of transaction involv-
ing a good, has occurred. Unless a "license" involves a sale, lease, or
"transfer of ownership" of the copy, it is not an activity exclusively re-
served to the copyright owner under federal law. Yet, according to the
established judicial view, a "true" license agreement is not subject to
the First Sale Doctrine if return of the transferred materials is re-
quired and title does not appear to pass, while a sale agreement is
subject to the First Sale Doctrine if title to the particular copy passes.181
Thus, the most common holding at the time, when the carrier media
often cost a significant amount (e.g., large motion picture reels and
hard cover books), was that the First Sale Doctrine would not apply
where the copyright owner expressly reserved title to the copy.182
However, the policy behind the doctrine seems to require the same
results regardless of the type of licensed goods to which it applies.
2. Software Transfers and the First Sale Doctrine
The first case relying upon the distinction between a "license"
and a "sale of a copy" of software under section 109(a) came in 1990.
In ISC-Bunker Ramo v. Altech' 83 a software copy was transferred onto a
hard disk drive and could not be used until copied onto a floppy
disk.184 When the copyright owner claimed copyright infringement
against a purchaser who had sold the hard drive to a third party with-
out the owner's consent, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois rejected a First Sale Doctrine defense raised by the first and
second purchasers.18 5 The court held, without elaboration, that "ISC
did not sell copies of its software to its customers; it only licensed
them, making the 'first sale' doctrine inapplicable." 8 6 If the ISC-
Bunker Ramo decision sounds familiar, it is because it relies on the
same formalistic distinction between "license" and "sale" as the later
181. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1240 (1996). In Bourne, a copyright holder ("Bourne") claimed that the Walt Disney Co.
("Disney") infringed Bourne's copyright on its musical compositions. Disney had a license
from Bourne to use Bourne's music "in synchronism with any and all of the motion pic-
tures which may be made by [Disney]." Id. at 623. When Disney used the music in videocas-
settes and television commercials, Bourne brought an action for infringement, claiming
that even if Disney had the right to synchronize the music with its videocassettes, the First
Sale Doctrine permits it to distribute the resulting videocassettes as it sees fit. In upholding
that argument, the court explicitly rejected Bourne's contention that a license was not a
sale for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine. See id. at 631-32.
182. E.g., United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
183. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
184. See id. at 1314.
185. See id.
186. Id.
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case MAI Systems Corp.,187 which relied upon the nomenclature em-
ployed in the underlying contract.
The Kansas federal district court came to a similar conclusion the
same year in Data Products v. Reppart1 88 There, one of the defendants
was accused of copyright infringement of the plaintiff's software copy-
right by, among other things, acquiring the corporation that owned
the copy and using the software itself.189 The software license con-
tained a provision to prevent the resale or transfer of the software.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the copyright in-
fringement claims on the theory that the First Sale Doctrine immu-
nized the acquiring corporation from copyright infringement
liability.1 90 The court denied the motion. The status of one relevant
agreement as a software sale agreement or a license agreement, ac-
cording to the court, was unclear, and should be resolved by the
jury.1 9 ' The court then noted, however, that a second agreement ex-
pressly stated that it was a license agreement and on that basis alone
could withstand a motion for summary judgment. 19 2 As will be seen,
this line of reasoning-that a contract to sell a copy of software, if
called a "license agreement," presumptively loses its character as a sale
of a copy-exerted significant influence on later judicial opinions.
However, not all courts fell victim to the tautology. In the 1991
case Step-Saver v. Wyse, 193 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit noted that nontransferable copyright license practices
had developed to prevent software purchasers from renting the
software commercially. 194 Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, ques-
tioned "whether the use of state contract law to avoid the first sale
doctrine would be preempted either by the federal copyright statute
(statutory preemption) or by the exclusive constitutional grant of au-
thority over copyright issues to the federal government (constitutional
preemption).' 9 5 He then went on to write that since Congress in
1990 had statutorily prohibited commercial software rental by
software licensees, 19 6 the legal distinction between "sales of software
187. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
188. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058, 1990 WL 198610 (D. Kan. 1990).
189. See id. at 1060.
190. See id. at 1061.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
194. See id. at 105.
195. Id. at 96 n.7.
196. See Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000)).
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copies" and "software licenses" had become "largely anachronistic."'' 97
Even the licensor in that case had agreed that, notwithstanding the
"nontransferability" of the license, the licensee "had the right to resell
the copies of the . . . program." 98 Unfortunately, the Wyse decision
did not attract widespread adherence in other jurisdictions. Instead,
most courts continued to seek a meaningful distinction between sales
of copies of software and software licenses.
The most significant of these cases is Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Electronics. 199 In that case, Microsoft sued distributors of
its software for copyright infringement on the grounds that the dis-
tributors held no Microsoft license.200 The distributors did not prove
that they purchased software from legitimate Microsoft licensees. The
terms of the Microsoft license stated that those particular copies of
software could be distributed only when bundled with a personal com-
puter ("OEM licenses"), while the distributors sold the software as
"stand alone" products. In their defense, the distributors pointed out
that Microsoft had relinquished control over the disposition of the
software copies when it first sold the copies to the Microsoft licensees.
After holding that this First Sale Doctrine defense was moot because
the distributors could not show a "first sale," the court nevertheless
repeated in dicta that, because Microsoft called its sale a "license," a
sale could not have taken place. 20 1
The trial court dicta of ISC-Bunker Ramo and Microsoft have ex-
erted a palpable influence on later opinions applying the First Sale
Doctrine to computer software. However, one diverging case in the
trend toward nullifying the First Sale Doctrine came in 1997 from the
United States District Court for Utah. In Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade
Center, Inc., 20 2 Novell brought an action for copyright infringement
and contributory infringement against a software retailer who bought
inexpensive, older Novell software, purchased an inexpensive up-
grade, and sold the upgrade as a licensed version of the software. 203
This system was less costly than buying and reselling new copies of
software. Novell asserted that it retained ownership to all copies of its
software and that the shrinkwrap license agreement forbade anyone
197. Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 96 n.7.
198. Id.
199. 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
200. See Microsoft, 846 F. Supp. at 211.
201. See id. at 213.
202. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657
(D. Utah 1999).
203. See id. at 1222.
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but authorized purchasers to use the software. 20 4 Under this theory,
the retailer had infringed the Novell copyright by selling the software
contrary to the license terms and it also committed contributory in-
fringement by allowing third parties to copy the software into their
memory (RAM) or onto hard disk drives without Novell's permission.
The retailer defended by pointing out that, after first selling the
software, Novell had forfeited all rights to control further sale. 20 5
Moreover, the copies of the software that end-users must make into
their RAM and onto their hard disk drives were necessary for its use
and therefore could not constitute infringement pursuant to section
117.
The court first rejected the contention that the terms of Novell's
shrinkwrap license agreement governed what constituted infringe-
ment.206 After noting that most jurisdictions continued to reject the
validity of shrinkwrap licenses, the court concluded that the Novell
license terms were unenforceable. 20 7 The court then noted that
software sales are evaluated according to the provisions of the state
UCC and therefore concluded that if the transfer of a copy of the
software was a "sale" for UCC purposes, it must be a sale for First Sale
Doctrine purposes. 208 Because the First Sale Doctrine prevented
Novell from claiming infringement based on an unauthorized resale
of its software, and because section 117 authorized the lawful end-
users to make necessary copies of the software, the retailer had
neither infringed nor contributed to the infringement of the copy-
right.20 9 Perceiving that control over its licensing practices would be
severely impaired by the ruling, Novell negotiated a settlement with
the retailer that included vacatur of the earlier case. 210 While the
court granted vacatur in the interests of the settlement in 1999, it de-
clined to comment about Novell's argument that case law since the
1997 decision (in particular, due to DSC v. Pulse211 ) had sufficiently
changed to justify vacatur in an opinion displaying a thinly veiled
skepticism toward Novell's arguments.2 12
204. See id. at 1229.
205. See id. at 1229-30.
206. See id. at 1230-31.
207. See id. at 1230.
208. See id. at 1229-30.
209. See id. at 1230-31.
210. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 147-160.
212. See Novell 187 F.R.D. at 659 n.3.
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Most recently, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, a court that should be savvy about software, 21 3
repeated the dicta of ISC-Bunker Ramo and Microsoft without further
analysis. In Adobe Systems, Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc.,214 Adobe, a com-
puter software publisher, accused a software reseller of selling dis-
counted "educational" software to non-educational end-users. 215
Because the reseller had not signed any contract with Adobe, Adobe
brought suit for copyright infringement.216 When the reseller asserted
a First Sale defense, the court followed the Illinois and New York
precedents mechanically, repeating that the First Sale Doctrine only
applies to an "actual sale" and not to a license. After noting that it
must give effect to the mutual agreement of the parties, the court de-
cided that, in spite of the use of the terms "purchase" and "own" in
the Adobe contracts and license agreements, the presence of the word
"license" in the agreements, and the statements of Adobe executives
that a license agreement was intended, resulted ipsofacto in the agree-
ment being a license only.217 Copyright publicist Raymond Nimmer
testified for Adobe, stating that the license restrictions were "not con-
sistent with any claim that the distributor is the owner of the copies,"
but at the same time, "the license is the product[,] . . . no software
company ever sells its software." 2. I The view on which Nimmer based
his testimony nullifies the public policy behind section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act.2 19 Yet, the court accepted Adobe's arguments and
ruled that the reseller had committed copyright infringement.220
United States courts have widely differing opinions on which cri-
teria to employ when analyzing whether to apply the First Sale Doc-
213. The jurisdiction of the federal District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia includes San Francisco, Marin County, and all of Silicon Valley (San Mateo and Santa
Clara Counties).
214. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
215. See Adobe, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 1091.
218. Id. at 1091-92.
219. Nimmer obscures the necessary differentiation between "computer program," an
intangible good, and a "license," a set of legal rights. Nimmer's claim that no company ever
sells its software, besides being factually incorrect (for example, development companies
assign all rights-i.e., sell-their software to purchasers all the time), conflates the concept
of "sale of a copy" with the sale of the underlying copyright rights themselves. The license
is not the product, it is the right to use the product. The product is the intangible data set
that makes up a computer program. In determining whether a copy was sold, the question
is not whether there was a license. There must be a license, expressly granted by the copy-
right holder or implied by sections 109 and 117, in order for anything to change hands
legally, for any length of time whatsoever. See id.
220. See id. at 1094.
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trine to a software transfer. The traditional view, set forth and applied
in Drebin and Wise, requires courts to analyze whether actual title to
the copy of the intellectual property passes to the transferee and need
not be returned. The concept opposing a "sale" in these cases may be
labeled a "license," but is in reality a "lease" of the copy. By contrast,
the prevailing view, advanced in the federal district and circuit court
cases, 221 concluded that any transfer is a "license" of software, and
hence not a sale of a copy. These holdings require the use of the word
"license" pro forma in the agreement, and for the licensor to reject
claims of an intended sale to successfully prohibit end-users from ex-
ercising the very rights that would arise under section 117 if it applied.
Finally, in Novell, the court based its decision on whether the transfer
of software was a sale for UCC purposes. 222
One commentator has argued that courts should instead distin-
guish between transactions that are "in substance" a "true license" ver-
sus a "sale."2 23 In this view, a license granted to an end-user who
already possesses copies of a computer program to make a certain
number of additional copies of the program is a true license, presum-
ably because no carrier media is sold in such a scenario. Similarly,
"when the software's transfer is combined with a large service or main-
tenance component," the transaction should be considered a li-
cense.2 24 This view essentially relies upon the transfer of title to a
carrier media, such as a CD or DVD. An opposing view is that, because
the carrier media is essentially epiphenomenal, software is not a
"good" that can be "sold," but rather an intangible that must be li-
censed.225 While the premise of this approach is correct, the conclu-
sion begs the very question it seeks to address.
Melville Nimmer advanced another theory with some similar ele-
ments; namely, that a software license becomes a software sale due to
221. See ISC-Bunker Ramo v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Data
Products v. Reppart, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058,1601 (D. Kan. 1990); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Electronics, 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Adobe Sys., 84 F, Supp. 2d
at 1092; see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); DSC
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
222. See Novell, 25 F.Supp. 2d at 1230.
223. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property
Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, The Concept of Derivative Works,
and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 105, 150 (1986).
224. Id. at 150-51.
225. See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DuQ. L.
REv. 459, 535-40 (2000).
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the sale of the actual medium. 226 Although this position makes some
sense with respect to the application of the UCC, which was designed
for sales of tangible goods, it seems quite odd to apply it to intellectual
property law, which was designed for sales of intangibles. The medium
on which software is conveyed (except in embedded systems and pre-
loaded hard drives) is usually only a negligible fraction of the cost of
the software itself. To try to characterize licensing as a sale by merging
it with the sale of the medium misses the mark. The purchaser, or
"licensee," of a novel or software program does not buy for the paper
or CD-ROM; he buys for the intangible writing or programming con-
tained therein and the conceptually separate sine qua non, the licensed
rights accompanying the sale. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, a book is useless without the legal right to use it.22 7 This is true
afortiori for software, the value of which vastly exceeds the value of the
transfer media. The medium itself is purely incidental to the transfer
of intangible data and the rights to use it.
Nonetheless, it is now an almost universal practice in the software
industry to specify in the license that the sale of a copy of software "is
not a sale, it is a license," and that the only object sold to the con-
sumer is the underlying media. By distinguishing between the sale of
the media and the license of the software, software publishers try to
circumvent the First Sale Doctrine and to prevent purchasers of
software and of hardware bundled with OEM software or so-called
"full upgrade versions" of programs, from reselling that software. At
least one commentator has argued that copyright owners should have
this right; that the mandatory application of the First Sale Doctrine
has a "devastating" effect on software publishers because it prevents
them from gaining the economic benefits of price discrimination,
which in turn inhibits efficient distribution of software. 228 However,
this argument misstates the economic effect of the First Sale Doctrine.
It has been observed that the First Sale Doctrine "interfere [s] with the
producer's ability to achieve the perfect pricing curve," and therefore
denies to some producers economic monopoly rents on their
226. See Melville Nimmer et al., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[B] [I] Mathew Bender,
Inc. (1997). This view may have been based on a common practice in the motion picture
industry of using a reel use license that purportedly conveyed title to the media (the reel)
while claiming that title to the intangible copy of the film on the reel remained with the
copyright owner. Cf Rice, supra note 9, at 169.
227. See Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, 56 F.3d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1995).
228. See Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceabil-
ity of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 34-43 (2000).
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software229 (to be distinguished from legal monopoly rents, which the
software publishers maintain). Yet, the First Sale Doctrine does not
prevent all price discrimination; it merely prevents a copyright owner
from monopolizing the aftermarket for used copies of the copy-
righted work. Software authors and publishers are free to capture as
much consumer surplus as they can on the first sale of their copies. 230
And even if the First Sale Doctrine did foreclose price discrimination,
it is unclear that whatever benefit the price discrimination conferred
on the software market would not be counterbalanced by the elimina-
tion or circumscription of the market for used software. 2 31
229. Boyle, supra note 36, at 2019, 2028.
230. As for using other means of capturing consumer surplus, it is important to note
that most courts in the United States and Europe treat mass market software as goods for
most purposes, and competition laws generally disfavor price discrimination in connection
with the sale or transfer of goods. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, also known as the Robin-
son-Patman Price Discrimination Act ("RPA") forbids price discrimination in the sale of
like commodities where such discrimination would have an anticompetitive effect in a mar-
ket. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000). As discussed above, courts have treated software transfers as
sales of goods under the UCC if the sale of goods dominates over the provision of services.
The RPA treats the terms "commodity" and "good" as interchangeable, and as might be
predicted, courts have tended to apply a UCC-type analysis to RPA claims involving issues
where goods and services are both provided. See, e.g., May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process
Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1980). However, in most circuits, the issue of
whether the RPA applies to sales of software has not been definitively decided. We see no
convincing policy argument to justify allowing software publishers to discriminate while
sellers of other hi-tech goods cannot. Though the case was "not for publication" and the
court provided no other relevant analysis, the court in Storis, Inc. v. GERS Retail Systems, Inc.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7614, *10 (D. N.J. 1995) held that plaintiff Storis, in the business of
developing, marketing and manufacturing computer software that aids retail stores in the
U.S., had alleged sufficient allegations in its complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss on
grounds of failure to state a claim for predatory pricing in violation of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. The complaint alleged that GERS (in the same line of business) committed price
discrimination between Storis customers and all other customers, with the intent of injur-
ing Storis through GERS' software. See alsoJohn J. Voorhees, Jr., Note, Price Discrimination
and Software Licensing: Does the Robinson-Patman Act Fail to Accommodate Modem Technology?,
69 WASH. U. L. Q. 317 (1991).
231. Whether an antitrust policy disfavoring price discrimination is wise is an issue be-
yond the scope of this Article, but is worth touching on in the software context. Judge
Frank Easterbrook, writing for an unanimous Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), presented his best argument as to why price
discrimination benefits both software publishers and software consumers. Id. at 1449-50.
His argument turns on the fact that price discrimination allows publishers to offer software
to some sectors of the public at prices that would not be efficient in a market with uniform
prices. In other words, under some circumstances, price discrimination allows publishers
to charge more to consumers that want the software very much and can afford higher
prices, and charge less to consumers that want the software less or who may not be able to
afford high prices. This may sometimes result in an overall increase in quantity sold by the
price discriminating manufacturer, but this does not necessarily lower average price over-
all. For price discrimination to be profitable to a software publisher, such discrimination
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Similarly, the service or maintenance component should have
nothing to do with the characterization of the agreement. Service and
maintenance are commonly sold bundled with hardware and other
tangible goods that are not "licensed," and warranties are almost uni-
versally used in the software industry. Moreover, tying the purchase of
maintenance and repair services to the purchase of software may, in
some circumstances, violate antitrust laws, and such an approach
would encourage software publishers to tie in service and mainte-
nance in order to avoid the application of the First Sale Doctrine. It
would not be wise policy, as section 1 of the Sherman Act 232 attests, to
encourage businesses to limit public choice through tying
arrangements.
Every sale of software is accompanied by a license of some form.
Unfortunately, not a single United States court has recognized, in a
published or reported decision, that a sale of a copy of software must
necessarily be accompanied by an express or implied license agree-
ment. Therefore, the proper issue for analysis is not whether a "sale of
a copy" of software or a "license" of the software has occurred, but
whether the terms of the license constitute the transaction as a "sale of
a copy" or a "lease of a copy" of software. In Part IV, this article de-
scribes how courts in the European Community have approached the
First Sale Doctrine from precisely this perspective.
must be an industry practice established by collusion of some kind, or else the publisher
must have economic monopoly power. For if equivalent substitute software were available
from another publisher, then those consumers facing higher prices charged by the price
discriminator would turn to its competitor, leaving the price discriminator to sell only to
those who will pay a price lower than the equilibrium competitive price. Because economic
monopoly power or cartelization are alternative preconditions to effective price discrimina-
tion, and because both such market structures are generally inefficient, the merits of al-
lowing price discrimination in the software industry seem dubious, notwithstanding its
many supporters. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHL.-
KENT L. Rv. 1203, 1234-40 (1998); Ravicher, supra note 228, at 34-43. In addition, price
discrimination encourages companies in the inefficient market to micromanage the use of
their products. As one commentator put the question, "Do we really want to commit our-
selves to a regime that will offer companies major assistance in the form of state power,
assistance that will yield them big bucks, but only if they monitor their customers superla-
tively well?" Boyle, supra note 36, at 2034. It is also worth noting that, in the real software
market, publishers have clearly not lacked incentives to continue innovation and invention
even while lacking the right to monopolize the aftermarket in their software. One com-
mentator has argued that the constraints on price discrimination of are a virtue of the
system because they balance incentives with distribution near marginal cost (the competi-
tive equilibrium). See, e.g., id. at 2030.
232. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
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L. Public Policy and the Resale of Software
United States courts considering the First Sale defense for com-
puter software transfers often focus their attention on determining
whether the presence of a license agreement negates the application
of the First Sale Doctrine by distinguishing a "sale of a copy" of the
software from a "license" of the software. 233 A better starting point for
the analysis is to take the license for granted, and to determine
whether an agreement conveys a copy of software by "sale" or "lease,"
as courts traditionally have done for other transfers of copies of intel-
lectual property, such as movie reels, books, or phonograph records.
One United States court came close to this position in dicta, 23 4 but
none have positively repudiated the well established "sale versus li-
cense" precedent on the merits.
The tautological approach of relying upon the agreement's own
label to determine its legal status severely undermines the public pol-
icy that motivated Congress to include the First Sale Doctrine in the
1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. The First Sale Doctrine "restates and
confirms" the judicially created principle that "where the copyright
owner has transferred ownership of a particular copy ... of a work,
the person to whom the copy.., is transferred is entitled to dispose of
it by sale, rental, or any other means. '"235 If a licensor could negate the
First Sale Doctrine's applicability by pro forma methods, then the Doc-
trine would never, or almost never, apply to any transfer of computer
software because almost every sale of a copy of software is accompa-
nied by an explicit "License Agreement." Such license terms threaten
to undermine the congressionally determined balance between grant-
ing the copyright owner adequate reward to continue creation, while
233. It is interesting to note that this approach would be viable when analyzing
whether the First Sale Doctrine applies to a manufacturing or a publishing license as dis-
cussed above. See supra note 44. When a copyright owner conveys such a license, he may
convey a copy of the software (to be destroyed upon termination of the license), but the
purpose of the agreement is neither to sell nor to lease any particular copy. The license
agreement is designed to transfer certain production rights independently of any copy. In
this case, the proper opposition is between a "sale of a copy" and a "license to publish."
234. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse, 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d. Cir. 1991). In Step-
Saver, Judge Wisdom noted that, since Congress had prohibited commercial software
rental by software licensees statutorily in 1990, Computer Software Rental Amendments
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000)),
the legal distinction between contracts for sales of software copies and software licenses
had become "largely anachronistic." Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 96 n.7. Even the licensor in that
case had agreed that, notwithstanding the "nontransferability" of the license, the licensee
"had the right to resell the copies of the ... program." Id.
235. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5693 (1976).
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encouraging public dissemination of the work in accordance with
market forces. As the United States Supreme Court has reiterated
many times through diverse formulations:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly...
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private moti-
vation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and other arts. The immediate ef-
fect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's"
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimu-
late artistic creativity for the general public good. 2 3 6
Section 109(a) of the 1976 Act ensures that the copyright owner
reaps its reward at the first sale and does not attempt to distort the
market using licensing terms backed up by a threat of an action for
infringement. Courts have conceded that they would not be likely to
nullify a statutory purpose through a far-fetched interpretation of its
meaning. 237 However, this is exactly what has happened since 1990 to
the application of the First Sale Doctrine in United States courts. If a
court did conclude that a license agreement was subject to the First
Sale Doctrine, the subsequent sale of software would not constitute
copyright infringement, regardless of the provisions of the license
agreement. 238
To avoid undermining the congressional policy behind the First
Sale Doctrine, courts must recognize the reality that every legal trans-
fer of software is accompanied by a license of some kind. The proper
analysis begins with the terms of the license. In the Drebin and Wise
decisions, the court undertook just such an analysis for film reels, but
the analysis in those cases was flawed in two ways. The first is merely a
semantic error. The court juxtaposed the concept of a permanent
"sale of a copy" against a temporary "license." The proper term for a
temporary transfer of a copy of intellectual property is a "lease" of the
copy; a "license" is the grant of rights to use the intellectual property
rights to the copy and can be either temporary or perpetual. The sec-
ond flaw is that the sole factor considered by the Drebin and Wise
236. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). See Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994); Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1991); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
237. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
859-66 (1984) (discussing the need for courts to interpret accurately the intent of legisla-
tors and defer to their policymaking choices).
238. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 929, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 977 (1977); American Int'l Pictures v. Foreman, 576 F.2d
661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978).
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courts in determining whether a sale of a copy had occurred was
whether title to the copy had passed. The court was certainly correct in
concluding that ownership is of preponderant importance to First
Sale Doctrine analysis. However, by concentrating on the passage of
title, the court opens the door to easy circumvention of the First Sale
Doctrine by the licensor. The licensor need merely specify in the li-
cense that it retains all title to the copy and perhaps require the licen-
see to return the copy after a set period of time.23 9 Of course, the
useful life of software rarely surpasses five or six years, so such a li-
cense requirement would be purely symbolic.
A better alternative would be to focus on the substance of the
transfer of intellectual property. A copy of software is usually different
from other chattels in that "title" to the copy is not strictly germane.
After all, title to the particular carrier medium upon which the
software was transferred is irrelevant-any particular copy of software
can be transferred to a variety of carrier media, and the value of the
carrier medium is usually de minimis. What matters to the licensee is
whether he has lawful possession of the software. Unlike other chat-
tels, to have lawful possession during the commercially valuable life of
the software is to have title. A lease, in contrast, merely means having
lawful possession for less than the commercially valuable life of the
software. Specifically, for a lease to occur (and thus, for the First Sale
Doctrine not to apply), possession of the copy (regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of the carrier media) should only be granted by li-
cense for a duration that is significantly shorter than the commercially
valuable life of the copy.2 40
This may seem an unorthodox policy, but, upon reflection, its
merit should become self-evident. At the end of its brief useful life,
software leaves nothing of value-it has no resale value by definition,
cannot be recycled because it is intangible, and generally it becomes
technologically moribund. For example, consider a licensed copy of
an operating system. Assume that operating systems of this type un-
dergo a major revision on average every twenty-four months. Assume
239. One commentator noted ten years ago that the requirements of a software lease
must be strictly met, as counsel for software firms would not take long to capitalize on the
ability to insert resale restrictions in what superficially appears to be a lease. See Rice, supra
note 9, at 175.
240. We focus on "possession" rather than title because title to a copy of intellectual
property can be manipulated quite easily by contract, but possession of a copy is a prereq-
uisite to deriving any benefit from its use. Thus, what counts in a software transfer is posses-
sion of the copy and a right to use it. "Title" to any particular copy presumably rests with
the possessor regardless of the wording of the license agreement.
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further that a properly conducted economic analysis shows that busi-
nesses of the licensee's type replace their operating systems every
thirty-six months. For the license of an. operating system of this type to
fulfill the first "lease" factor, the license period must last significantly
less than thirty-six months.
Of course, this calculation must be determined as a factual matter
for each kind of software, but it is not difficult to discover. The first
factor that can assist in this analysis is the form of consideration used.
A lease of a chattel is accompanied by a payment corresponding to the
duration of use; this applies equally to software. 24' For example, video
stores that lease copies of video games typically charge a per diem
rate. By contrast, a sale is almost always accompanied by a one-time
payment of a fixed price for the software. The second requirement
that must be fulfilled for a software transfer to be a "lease" is that the
consideration for use of the software must correspond directly to the
duration of its use.24 2
A. Federal Preemption of State Contractual Remedies
Although the issue of when the First Sale defense should apply to
transfers of software copies has been addressed, another important
question remains. If the First Sale Doctrine expresses Congress's pub-
lic policy against restraints on alienation of copies of computer pro-
grams, may the copyright owner use the terms of the license to impose
a contractual restraint on resale of a copy? Would not any state law
granting the licensor the ability to restrain alienation in this manner
contradict a federal public policy within a domain regulated by Con-
gress under its constitutional powers, and therefore be void? The leg-
islative history of section 109(a) discloses that Congress did not
necessarily intend to preempt copyright owners from imposing some
restrictions on resale of the items under state law. On the contrary,
the legislative report intimates that section 109(a) "does not mean
that conditions on future disposition of copy ... imposed by contract
between their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the
241. See Rice, supra note 9, at 175. The U.C.C. § 2A-]03(1)(j) defines a "lease" as a
"transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for a considera-
tion," but there is no requirement that the consideration be measured according to the
duration of possession or use.
242. One potential problem with this requirement is that there are possible arrange-
ments in which the sale or lease of a copy is not accompanied by any monetary remunera-
tion, e.g., a trade of one software program for another. However, these arrangements are
extremely rare, and in these cases, it should be possible to rely upon the duration of the
transfer alone.
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parties as a breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be
enforced by an action for infringement of copyright."243 Yet, such a
result seems to undermine the purpose of section 109(a).
This issue has been touched upon by two courts already. In the
first, Brode v. Tax Management, Inc.,2 4 4 the plaintiff, the author of the
third and fourth editions of a treatise on tax law, claimed that the
treatise publisher committed breach of contract and copyright in-
fringement by failing to pull all copies of the treatise from circulation
after the publisher informed the author that he would not be commis-
sioned for the fifth edition. 245 The district court rightly accepted the
publisher's First Sale Doctrine defense against the infringement alle-
gations, noting that the publisher had been the lawful owner of the
copies, as were the copy purchasers, and it could not pull the copies
from circulation after a sale had been made.246 On the breach of con-
tract claim, the court expressed doubt that the contract imposed any
obligation on the publisher to pull the copies. However, the court
noted, even if the contract had imposed such a duty on the publisher,
the publisher could not be required to comply with the contractual
provision. "The portfolios belonged to the subscribers and under the
'first sale' doctrine of copyright, those subscribers had total control of
the copies." 247 Thus, the court implies that the First Sale Doctrine pro-
tects the lawful owner of a copy who sells the copy not only against a
claim of infringement, but also against a claim of breach of contract
by virtue of the sale.
The other, more widely cited case came from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In the 1991 case Step-SaverData
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse,248 Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, noted that
nontransferable copyright license practices had developed to prevent
software purchasers from renting the software commercially. 249 The
court questioned "whether the use of state contract law to avoid the
First Sale Doctrine would be preempted either by the federal copy-
right statute (statutory preemption) or by the exclusive constitutional
grant of authority over copyright issues to the federal government
(constitutional preemption). "250 The issue was not before the court,
243. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5693 (1976).
244. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1195, 1990 WL 25691 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
245. See id. at *5.
246. See id.
247. Id. at *11.
248. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
249. See id. at 96 n.7.
250. Id.
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so Judge Wisdom never had occasion to resolve it. Nonetheless, Step-
Saver, like Brode, stands for the proposition that it would be contrary to
federal policy to allow licensors to use state contract law to impose
breach of contract penalties for conduct (specifically, the resale of
copies of a copyrighted work) that is explicitly approved in the federal
Copyright Act.
Finally, as discussed above, in DSC Communications v. Pulse Commu-
nications,25 1 both the district court and the appellate court generally
respected sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act as nonderogat-
able because both courts refused to halt their analyses after determin-
ing the parties' intent, and instead tried to analyze the character of
the transaction objectively.
As a general matter, federal preemption can negate state law in
two ways. First, a federal law can expressly conflict by its terms of a
state law, in which case the contrary terms of the state law must suc-
cumb to those of the federal. Alternatively, a federal court may nullify
a state law on the grounds that, although the federal statute does not
speak directly to the matter governed by the state law, application of
that state law would undermine the public policy embodied in the
federal law, either because Congress intended the federal law entirely
to preempt any other lawmaking on the subject of the federal statute,
or because the state law is contrary to the thrust of the policy ex-
pressed by the federal statute. In such cases, federal courts engage in
"interstitial lawmaking" 252 to fill in the gaps in the statute according to
Congress's implied intent.
In the absence of a manifestation of such intent, however, courts
may only negate state law where "necessary to protect unique federal
interests" 253 or a "distinctive national policy." 254 It is for this reason
that courts have consistently held that, unless state law conflicts with a
federal statute or policy, "construction of [a] license agreement is
solely a matter of state law." 255 In the particular case of the common
law of contracts enforceable in states, it is well established that the
251. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
252. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
253. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
254. Barsch v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 826 (1968).
255. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1969). See also McCoy v. Mitsubishi
Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Whether express or implied, a license is a
contract 'governed by ordinary principles of state contract law."'); Power Lift, Inc. v. Wea-
therford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A) license agree-
ment is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.").
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state law of contract is not displaced merely because an agreement
relates to intellectual property.25 6 The question, then, is whether ap-
plying the state common law of contracts (or the state commercial
law) to allow a licensor to restrain the resale of a copy of software
would violate unique federal interests or a distinctive national policy.
The First Sale Doctrine does not explicitly address contract terms
limiting resale rights; no provision of the 1976 Copyright Act forbids
copyright owners from imposing restraints on resale of copies of
software. Instead, section 109(a) states that under federal law, the
owner of a copy is "entitled" to sell that copy without needing to ob-
tain the permission of the licensor.257 There are two logical reasons
why Congress might adopt section 109(a) while allowing a state law
action for breach of contract based on a clause prohibiting resale of a
copy to proceed. First, Congress may have wished to allow the copy-
right owner to profit from after-market sales of its software without
being able to prevent the sales absolutely through the high statutory
damages, injunctions, and criminal penalties provided for in the Cop-
yright Act. Under this theory, Congress intended to deprive the licen-
sor of the deterrent elements of the Copyright Act while leaving him
the economic right to profit from each copy of his work sold. This
would prevent the licensor from impeding an "efficient breach" by the
licensee, and would thereby help encourage an economically efficient
allocation of private capital for the greater perceived benefit of the
United States economy.258
The weakness in this argument is that the elimination of copy-
right does not remove all market deterrents to licensees breaching
their contracts with the licensors for reasons of efficiency. First, licen-
sees may wish to avoid breaching the contract and thereby angering
the licensor, which could result in deprivation of crucial updates and
future software sales by the licensor. The licensee may well rely upon a
continuing supply of updated, patched, or more advanced software
256. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
258. The theory of efficient breach basically posits that, when an allocation of private
capital pursuant to a contract is less efficient than an alternative allocation in breach of
contract, breach should not be discouraged through punitive measures of any kind. On
the concept of efficient breach, see David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and
Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 397 (1998); Richard Crasswell, Con-
tract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629 (1988). It
is interesting to note that the concept of efficient breach is not a brainchild of the current
legal fixation on economics, but rather a product of the law and social science orientation
of the Legal Realists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and Karl Llewellyn. See, e.g., Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
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from the licensor. A copyright owner in the United States may unilat-
erally refuse to license his software to anyone for almost any reason,
regardless of any perceived harm to consumers. 259
Also, a more general deterrent is the problem of assessing dam-
ages to the licensor for breach. In the rare case that the licensor has
used a contractual tool to deter the resale of software, such as impos-
ing liquidated damages for the lost sale of the software, these damages
are very likely to strongly favor the licensor.260 But the more common
scenario is that the licensor would claim that its damages for the resale
are equal to the profit it would have derived from selling an additional
copy of the software for each copy resold by the licensee. Such dam-
ages would inevitably wipe out any profit accruing to the first pur-
chaser. This is so for two reasons. First, software, like any commodity,
is more valuable new than used. This is true a fortiori for software,
because its value depends on the currency of the technology that the
software employs. Second, the marginal cost of producing a copy of
software is near zero, and the marginal revenue generated by selling
an additional copy of software is likely to be significant (or, at least, so
a court will generally assume). Combining these two factors-a high
profit to the copyright owner for each sale and a lower resale value for
the software-it is apparent that an "efficient breach" of a resale provi-
sion will occur only when the marginal cost of the copyright owner
producing an additional copy of software exceeds the difference be-
tween the sale price and the resale price.
In other words, for the lawful owner of a copy of software to
profit from a resale in breach of contract, not only must the software
hold its value well (or resale must take place very quickly after the
initial sale), but the cost of producing an additional copy of the
software must be extraordinarily high. These two conditions are likely
259. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, No. 97-1298, 1998 WL 54320 (1998) (holding that there is a presump-
tion that anti-competitive conduct by a licensor has a legitimate business justification);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) ("A]n
author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.").
260. Although such liquidated damages provisions may be enforceable as non-punitive
in state court, they may be dubious from an economic perspective. Typically, such a provi-
sion would impose liquidated damages equal to the profit that the licensor would have
received but for the sale to the third party by the licensee. However, in the case of used
software, the resale value may be significantly lower than the value of new software. In such
a case, the licensor may not have been able to make the sale, because the third party might
only have purchased at the lower, "used software" price. The licensor may recover in court
liquidated damages much higher than its actual damages.
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to occur only in the rarest of circumstances. Moreover, they do not
account for the deterrent effect of the costs of litigation that often
accompany a breach of contract. Given these market realities, this the-
ory does not seem to offer a convincing reason why a state law permit-
ting a breach of contract action for resale of a copy of software would
not undermine the federal public policy embodied in the First Sale
Doctrine.
Alternatively, Congress may merely have wished to immunize sec-
ond-tier purchasers from any cause of action for copyright infringe-
ment, while leaving the first tier purchaser liable to the licensor. In
this view, if the first-tier purchaser breaches his contract, he will suffer
the consequences, but a good faith second-tier purchaser will not be
deprived of the benefit of the software copy that he purchased. For
example, Congress may have intended to allow a copyright owner to
sell OEM versions of his software, without expensive manuals or eye-
catching packaging at a much lower price than retail versions of the
software, and contractually to forbid the distributor from selling it as a
retail version, undercutting the retail profits. This encourages poten-
tial hardware purchasers to complete the contemplated purchase be-
cause the hardware comes bundled with discounted software, to the
benefit of both the purchaser and the sellers, who increase their sales
volume without sacrificing profits.
However, this reasoning seems even less convincing than that of
the first argument. In the first place, the First Sale Doctrine, as cur-
rently written, would not achieve that policy result, because it fails to
protect second purchasers from a state law action for tortious interfer-
ence with a contract. If selling a lawfully owned copy of a copyrighted
work were a breach of contract, then the original seller would have a
potential action for tortious interference against any second pur-
chaser of the copy, who will often be on notice regarding the license
terms due to a copy of the license agreement that pops up during the
installation process. Second, even if section 109(a) achieved the pol-
icy, it does so through an unnecessarily circuitous method. Had Con-
gress merely wished to exempt second purchasers from liability, why
immunize the first purchaser from copyright infringement instead of
simply providing that purchasing a copy of a copyrighted work from a
lawful owner, in violation of a license agreement, does not constitute
infringement or contributory infringement? This is a much more di-
rect route to the same result, without the presumably unwanted side-
effect of protecting a lawful owner of a copy who resells in violation of
a license agreement. In short, neither theory offers a satisfactory pol-
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icy justification for permitting state contract law to undermine the op-
eration of the First Sale Doctrine.
The public policy underlying section 109(a) appears to be that of
the courts that developed the common law doctrine of copyright, pat-
ent, and trademark exhaustion. The concern was one of competition
law and consumer protection-the copyright owner should expect to
obtain adequate remuneration upon the first sale of a copy and price
the copies accordingly. As one court stated, "the ultimate question
under the First Sale Doctrine is whether or not there has been such a
disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the
copyright proprietor has received his reward for its use."261 Thereaf-
ter, the copy is the property of the purchaser, and any restraints on
alienation imposed by the seller serve no purpose except to restrain
competition to the detriment of consumers in general and the pur-
chaser in particular. 262 Such restraints distort the aftermarket for the
copyrighted goods and possibly other ancillary markets. 263 It may be
recalled that the Supreme Court case upon which the First Sale Doc-
trine is based, Bobbs-Merrill Co., had specifically negated a contractual
provision controlling resale terms.264 In other words, allowing a state
law breach of contract claim would undermine the federal public pol-
icy of treating chattels that embody intellectual property-including
what might be called "digital chattels"-just as any other chattel, and
with the same hostility to restraints on alienation. It also encourages
market distorting activity by copyright owners seeking to reap multiple
rents from a single sale of a copy of the protected work.
Finally, the statutory language of section 109(a) itself appears to
preempt any contrary state law. That section provides that the pur-
chaser of a copy is "entitled" to resell the copy without the copyright
owner's permission. The term "entitlement" legally conveys an affirm-
ative right.265 It would violate the principle of federal preemption to
261. Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa.
1964). See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); Platt & Munk Co.
v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 857 (2d Cir. 1963); Allison v. Vintage Sports
Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448-49 (11th Cir. 1998).
262. See also Rice, supra note 9, at 185 ("The vehicle in this instance is a contract, usu-
ally an unnegotiated standard form agreement. It is one which does far more than fine-
tune the legislated reward to fit special circumstances. It substantially broadens the scope
and extends the reach of monopolistic exclusion.").
263. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
264. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
265. See Black's Law Dictionary 532 (7th ed. 1999) ("Entitlement. Right to benefits,
income or property which may not be abridged without due process."); WEBSTER'S ENCY-
CLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 476 (1994) ("Entitle.... to
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allow state law to authorize a licensor to take away a federal entitle-
ment or right absent an express statutory exception. Notwithstanding
the reference in the legislative history of section 109(a) to the contin-
uing possibility of a state law action for breach of contract for resale of
a copy of software, such an assertion of state law would undermine the
federal public policy of the First Sale Doctrine, and should therefore
be considered void and unenforceable. Accordingly, where no breach
of contract claim is possible against the lawful owner of a copy, the
copyright owner would be unable to bring a credible claim of tortious
interference with a contract against a third party transferee. Tortious
interference has been raised in litigation against a party purchasing a
copy of software that allegedly violated a resale restriction, and at least
some courts have chosen not to dismiss the argument out of hand for
failure to state a valid claim.266 Based on the view of the First Sale
Doctrine as a mandatory public policy principle proposed in this arti-
cle, this would be a mistake, as a party cannot tortiously interfere with
an invalid provision of a contract. The first required element of a tor-
tious interference claim is the existence of a valid contractual provi-
sion;267 if a resale restraint is invalid under the First Sale Doctrine, a
party inducing breach of the restraint commits no tort.
B. Technological Anti-Circumvention Measures
The threat of an action for breach of contract is no longer the
only means at the disposal of a copyright owner to extend his market
power beyond that contemplated in the 1976 Copyright Act. Inge-
nious copyright owners have in many cases developed technological
means to prevent any transgression of the license terms. Such "anti-
circumvention measures" could theoretically prevent the lawful owner
of a copy of a copyrighted work, such as a software disc or a copy
downloaded from the Internet, from transferring that copy to another
party after having installed it on a computer in order to use it. For
example, code built into the software could, upon first installation on
a computer hard disk drive, disable the software from allowing any
give (a person or thing) a tide, right, or claim to something; furnish with grounds for
laying claim . . ").
266. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. MicroTeam, No. C98-20164 PVT (N.D. Cal.
2000). The defendant, the second purchaser of computer software, failed to defend itself
and the plaintiff publisher was granted default judgment in spite of its failure to present
any evidence that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the provision. The court
failed to address the invalidity of the resale restraint under the First Sale Doctrine.
267. See Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio 1995); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
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further installations on any other computer hard disk drive. Four
large hardware manufacturers (IBM, Intel Corp., Matsushita Electric,
and Toshiba), cooperating as a group called the 4C Entity, would
block certain types of files from being transferred to portable devices
such as Zip drives or flash cards.2 68 Thus, rather than relying on any
legal right to prevent the sale of software copies, the licensor could
use practical measures to defeat such a sale even in the face of an
affirmative legal right on the part of the owner of the copy.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was drafted in part to im-
plement the World Intellectual Property Organization's ("WIPO")
Performances and Phonograms Treaty,269 to which the United States
is a signatory. Article 18 of the Treaty requires signatories to provide
"adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the cir-
cumvention of effective technological measures" used by copyright
holders of "phonograms" if such circumvention is not permitted by
law.270 Section 1201 (a) (1) (A) of the United States Copyright Act (the
DMCA) seems to go further, providing that "no person shall circum-
vent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title."271 This appears to include more than just
phonograms and appears superficially to allow copyright owners to do
technologically what the First Sale Doctrine forbids them to do
contractually.
In this case, appearances are deceiving. It is a well established
principle of statutory interpretation that when two statutes appear to
conflict, as DMCA section 1201 (a) (1) (A) and 1976 Copyright Act sec-
tion 109(a) do, they must, if possible, be reconciled so as to give effect
to each. 2 72 The Performances and Phonograms Treaty, upon which
the DMCA is based, requires only that the law protect against circum-
vention that is not "permitted by law." 273 In the case of a technological
measure that obstructs the lawful owner of a copy from exercising a
statutory entitlement, such as that conferred by the First Sale Doc-
trine, the only reasonable reading of section 1201 (a) (1) (A) would be
that copyright owners are free to use technological means to prevent
268. See John Borland, Hardwiring Copyrights, CNET NEWS, Mar. 23, 2001, at http://
cnet.com/news/0-1005-5211420-0.html.
269. See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, at http://www.
wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm.
270. Id.
271. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2000).
272. See Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Revenue Service, 139 F.2d 65, 67
(6th Cir. 1943); D.C. Fed. of Civic Ass'n v. Airis, 275 F. Supp. 533, 538 (D.D.C. 1967).
273. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 269, at *7.
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unlawful copying or other forms of copyright infringement,274 but not
to undermine statutory rights of others granted by the 1976 Copyright
Act.
Congress made clear its intent that section 1201 (a)(1)(A), as de-
termined by the Copyright Office,
[Does]not apply to persons who are users of a copyrighted work
which is in a particular class of works if such persons are, or are
likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by
virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing
uses of that particular class of works .... 275
Unfortunately, the Copyright Office limited these "particular classes
of works" to two very narrow kinds of works: compilations of lists of
Web sites blocked by filtering software applications, and literary works
(including computer programs) protected by access control mecha-
nisms that fail to permit access due to malfunction, damage, or obso-
leteness.276 Several commentators on the proposed regulations,
including the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications
and Information, endorsed an exemption for "works embodied in
copies which have been lawfully acquired by users who subsequently
seek to make noninfringing uses thereof."2 77 Such language would
have clarified that lawful owners of copies could use circumvention
techniques to transfer those copies to others regardless of any techno-
logical impediments erected by the copyright owner. Unfortunately,
the Copyright Office rejected such a suggested exemption based on
the perceived difficulty of defining a "class of works" that would en-
compass such diverse uses. 278 In the opinion of the Office, such an
exemption would cover a "class of users" making a particular "class of
use," which was not within the Office's mandate to exempt "particular
classes of works." Moreover, because the House of Representatives
had considered and ultimately rejected a provision in the DMCA pro-
tecting persons who had "gained initial lawful access" to a work
(incidentally, a "class of users" and not a "class of works"),279 the Copy-
right Office concluded that Congress did not intend to confer upon it
the power to exempt such persons from the anti-circumvention
measures.
28 0
274. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
275. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
276. See 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,562 (2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2000)).
277. Id. at 64,561.
278. See id. at 64,562.
279. H.R. 2281 EH (1999).
280. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,572, 64,573.
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Whatever the merits of the Office's first objection, its second is a
non sequitur. There are many reasons that the House could have de-
leted the exemption for persons with "initial lawful access;"281s it does
not necessarily follow that Congress deleted the provision intending
to prevent the Office from promulgating a similar exemption. If Con-
gress had wished to make such a limitation on the Office's rulemaking
power, it could have done so explicitly. More likely, the drafters be-
lieved that the Office was in a better position to judge whether such
an exemption should be granted, due to its proximity to and familiar-
ity with copyright issues.
While the authors believe the Copyright Office, in ignoring these
suggestions, missed an opportunity to clarify the interaction between
DMCA section 1201 (a) (1) (A) and Copyright Act section 109(a), the
authors do not believe that the Office's failure to promulgate a spe-
cific exemption derogates from the duty for licensors and courts to
avoid using technological means to circumnavigate the First Sale Doc-
trine. Even in the absence of a specific exemption, any circumvention
of such technological impediments should be considered a lawful,
protected activity if the circumvention were undertaken in pursuit of a
statutory entitlement to transfer the software copy.282
Yet, merely affirming the copy owner's legal right to circumvent
technological restraints on resale of the copy does not resolve the
prior question of whether the copyright owner is entitled to impose
the restraint. As discussed above,283 most courts apply the state com-
mercial code to sales of software copies and even "licenses" of software
as they define them, and all but one of the States has enacted a ver-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). The UCC provides
for several types of warranties to be included by default in any con-
tract for the sale of goods. One such warranty, the warranty of title,
provides that the "title conveyed shall be good. ' 28 4 Because one essen-
tial attribute of title to property, as discussed earlier, is the right of
alienability, a sale of a copy of software that is technologically de-
signed to obstruct resale could arguably be considered a sale of "tech-
nologically disabled title" given that the right of alienability is an
281. For example, expiration of a valid software license would remove any legal justifi-
cation for continuing access to a copyrighted work. Congress may not have wished to imply
continued authorized after such a license expired.
282. Of course, this would affect only the very few with the time, skills, and motivation
to hack the security measures. See James R. Davis, On Self-Enforcing Contracts, The Right to
Hack, and Willdly Ignorant Agents, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (1998).
283. See supra Part III.B.
284. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(c) (2000).
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essential attribute of title to property. If the purchaser's ownership of
the software copy is incomplete due to a latent technological obstruc-
tion, the purchaser can assert that the warranty of good title has been
breached. Of course, a software manufacturer may successfully insist
that the legal concept of "good title" should not be confused with ac-
tual possibilities of accessing, copying, and transferring copies of a
computer program.
Moreover, the implied warranty of merchantability imposes a re-
quirement that goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used. ' 285 If the ordinary purposes for which copies of
software are used include being sold, then an argument can be made
that software incorporating a built-in technological device to prevent
resale is defective and thus traduces the implied warranty of
merchantability. The Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty
Act provides that warranties included with products sold to consumers
may not exclude the implied warranty of merchantability. 286 Software,
like most products, derives part of its value from the fact that it can be
resold or otherwise alienated from its lawful owner. A product that
lacks the essential feature of alienability is not "merchantable" be-
cause it has a latent attribute that substantially reduces its value. Of
course, it is relevant in this regard whether the purchaser is aware of
and accepts the restriction. If not, computer software with a techno-
logical obstruction to resale may be a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability as well.
In both cases, the end-user would rely on a combination of state
law commercial rights and federal statutory rights under section
109(a). But these commercial remedies typically would only apply to
consumers, as business-to-business software sales can be accompanied
by a repudiation of both the warranty of title and implied warranty of
merchantability. However, the First Sale Doctrine may provide an
even stronger argument against the legality of such technological ob-
structions. The use of a technological measure to undermine the abil-
ity of a lawful owner of a copy to transfer that copy to another party
would violate section 109(a). DMCA section 1201 (a) (1) (A) does not
explicitly authorize copyright owners to impose technological re-
straints on the resale of copies of the protected works, and section
285. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (2000).
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2000). Although there does not seem to be any precedent
on point yet, most scholars seem to believe that the Act should be applied to software. See
also Cern Kaner, Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act: Software Engineering and
UCITA, 18J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 460 (1999).
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109(a) requires a sale of a copy to include resale rights. Therefore, a
sale must include resale rights, and the licensor may not undermine
those rights technologically any more than he may do so contractu-
ally.287 In the absence of an affirmative statutory right, which has not
been incorporated into the 1976 Act by the DMCA or otherwise, such
restraints violate the lawful owner's entitlement freely to alienate the
copy.
IV. Applicability of the First Sale Doctrine to Software
Transfers Under European Community Law
Turning the focus of this analysis to Europe, statutory provisions
and litigation scenarios similar to those under United States law are
discovered. Even some of the software products and plaintiffs are the
same. Yet, while the European Court of Justice has not yet ruled on
the matter, European courts, and in particular those of Germany,
have come to very different conclusions with respect to the applicabil-
ity of the First Sale Doctrine to software transfers.
A. Applicable Statutory Provisions
1. European Community Law and National Laws
The law on copyrights and on contracts is not yet completely har-
monized within the European Community.28 8 Therefore, in all Mem-
ber states of the European Community, software license agreements
are governed both by national contract law, which differs from Mem-
ber state to Member state, and by the European Community ("EC")
law, as implemented into national law. As in the United States and
most other countries worldwide, copyright law is territorial (i.e., the
copyright law of the country where protection is sought applies).289
287. Any action for infringement by virtue of the use of anti-circumvention measures
could thus be defended with a claim of copyright misuse, for an attempt by the copyright
owner to extend his statutory monopoly beyond-indeed, contrary to-the terms of the
1976 Copyright Act, is void and unenforceable. See generally Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copy-
right Misuse and the Limits of the Copyright Monopoly, 6J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1998).
288. This article has focused on the European Community, because while the Euro-
pean Union ("EU") provides a common "roof" for the different forms of cooperation of its
Member states, it is still the European Community ("EC") that passes the relevant laws and
undertakes nearly all other relevant legal actions. See Helmut Lecheler, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS
EUROPARECHrr, [Introduction to European Law] 27-33 (2000); Rudolf Streinz,
EUROPARECHT [European Law] 38-46 (4th ed. 1999).
289. See The Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); PAUL E. GELLER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACICE
§ 3[1] [a] [i] (looseleaf, last updated Oct. 2000).
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Therefore, the national law of the Member state where a copyright
owner seeks protection or enforcement primarily applies. With regard
to contracts law, the national conflict of laws principles govern. How-
ever, as EC law is paramount and its purposes and policies may not be
undermined by national laws, the relevance of national laws is re-
stricted to aspects and situations that are not yet governed by EC
law. 290 Thus, German statutory and case law serves as an example to
the extent it is relevant for a comparative analysis.
2. The European Community Software Directive and German
Copyright Law
The most important legal rules with regard to the licensing of
computer software in the European Community common market are
provided by EC law, most notably the Council Directive 91/250/EEC
of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (the
"EC Software Directive").291 Sections 69c and 69d[1] of the German
Copyright Act 29 2 basically reiterate the German language version of
Articles 4 and 511] of the EC Software Directive.
Article 4[c] of the EC Software Directive contains the EC version
of the First Sale Doctrine. It provides that the copyright owner has the
exclusive right to undertake or authorize:
[Any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of
the original computer program or of copies thereof. The first sale
in the Community of a copy of a program by the Copyright holder
or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the
Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control
further rental of the program or a copy thereof.29 3
All Member states of the EU have implemented this provision in one
form or another.29 4
Similar to section 109 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act,
the EC Software Directive does not further define the term "sale" or
address the question whether the copyright owner may contractually
prohibit a purchaser of a software copy from reselling such copy. In
290. See Grad/Finanzmt Traunstein, 97/70, 1970 ECJ OFFICIAL CASE COLLECFION 825,
837 (1970); Streinz, supra note 288, at 141-44.
291. See 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42-46.
292. See Gesetz fiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz)
[Code on author's rights and related proprietary rights], Fed. Gazette 1, 1273 as amended
(Sept. 9, 1965), translated at http://www.ipr-helpdesk.org.
293. EC Software Directive, Article 4(c).
294. See EC Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, The European Parlia
ment and the Economic and Social Committee on the Implementation and Effects of Directive 91/250/
EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs 11 (Apr. 4, 2000).
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the United States, as in the EC, the effectiveness of such contractual
resale prohibitions is not expressly governed by copyright laws, but
rather by general contracts law and competition laws. Just as in United
States courts, the German federal court of last instance for civil law
matters, the Bundesgerichtshof295 understands the First Sale Doctrine as
a limitation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights in the interest of
free dealing in goods, which a copyright owner has permitted to enter
the stream of commerce. 296 Once an author of a copyrighted work has
benefited from its exclusive rights to its intellectual property by selling
a copy of its work, the public interest in a free marketplace and in the
absence of hidden restrictions overcomes the author's interests in
controlling the further commercialization of copies of its copyrighted
work.
2 9 7
Articles 4 [a] and 5 [1] of the Software Directive address the rights
of an acquirer of a software copy with respect to uploading and repro-
ducing such copy in the course of its normal use-rights that are ad-
dressed in section 117 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act. Article
4[a] of the EC Software Directive provides that the copyright owner
shall have the exclusive right to undertake or authorize "the perma-
295. For purposes of the First Sale Doctrine as well as contract and copyright law in
general, the authority of the Bundesgerichtshof in Germany can be compared to the au-
thority of the United States Supreme Court, even though the German constitution does
not provide for one single supreme court as such. Instead, according to Article 95 of the
German constitution ("Grundgesetz"), there have to be several federal courts of last in-
stance in the areas of civil and criminal law ("Bundesgerichtshof"), administrative law
("Bundesverwaltungsgericht"), social security law ("Bundessozialgericht"), labor law
("Bundesarbeitsgericht"), and tax law ("Bundesfinanzhof"). Additionally, according to Ar-
ticle 93 of the German constitution, a federal constitutional court ("Bundesverfassungsger-
icht") has jurisdiction over a number of enumerated constitutional disputes including
complaints of individuals who have already exercised all reasonable rights of complaints
and appeals in front of the other courts. In recent years, the German federal constitutional
court has continued to expand its ownjurisdiction in many areas of political public interest
by finding constitutional questions even in core areas of civil and criminal laws, (e.g., by
inventing so-called "protection duties" according to which the other courts and even the
legislature has to protect certain political interests in accordance with the case law of the
constitutional court.). See LOTHAR DETERMANN, NEUE, GEFAHRVERDACHTIGE TECHNOLOGIEN
ALS RECHTSPROBLEM [New Potentially Dangerous Technologies as Legal Problem] 158-76,
200-08 (1996); LOTHAR DETERMANN, KOMMUNIKATIONSFREIHEIT IM INTERNET [Freedom of
Communications on the Internet] 274-83 (1999). However, it seems currently unlikely
that the German federal constitutional court would hear such technical issues as cases
dealing with the First Sale Doctrine as it applies to software transfers. Therefore, the
Bundesgerichtshof probably has the final say on this issue as far as German law is
concerned.
296. See Bundesgerichtshof, Computer und Recht [The Computer and Law] 651, 652
(2000) [hereinafter CR]; see also BLUNDESGERICHTSHOF, WETTBEWERB IN RECHT UND PRAXIS
[Competition Law and Practice] 1407, 1409 (2000) [hereinafter WrRP].
297. See CR, supra note 296, at 651, 653; WRP, supra note 296, at 1407, 1409.
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nent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by any means
and in any form, in part or in whole. Insofar as loading, displaying,
running, transmission or storage of the computer program necessitate
such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the
rightholder ... -"298
Article 5[1] of the EC Software Directive provides: "In the ab-
sence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in Article
4 (a) ... shall not require authorization by the rightholder where they
are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful ac-
quirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including error
correction. 299
While the EC version of the First Sale Doctrine seems similar to
the United States version, the provision addressing the right to upload
a lawfully acquired software copy differs notably from its United States
parallel, section 117 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act. First, the
EC Software Directive refers to the lawful acquirer, not the lawful
owner of a software copy. Second, the EC Software Directive grants
the right to create and upload the software copy for purposes of in-
tended use and repair only "in the absence of specific contractual pro-
visions." 300 This reservation may be read to allow a copyright owner to
exclude the rights granted in a license agreement. However, the recit-
als of the EC Software Directive clarify that a "core portion" of user
rights may not be excluded contractually:
Whereas the exclusive rights of the author to prevent the unautho-
rized reproduction of his work have to be subject to a limited ex-
ception in the case of a computer program to allow the
reproduction technically necessary for the use of that program by
the lawful acquirer;
Whereas this means that the acts of loading and running necessary
for the use of a copy of a program which has been lawfully ac-
quired, and the act of correction of its errors, may not be prohib-
ited by contract; whereas, in the absence of specific contractual
provisions, including when a copy of the program has been sold,
any other act necessary for the use of the copy of a program may be
performed in accordance with its intended purpose by a lawful ac-
quirer of that copy .... 301
The recitals of a directive are legally binding for the Member
states because the recitals clarify which results the Member states have
298. EC Software Directive Arts. 4, 5, as implemented in German Copyright Act §§ 69c,
69d.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
Fall 20011 SOFTWARE TRANSFERS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
to achieve in implementing a directive. According to Article 249(3) of
the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community, "[a] direc-
tive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Mem-
ber state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods."30 2 Thus, if a copyright
owner sells a software copy, according to the EC Software Directive,
the copyright owner cannot contractually exclude a first or second
purchaser's right to create copies as required to upload and run the
software copy. Despite the somewhat misleading language of Articles 4
and 5 of the Software Directive, EC law intends to grant any lawful
acquirer of a software copy, irrespective of any contractual agreements
between the acquirer and the copyright owner, the same rights that
are granted in section 117 of the Copyright Act.30 3
The German legislature adopted the misleading language of Arti-
cles 4 and 5 of the Software Directive word for word in section 69d Nr.
1 of the Copyright Act. The legislation explained that a copyright
owner cannot validly exclude a lawful acquirer's right to upload a
software copy into the RAM of a computer.30 4 As a consequence,
courts and commentators treat the right to upload legally acquired
software as a "core user right," which cannot be contractually ex-
cluded.3 5 One German court even held that a software user who
uploads a lawfully installed copy from the hard drive of a computer
into its RAM does not create a copy for purposes of the German Copy-
right Act or the EC Software Directive.3°16 The court based its decision
on the fact that Article 4[a] of the EC Software Directive provides that
the copyright owner's permission (i.e., license) is required for upload-
302. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1958, Article 249(3). Seegenerally THOMAS OPPERMANN,
EUROPARECHT 209-214 (2d ed. 1999); Streinz, supra note 288, at 141-44.
303. See Ulrich Loewenheim, Special Provisions Applying to Computer Programs, in GER-
HARD SCHRICKER, URHEBERRECHT [Copyright Law] §§ 69d(12)-(14), at 1111-12 (2d ed.
1999); JOCHEN SCHNEIDER, HANDBUCH DES EDV-RECHTS [Handbook of Electronic Data
Processing] 387, 395 (2d ed. 1999); Kai Vinck, Special Provisions Applying to Computer Pro-
grams, in URHEBERRECHT [Copyright Law] 439-40 (Wilhelm Nordemann et al. eds., 8th ed.
1994); Matthias Brandi-Dohrn, Softwareschutz nach dem neuen deutschen Urhebergesetz
[Software Protection According to the New German Copyright Law], in BETRIEBS-BERATER
[Corporate Counsel] 658, 659 (1994) [hereinafter BB]; Hans-Werner Moritz & Stefan Hfi-
tig, Fortbildung des Computerrechts von 1998 bis heute [Development of the Computer Law
From 1998 Until Today], in 12 SUPPLEMENT TO COMPUTER AND LAW 2 (2000); MICHAEL
LEHMANN, RECHTSSCHUTZ UND VERWERTUNG VON COMPUTERPROGRAMMEN [Legal Protection
and Commercialization of Computer Programs] § I.A[13] (2d ed. 1993).
304. AMTLICHE BEGRONDUNG [Official Reasons for the Enactment of the Changes to
the German Copyright Act], BT-DRUCKSACHE [Off. Gazette of the Fed. Parliament] 12/
4022 (V/270), at 12.
305. See Loewenheim, supra note 303, §§ 69d(12)-(14), at 1111-12.
306. 1999 LG Mannheim, CR, 360-62.
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ing only "[i]nsofar as loading, displaying, running, transmission or
storage of the computer program necessitate[s] . . . [a] reproduc-
tion." 30 7 From this language the court concluded that the EC and Ger-
man legislatures must have assumed that certain acts of loading,
displaying, and running do not necessitate a reproduction because
they do not involve the creation of a sufficiently permanent copy.30 8
However, neither the EC Software Directive nor the German Copy-
right Act clearly defines how permanent a copy must be to cause copy-
right infringement. Most German commentators assume that by
uploading a copy into the RAM of a computer the software user cre-
ates a copy for purposes of the German Copyright Act and the EC
Software Directive, 30 9 a view that is shared by courts and commenta-
tors in the United States.3 10
The German legislature also adopted the codification of the First
Sale Doctrine in the EC Software Directive word for word in section
69c Nr. 3 of the German Copyright Act, which applies exclusively to
software. The generally applicable version of the First Sale Doctrine of
German copyright law is laid out in article 17(2) of the German Copy-
right Act, which provides that " [i]f the original work or copies thereof
have been put into circulation in the territory of the European Union
... with the consent of the holder of the distribution right, their fur-
ther distribution shall be permissible with the exception of rental." 3 11
3. German Contracts Law: Civil Law and the Standard Contracts
Terms Act
Like United States law on contracts, the German Civil Code 31 2
respects the freedom of individuals to enter into any agreements and
contractual promises, provided that such agreements do not violate
the German Federal Penal Code, other mandatory federal and state
307. EC Software Directive, Article 4(a).
308. See id. at 361.
309. See LEHMANN, supra note 303, § I.A[13]; Moritz & Hutig, supra note 303, at 5;
Loewenheim, supra note 303, § 69c(9), at 1095; JoCHEN SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 387.
310. SeeMAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Mark
A. Lemley et al., Exclusive Rights in Computer Programs, in SoFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW
195-96 (Mark. A. Lemley, Peter S. Menell, Robert P. Merges, Pamela Samuelson, eds.
2000).
311. F.R.G. Copyright Act § 17(2).
312. See Bargerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB"), v.18.8.1896 (Reichsgesetzblatt s.195). Fed-
eral Gazette ("RGBI.") at 195. Civil and criminal laws are subject to (concurrent) federal
legislative jurisdiction.
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statutes, including the above mentioned mandatory principles of the
German Copyright Act, or certain principles of public policy. 3
The German Civil Code provides clearly defined sets of rules for
certain types of contracts, which were common at the time of the en-
actment of the German Civil Code in 1896: sections 433 et seq. define
contractual obligations of the parties to a sales contract; sections 535 et
seq. lay out the rules for lease agreements; sections 611 et seq. cover
services provided on a time and materials basis ("services agree-
ments"); while sections 631 et seq. cover contracts wherein one party
promises to produce a work and the other party pays if the work meets
the acceptance criteria ("works agreements"). Additionally, the Ger-
man Commercial Code3 14 contains special rules that apply only to
merchants.
Most of the individual provisions in these sets of rules may be
derogated from. However, in accordance with German legislative in-
tent, in Germany contracting parties traditionally refer to the statutory
concepts of sales, lease, services, or work contracts and specify in their
written contracts only the variables of a transaction (such as price,
goods sold or leased, work to be created, etc.), and possibly certain
derogations from the statutes (e.g., a disclaimer of certain warranties,
a limitation of liability). As a result, German contracts are generally
much shorter than agreements drafted in the United States, which
often contain lengthy lists of definitions as well as reiterations, clarifi-
cations, and derogations from statutory and common law rules.315
Yet with regard to derogations from statutory concepts, the reality
of the business world today-in Germany as in the United States-
seems to be that more often than not, one party presents to the other
a contract of adhesion, the terms of which the other party accepts
unchanged or not at all. In an attempt to correct a perceived unfair-
ness created by unequal bargaining powers, German courts estab-
lished a line of "content control" case law based on section 138 of the
German Civil Code.3 16 Subsection one of this mandatory provision de-
clares void any contract or other legal instrument that violates public
policy, and German courts have found a number of standard contract
clauses, such as "overbroad" limitations of liability and warranty dis-
313. See BGB (HGB) §§ 134, 138 v.10.5.1897 (Reichsgesetzblatt s.219).
314. See Handelsgesetzbuch May 10, 1897, Reichsgesetzblatt [Federal Gazette] 1897 at
219, as amended.
315. See MATHIAS REIMANN, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS US-AMERIKANISCHE PRIVATRECHT 22
(1997).
316. See MANFRED WOLF, AGB-GESETz KOMMENTAR 15-16 (Manfred Wolf et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1999).
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claimers, to violate public policy. The German federal legislature ap-
proved, codified, and tightened this case law in 1976 with the
Standard Contracts Terms Act.3 17 This Act generally declares boiler-
plate terms void to the extent they are unfair. German courts consider
a contractual clause a "standard term" if there are any indications that
the drafter intended to use the clause again in other contracts. 318 The
drafter has to show that a clause was seriously negotiated with the
other party in order to avoid applicability of the Standard Contract
Terms Act ("the Act"). Unless a clause has actually been changed pur-
suant to negotiations, drafters are often unable to prove that "serious
negotiations" took place. 319
The Standard Contract Terms Act lists certain terms that are gen-
erally void, for example, contractual penalties of any kind, limitations
of liability that apply to gross negligent or intentional conduct, or an
exclusion of the buyer's right to a refund in case of nonconforming
goods.3 20 The Act also lists certain terms that are normally void, unless
there is a specific justification for them. On this list are clauses such as
the drafter's right to terminate for convenience and any factual
acknowledgements of the other party (e.g., that a copy of the terms
has been received, that the parties would not have entered into the
agreement if certain terms were invalid, or that the agreement has
been negotiated).321 Additionally, as a catch-all provision, section 9 of
the Act allows courts to invalidate any standard term that (i) puts the
317. See Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der AlIgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen
(AGB-Gesetz), v.9.12.1976 (BGBI. I. S. 3317).
318. According to AGBG § 1, a clause is deemed pre-formulated if: (i) it is drafted to
be used in several contracts, even when used for the first time. See Helmut Heinrichs,
AGBG, in Orro PALANDT, 1 BGB, AGBG para. 6 (56th ed. 1997) (deducing that the AGBG
applies if clause is drafted for three to five contracts); 1992 BUNDES ERICr-ITSHOF, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [New Weekly LawJournal] 2759; 1981, 2344, 2345 [hereinaf-
ter NJW] (establishing that the first use is sufficient); 1988 BUNDESGERICHTS-OF, NJW 410
(establishing that a clause "stored" mentally is sufficient); and (ii) it is presented by one
party to the other (and not suggested by an independent third party or jointly conceived);
and (iii) it has not been negotiated. According to the Bundesgerichtshof, a clause is nego-
tiated only if the party presenting the clause has seriously offered to modify it according to
the interests of the other party. See 1998 BUNDESGERICFrTSHOF, NJW 410; 1987 NJW 410 at
211.
319. A clause is generally presumed to have been negotiated if such clause is in fact
changed during negotiations, or if another clause is changed instead as a compromise
(1988 BUNDESGERICHTSHOF, NJW 410-11). A clause does generally not qualify as "negoti-
ated" under II AGBG § 1, if the party presenting the clause merely explains it and con-
vinces the other party to accept the clause unchanged (1992 BUNDESGERICHTSHoF, NJW
2759, 2760).
320. See Standard Contract Terms Act § 11.
321. See id. § 10.
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non-drafting party at an unreasonable disadvantage, (ii) derogates sig-
nificantly from the statutory fall-back provisions (e.g., in the German
Civil Code), or (iii) puts the material purposes of the contract at risk
by unreasonably limiting either the drafting party's obligations, or the
non-drafting party's rights. 322
Section 9, also applies to agreements between merchants while
the specific lists of invalid clauses apply only to contracts with consum-
ers. 323 However, in determining what is unreasonable in a contract
between merchants under Section 9 of the Standard Contract Terms
Act, German courts usually seek recourse to the blacklists applicable
in a consumer context.324 If a clause is blacklisted for consumer con-
tracts, German courts will often find the clause unreasonable even in a
purely commercial context.3 25
If a German court determines that a boilerplate contract term is
unfair for purposes of the Standard Contract Terms Act, the court will
strike the entire clause.3 26 German courts will not interpret a clause
restrictively in order to uphold it as courts in the United States nor-
mally do. On the contrary, in order to encourage narrow drafting of
standard contract terms, German courts apply the following test:
Would the challenged clause be unfair if its wording were interpreted
as broadly as possible in the interest of the drafting party? If so, it will
be stricken, even if a narrower interpretation would have been reason-
ably possible and ensured that the clause would have been reasonably
fair. For example, let us assume a plaintiff sues a defendant for breach
of a contract governed by the defendant's standard terms. If the de-
fendant's standard terms contain a limitation of liability clause, ac-
cording to which the defendant's liability shall under no
circumstances exceed the value of the contract and the defendant
shall never be liable for consequential damages, a German court
would read this clause to mean that the defendant shall not even be
liable for consequential damages or in excess of the contract value in
cases of intentional misconduct.327 Such a far-reaching limitation of
322. See id. § 9.
323. According to Standard Contract Terms Act § 24(1), sections 10 and 11 do not
apply if the non-drafting party acts for its business or professional practice.
324. See Norbert Horn, Section 9 of the Standard Contract Terms Act, in AGB-GESETz KOM-
MENTAR 1901-13 (4th ed. 1999).
325. See, e.g., BGH, 96, 182 (191-92).
326. See 1993 BGH, NJW, 1135; Helmut Heinrichs: PALANDT, BtJRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [Commentary on the German Civil Code], 56th ed. at 2391 (1997).
327. See Walter Lindacher, Section 9 of the Standard Contract Terms Act, in AGB-GESETZ
KOMMENTAR 250-52 (4th ed. 1999).
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liability would qualify as unfair under the Standard Contracts Term
Act. 328 Consequently, the German court would strike the entire limita-
tion of liability clause. As a consequence, the defendant would be fully
liable even if the actual case before the court only involved ordinary
negligence, or no fault of the defendant at all. In order to draft a
standard limitation of liability clause to pass the strict scrutiny of the
Standard Contract Terms Act, a drafter must expressly exclude all sce-
narios under which a limitation would be unfair, such as willful
breach, gross negligence of managerial employees, strict product lia-
bility, and violations of so-called cardinal contractual duties.329
With the Standard Contracts Terms Act, Germany exceeds the
minimum standard set by the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts, 331 which only applies in a consumer context. 3' If a
contract is formed pursuant to solicitation in Germany or with a con-
sumer residing in Germany at the time of contract formation, the Ger-
man Standard Contracts Terms Act even applies to agreements that
are governed by foreign law.332 However, the Act does not apply if an
agreement is governed by foreign law, one party resides outside Ger-
many, and the non-drafting party is a merchant. 333
4. Restraints on Alienation Under European Community and
German Laws
German law displays the same antipathy to general restraints on
alienation as the common law of the United States. Section 137 of the
German Civil Code provides that the ability to eliminate generally dis-
posable rights cannot be excluded in a contract effective erga omnes.334
However, section 137 of the German Civil Code does not affect the
validity of a contractual promise between parties in privity to refrain
from eliminating a generally disposable right. Thus, if a seller and a
first purchaser agree in a car sales agreement that the first purchaser
shall be prohibited from reselling the car, the first purchaser would
nevertheless be able to transfer title of the car to a second purchaser.
328. WOLF, supra note 316, at 1270. Any limitation to the contract value is normally
regarded unfair.
329. See Lindacher, supra note 327, at 242-53.
330. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 2000 O.J. (L 095), (21/04/EEC1993, at 29-34).
331. See Helmut Heinrichs, Standard Contract Terms Act, in OTTO PALANIT, 1 BGB,
AGBG 2378 (56th ed. 1997).
332. See Standard Contracts Terms Act §§ 12, 24a.
333. See Lindacher, supra note 327, at 1416.
334. See Romina Polley, Verwendungsbeschrdnkungen in Softwareuberlassungsvertrdgen, 1999
CR 345, 347.
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The second purchaser would acquire title and the first purchaser
would possibly violate the sales contract with the original seller.3 3 5
However, a contractual resale prohibition in a pre-formulated
standard sales agreement would be invalid under the German Stan-
dard Contract Terms Act as an unfair derogation from the German
civil code according to which a purchaser can normally use the pur-
chased good without restraint. 336 An individually negotiated contrac-
tual resale prohibition could be invalid under unfair competition
laws. 33 7 Both EC and German antitrust laws are generally stricter with
respect to vertical restraints of trade than United States antitrust laws.
Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, contractual resale prohibitions be-
tween undertakings are considered illegal restraints of trade.338
335. See generally Heinrichs, supra note 331, at 117.
336. See Standard Contract Terms Act §§ 9(11), 433, 903 Civil Code; 1998 OLG
Bremen, Betriebs-Berater (BB), at 4, 5.
337. See Michael Lehmann, Aktuelle kartell- und wettbewerbsrechtliche Probleme der
Lizenzierung von urheberrechilich geschiitzten Computerprogrammen [Current antitrust and com-
petition law problems related to the licensing of copyrightable computer programs], 1985
BB 1209, 1210; XVI LEHMANN, supra note 303, at 802, 814; Polley, supra note 334, at
351-52; SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 469-70; Hanns Ullrich & Karheinz Konrad, Competi-
tion Laws, in DER INTERNATIONALE SOFWAREVERTRAG [The International Software Agree-
ment] 332-35 (Hans Ulrich & Eberhard K6rner eds. 1995).
338. The Rome Treaty establishing the European Community of 1958, as amended,
("EC Treaty") provides in TITLE IV (ex Title V), "COMMON RULES ON COMPETI-
TION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS," Chapter 1, "Rules on competi-
tion," section 1, "Rules applying to undertakings," Article 81 (ex Article 85):
(1.) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member states and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: (a) di-
rectly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a com-
petitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts. (2.) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
EC Regulation 17/62 additionally provides for hefty fines in case of certain violations. See
Gerhard Dannecker, Commentary on Regulation 17, in EG-WETrBEWERBSRECHT [EC Competi-
tion Law] 1780 (Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim Mestmacher eds. 1997). It is not entirely
clear whether resale prohibitions can be covered by the new general block exemption reg-
ulation 2790/1999, O.J. L336, 29/12/1999, at 21-25: While the regulation generally ex-
empts vertical restraints imposed by undertakings of 30% or less market share, according
to Article 4(b) the regulation does not apply to agreements that restrict "the customers to
whom the buyer may sell the contract goods or services." Arguably, a contractual resale
prohibition is the farthest reaching customer restriction possible. The block exemption
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Under section 16 of the German Act Against Restraints of Trade, con-
tractual resale prohibitions are not illegal per se, but any resale restric-
tions can be prohibited by the German Federal Cartel Office. 339
B. German Court Decisions on Software Transfers Under EC and
German Laws
3 40
1. Sale, Lease, or License Agreement?
Similar to the UCC cases in the United States discussed above,
German courts have had to decide whether software transfers qualify
as sales, leases, or "true" licenses in connection with disputes related
to supposedly defective or otherwise nonconforming software. Under
United States law in similar cases the question typically is whether the
UCC rules on contract formation and implied warranties apply.
Under German contracts law, courts normally have to decide for pur-
poses of applying the German Standard Contracts Terms Act, whether
the drafter has attempted to derogate unreasonably from the statutory
provisions on sales or lease agreements.
Most notably, the rules on sales contracts in the German Civil
Code provide for a six month warranty period.341 This warranty pe-
riod commences when the purchaser receives possession of the sold
goods..3 42 During the warranty period, a purchaser can demand, at its
discretion, an abatement of the purchase price, or a refund of the
purchase price against return of the goods, if such goods were defec-
tive when the purchaser received them.343 The seller may reserve the
right to repair or replace defective goods in order to avoid an abate-
regulation for technology transfer agreements, regulation 240/96, O.J. L31, 9/2/1996; at
2-13, does not seem to exempt resale prohibitions.
339. Section 16 of the German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschr5nkungen [Act
Against Restraints of Trade], last amended and re-published Aug. 26, 1998, Fed. Gazette I
at 2546 provides: "The Cartel Office may declare void and prohibit agreements regarding
goods or services between undertakings, which restrict the freedom of one party . . . to sell
the goods to third parties." According to section 17 of the German Act Against Restraints
of Trade in patent license agreements, any restraints are illegal unless justified and covered
by the statutory patent rights of the patent holder. However, this provision would normally
not apply to a software transfer because such transfers would usually qualify as sales under
German law.
340. In Germany, court decisions are traditionally published without any reference to
the identity of plaintiff and defendant. Only in some instances have the authors of this
article been able to identify the software manufacturer due to the name of software
products that were mentioned in the published court decisions.
341. See F.R.G. CIV. CODE §§ 459, 477 (2000).
342. See id.
343. See F.R.G. CIV. CODE §§ 459-65.
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ment or refund of the purchase price.3 44 However, according to the
German Standard Contract Terms Act, the purchaser must retain the
right to a refund in case repair or replacement is unreasonable under
the circumstances. 4 5 In a consumer context, the consumer must also
retain the right to an abatement of the purchase price which is espe-
cially burdensome in the software context given the fact that no com-
puter program is completely error-free3 46 Also, if a seller, in its
standard sales contract, reserved the right to terminate the contract
and demand a return of the goods sold, such termination clause
(often found in standard agreements accompanying software transfers
in the United States) would substantially derogate from the concept of
sales in the German Civil Code to the disadvantage of a purchaser,
and therefore be invalid under the Standard Contract Terms Act.3
4 7
A right to terminate for breach would, however, be typical in a
lease context.348 If a software manufacturer wanted to reserve the
right to terminate and demand a return of its software, it could enter
into lease agreements with German customers. However, according to
section 536 of the German Civil Code, a lessor must maintain the
leased good in suitable condition for the entire term of the contract.
If a leased good is or becomes defective, the lessor must repair or
replace it.349 If the lessor fails to do so, the lessee may abate its rent, or
demand specific performance or damages in court.3 50 Under the Ger-
man Standard Contract Terms Act, a lessor is typically not able to ex-
clude these basic remedies in a pre-formulated, non-negotiated
contract.3 5 Thus, in a lease context, a software manufacturer would
have to warrant the conformity and functionality of its software not
only for a six month warranty period applicable to sales, but for the
entire lease period, not unlike landlords, who must maintain residen-
tial apartments both under the German Civil Code and most United
States state laws. In practice, few software manufacturers are willing to
do so. Additionally, many software consumers prefer to acquire com-
puter programs permanently, and most software manufacturers prefer
an up front lump sum payment to monthly rent payments. Lump sum
payments allow a manufacturer to be able to recognize revenue, which
344. See F.R.G. CIv. CODE § 476.
345. See Standard Contract Terms Act § 1 (10)(b).
346. See WOLF, supra note 316, at 941.
347. See id. at 942-43.
348. See id. at 936, 943.
349. See F.R.G. CIv. CODE § 536 (2000).
350. See F.R.G. CIv. CODE §§ 936-38 (2000).
351. WOLF, supra note 316, at 941.
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often affects the stock price of a publicly traded company, at least in
the United States.
Given the aforesaid disadvantages of the established concepts of
sales and leases under German contracts law for sellers, software man-
ufacturers targeting the German market felt a similar incentive as
United States market players to label software transfers something dif-
ferent. This incentive likely existed because the large players in the
German market were initially mostly United States companies (and
still are to a considerable extent), and because the concept of a li-
cense was as undefined in German law as it is in United States law. A
literal translation of the United States "software license agreement"
became the industry standard label for standard agreements accompa-
nying software transfers: Softwarelizenzvertrag.
As one might expect from a statute first enacted in 1896, the Ger-
man Civil Code does not contain any specific rules on license agree-
ments. When the first software license agreements were presented to
German courts, the courts could have treated this new phenomenon
as a contract sui generis and determined, on a case by case basis, what
standard clauses are fair and unfair in a software license agreement
for purposes of the German Standard Contract Terms Act.352 In sec-
tion 7 of the Act, the legislature asked the courts specifically to pre-
vent any circumvention attempts: "This Act applies also if its
provisions are avoided by alternative structures." 53
Also, despite the fact that software has been expressly recognized
in section 2 of the German Copyright Act as a category of copyright-
able works since 1985, 354 prior to the implementation of the EC
Software Directive into German law in 1993, German courts had re-
quired a very high level of originality before they would afford copy-
right protection for software. 355 Many programs that would have easily
352. See Claus D. Mfiller-Hengsenberg, Die Bedeutung des Kauftechts fir die Computer-
software [The Relevance of the Law on Sales for Computer Software], 2000 NJW 3545;
Andreas Witte, Urheberrechtliche Gestaltung des Vertriebs von Standardsoftware, 1999 CR 65; Pol-
ley, supra note 334; SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 609-55.
353. F.R.G. Standard Contract Terms Act § 7 (2000).
354. See Loewenheim, supra note 303, at 1064 Vor §§ 69a-ff., Nr. 1. This is required by
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") an-
nexed to the 1994 World Trade Organization Agreement and the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty, both of which Germany and most of the rest
of Western Europe have ratified.
355. The leading cases are from 1985 and 1991:1985 BGH, GRUR, 1041 (known as the
collection program case-"Inkasso-Programm") and 1991 BGH, NJW, 1231 (known as the
operating system case-"Betriebssystem"). See Loewenheim, supra note 303, at 1064, Vor
§§ 69a ff., Nr. 2; SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 343-46.
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qualified as copyrightable in the United States were not found to be so
in Germany. Consequently, German courts tended to treat software
like any other goods and held early on that the traditional rules on
sales, leases, and works contracts apply at least by way of analogy to
most types of software transfers. 356
Thus, in 1981, in one of the first software-related cases, the
Bundesgerichtshof reviewed a software license agreement under the Civil
Code rules on commercial leases because, according to the license
agreement, the licensee was entitled to use a copy of the computer
program for a limited time period of five years.3 57 Commentators con-
cluded from this holding that any transfer with a time limit beyond
the useful life of the software product, or subject to a right to termi-
nate, qualifies as a lease.35 8 This, in turn, means that the software pro-
vider has to maintain the software during the entire time of use, even
in the absence of a support contract and additional consideration.
In 1987, the Bundesgerichtshof published a thoroughly reasoned
decision holding that a permanent transfer of a software copy, without
significant user restrictions and for a one-time payment, generally
qualifies as a sales contract for purposes of the implied warranties in
the German Civil Code.359 The acquirer must have proven that the
software contained "bugs" that rendered the software unusable for its
intended purpose. Because the transfer agreement was not expressly
labeled as a sales contract (more likely it was labeled as an end-user
software license agreement), the court considered applying the re-
spective laws of lease, license, and sales. The court decided that the
transfer could not qualify as a lease because according to the agree-
ment the acquirer was entitled to keep the software copy perpetu-
ally. 360 Therefore, the court found it was intended that the acquirer
should become the owner of the software copy and the implied war-
ranties in the sales section of the German Civil Code were to apply. -3 61
With respect to the acquirer's warranty claims, the court deemed it
necessary to decide whether the agreement also contained elements
of a license agreement because, if it did, the right to use the software
was necessarily transferred with the software copy and the warranty
claims did not concern a defect in rights, but a defect in the product
356. See Mtiller-Hengsenberg, supra note 352, at 3545-47.
357. 1981 BGH, NJW 2684 ("Programmsperre I").
358. See Schneider, supra note 303, at 665-66, 672-74.
359. See 1988 BGH, NJW 406; SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 643-45.
360. See 1998 BGH 406, 407.
361. See id. at 408.
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(i.e., the software copy that was stored on a disk) .362 The court de-
cided that the right to use did not transfer.363
In a significant 1989 case before the Bundesgerichtshof a software
vendor brought a claim for payment of monies due for an online
software transfer. 364 According to the agreement between the parties,
the acquirer was to keep the software copy perpetually against pay-
ment of thirty-six monthly installments in the amount of DM 500
each. 365 The court deemed the payment and delivery modalities irrel-
evant and found that at the heart of the transaction was a perpetual
exchange of a software copy against a lump sum price.366 Because the
vendor delivered the software copy to the acquirer for perpetual use
against payment of a pre-defined sum, the court qualified the transac-
tion as a sale and applied consumer protection laws pertaining to in-
stallment sales of tangible goods by way of analogy.367
Following this line of cases treating software licenses as sales of
goods, the Bundesgerichtshof in 1993, emphasized that a software copy
could generally be treated as a tangible good for warranty issues and
applied the rules on "works contracts" to a situation where a software
developer had delivered allegedly malfunctioning programs for per-
petual use by the acquiring company against payment of a lump
sum.
3 6 8
As a consequence, many lower courts qualified software transfers
as sales without much discussion. For example, in 1994, the Court of
Appeals in Frankfurt am Main, held that a central processing unit
("CPU") clause in a standard software license agreement is generally
invalid under the Standard Contract Terms Act because under the
German Civil Code provisions on sales, a purchaser can use purchased
goods at its discretion without any restrictions from the seller.369 Ac-
cording to a CPU clause, an acquirer of a software copy may install
and operate such copy only on a certain specified CPU, which may be
described (1) by size and performance, or (2) by serial number and
location. 370 With the second version of a CPU clause (designated
362. See id. at 408-09.
363. See id. at 408.
364. 1990 BGH, NJW 320.
365. See id. at 320.
366. See id. at 321.
367. See id. at 321-22.
368. See 1993 BGH, NJW 2436; SCHNEIDER, supra note 303, at 644.
369. See 1995 OLG Frankfurt, Betriebs-Berater Beilage 2, 23.3, at 4.
370. See Hans-Werner Moritz, Leistungsstirungen bei Hardware und Software [non-per-
formance or defective performance regarding hardware and software], in COMPUTER-
RECHTS-HANDBUCH [Handbook of Computer Law] § 41 Comms. 61-66 (looseleaf
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hardware, specified by serial number and location), manufacturers
may aim to control the exact hardware product that will run their
software. 37' With the first version of a CPU clause (designated per-
formance category of CPU specified by size and performance crite-
ria), manufacturers usually try to justify differentiated license fees in
proportion to the benefits a user receives from using the software
product. A common argument is that due to CPU clauses, manufac-
turers are able to capture consumer surplus by charging smaller com-
panies with less effective hardware lower prices for software products,
which, in the absence of CPU-related pricing, the manufacturer would
have to price so high that smaller companies could not afford the
software.3 72
In the case before the Court of Appeals in Frankfurt am Main, a
company had acquired two software copies in 1980 at a fee related to
the CPU on which the acquiring company installed the software.
When the company upgraded its hardware in 1987 and re-installed
the two software copies on a new system with a CPU of higher per-
formance, the software manufacturer demanded an upgrade fee of
DM 22,334.20 based on the CPU clause in the original contract. While
the district court decided in favor of the software manufacturer, the
court of appeals invalidated the CPU clause as incompatible with gen-
eral principles of sales law and dismissed the case. 373 Again, the pur-
chaser's dominion over software paid for with a single fee was
upheld.374
In 1999, the same court invalidated a CPU clause in a situation
where it qualified the software transfer agreement as a "true" license
agreement.375 The Court of Appeals in Frankfurt am Main stated that
the legal analysis of its 1994 decision, discussed above, did not apply
because the 1994 decision approached it from a sales context.3 76 It
found that the software transfer addressed in the 1999 decision, in
contrast, did not qualify as a sale because in the software license agree-
ment the software manufacturer reserved title to the software copy
and granted a time-limited, non-transferable right to use the software
collection, last updated Mar. 1999); Polley, supra note 334, at 346; SCHNEIDER, supra note
303, at 350-52.
371. To ensure that the software product functions appropriately, to accompany efforts
to bundle software and hardware products, or to prevent transfers to other countries.
372. See Zahrnt, Case Note, in Betriebs-Berater Beilage 2, 23.31995, at 5.
373. 1995 OLG Frankfurt, Betriebs-Berater Beilage 2, 23.3, at 4.
374. Id. See also BGB §§ 433, 903.
375. See 2000 OLG Frankfurt, CR, 146, 149.
376. See 2000 OLG Frankfurt CR.
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copies in question. The licensee assumed an obligation to install up-
dates and delete prior versions, both parties had a right to terminate
for convenience, and the licensor assumed the obligation to support
and maintain the software copy.
3 77
The court did not further discuss the character of the considera-
tion, which might have supported a qualification of the transfer as a
sale. It is not clear from the factual description given in the court deci-
sion how exactly the licensee paid for the software copy in question.
However, when the licensor attempted to enforce the CPU clause by
demanding additional fees for his consent to the hardware upgrade,
the licensor demanded an "initial license fee" of DM 278,000 up front
and a "yearly update fee" of DM 41,700.378 If the payment structure in
the original software license agreement had been similar, based on
prior case law the court could have interpreted the update fees as ser-
vices fees under a separate agreement and qualified the transfer of the
original software copy against a one-time initial license fee as a sale.
The court could then have invalidated any preformulated contractual
restrictions that failed to comply with civil law principles of sales.
However, apparently the court wanted to take the opportunity to
clarify which circumstances would make pre-formulated CPU clauses
unfair under the Standard Contract Terms Act, regardless of whether
the software transfer agreement qualifies as a sale, lease, or license
agreement. Thus, in a rather lengthy obiter dictum, the court ac-
knowledged the interests of software manufacturers and users to agree
on differentiated license fees depending upon the commercial bene-
fits that the software user is able to achieve due to the performance
capacity of the user's hardware. 379 Therefore, the court held that indi-
vidually negotiated CPU clauses should normally be enforceable and
even boilerplate CPU clauses should be enforceable if they are limited
to situations where a software user transfers the software copy to a
higher performance CPU. However, the court found that boilerplate
CPU clauses are unfair and invalid under the Standard Contract
Terms Act if, according to the relevant clause, the licensor is entitled
to an upgrade fee in case of any transfer, even if the licensee transfers
the software copy to a different CPU with the same performance
capacity.380
377. See OLG Frankfurt CR, at 149-50.
378. See id. at 146.
379. See 2000 OLG Frankfurt, CR, at 150-51.
380. See 2000 OLG Frankfurt, CR, at 151-52.
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German courts also condemn any attempts at circumvention. For
example, the Court of Appeals in Koblenz held that a software manu-
facturer could not validly terminate a software maintenance and sup-
port agreement in order to force the acquirer of the software copy to
pay an "upgrade fee" in connection with the transfer of the software
copy to a new hardware system. 381 Similar to the aforementioned facts
before the Frankfurt Court, the software manufacturer before the Ko-
blenz Court had transferred its software containing a license restricted
to a designated hardware system.38 2 According to the terms of the
end-user license agreement between the parties, the acquirer had to
obtain the software manufacturer's consent before the acquirer was
permitted to transfer the software copy to a different hardware system,
at which point the manufacturer was entitled to an upgrade fee. 383
The court deemed this clause unfair and invalid under the German
Standard Contract Terms Act because the perpetual transfer of a
software copy for a lump sum payment qualified as a sale and a pur-
chaser is generally entitled to use or alienate his own goods at will
under the German laws on sales. 384 Although the separate mainte-
nance and support agreement provided for both parties' right to ter-
minate for convenience every twelve months, the court assumed a
violation of the implied covenant of fair dealing if the manufacturer
tried to enforce an "upgrade fee" clause in the software license agree-
ment if the upgrade clause was invalid under the laws pertaining to
sales.318 5
Because repairs are also permitted for purchased goods, the
Bundesgerichtshof recently held that an acquirer of a software copy may
create and transfer to a third party an additional copy for repair pur-
poses. 38 6 With regard to the copyright implications of this decision,
the court referred to section 69c Nr. 2 of the German Copyright
Act,38 7 and Article 4 Nr. 2 and Article 5 of the EC Software Directive.
Under these laws, the lawful acquirer of a software copy may create
additional copies without the copyright owner's consent "where they
are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful ac-
381. See 1993 OLG Koblenz, NJW, 3144.
382. See id. at 3144-45.
383. See id.
384. See 1993 OLG Koblenz, NJW, at 3145.
385. See id. at 3146.
386. See 2000 BGH, CR, 656.
387. See F.R.G. Copyright Act § 69(c).
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quirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error
correction."3 88
As these cases demonstrate, German courts have created a dis-
tinction between sales and leases of software, irrespective of the for-
mal trappings of the license agreement accompanying the transfer of
the software copy. While the content of German commercial law
clearly differs from its United States counterpart, the policies that un-
derlie the laws of the two countries-protecting legitimate purchaser
expectations and avoiding market distorting activity-are identical.
German courts, like United States courts, have concluded that a per-
manent transfer of a copy of software constitutes a sale of goods for
the purposes of commercial law, regardless of the presence of a li-
cense agreement.
2. Application of the First Sale Doctrine to Software Transfers
As in the United States, EC software manufacturers and users
have in many cases taken opposing positions as to whether the First
Sale Doctrine applies specifically in connection with disputes about
software resale prohibitions and restrictions on distribution. This sec-
tion analyzes the cases addressing the "sale of a copy" question in the
context of the EC and German law version of the First Sale Doctrine.
a. Attempted Enforcement of Resale Prohibitions
In a 1998 case before the Court of Appeals in Bremen,3 89 a
software manufacturer had transferred a software copy to an end-user
for a one-time payment under a software license agreement, accord-
ing to which the right to use the software copy was nontransferable. 390
In order to effectively enforce the transfer restriction, the software
manufacturer incorporated an expiration mechanism into the
software copy.391 From time to time, the software manufacturer pro-
longed the expiration date in connection with software maintenance
and support services. The first acquirer of the software was not aware
of this mechanism and after a while resold the software copy to a sec-
ond purchaser. The second purchaser became aware of the expiration
mechanism in connection with an attempted resale to a third pur-
388. Section 69c Nr.2 of the German Copyright Act, implimenting Article 4 Nr.2, Arti-
cle 5 of the EC Software Directive.
389. See 1998 OLG Bremen, Betriebs-Berater (BB), 4 (4-7).
390. See id.
391. See id.
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chaser and demanded that the mechanism be removed.39 2 The manu-
facturer dismissed the request and demanded that either the second
or third purchaser pay the regular license fee. 393 The manufacturer
then applied for an injunction prohibiting the resale of the software
copy. The second purchaser counterclaimed to remove the expiration
mechanism based on a number of theories, including tort, arguing
that the expiration mechanism qualified as a criminal destruction of
data. 39 4 The software manufacturer asserted in its defense that no data
would have been destroyed if the first acquirer of the software had
complied with the transfer prohibition and the copyright laws. 39 5 It
further argued the transfer prohibition was enforceable because the
transfer agreement constituted a license agreement and not a sales
agreement.396
The Court of Appeals in Bremen sided with the second pur-
chaser, and found that the transfer constituted a sale, because the
software was transferred perpetually against a lump sum payment.397
The court deemed the fact that the transfer agreement was labeled a
"license agreement" entirely irrelevant and held that the First Sale
Doctrine applied to the transfer from the manufacturer to the first
purchaser, the contractual resale prohibition was invalid under the
German Standard Contract Terms Act, and the transfer from the first
purchaser to the second purchaser constituted neither a breach of
contract nor a copyright infringement.39 8 Thus, the software manufac-
turer's distribution rights had become exhausted under the First Sale
Doctrine.
Similarly, the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals held that a software
manufacturer committed a severe breach of trust by secretly installing
a dongle399 in a software copy before selling it to an end-user because
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. According to sections 303a and 303b of the German Penal Code, a person who
substantially interferes with the data processing of a business by illegally deleting data can
be sentenced to five years imprisonment.
395. See 1998 OLG Breman, Betriebs-Berater (BB).
396. See OLG BB, at 5.
397. See id.
398. Id. at 6.
399. A dongle, or "hardware key," is a copyright protection device that comes with
software. The software cannot be used unless the dongle is plugged into the computer's
parallel port. The dongle thus hinders software piracy because each program is tied to a
unique number encoded onto the dongle. See ALAN FREEDMAN, THE COMPUTER DESKTOP
ENCYCLOPEDIA 369 (1996). A software dongle performs the same function without the use
of hardware, by disabling the software's own installability after the first installation.
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it unlawfully limited the end-user's control over the lawfully acquired
copy.400
b. Attempted Enforcement of Resale Restrictions
(1) Updates Resold as Stand-Alone Products
In 1997, the Munich District Court decided a software manufac-
turer's lawsuit, which in accordance with industry practices generally
distributed identical versions of its software either as full versions, or
as updates.40 1 While both versions were technically identical, the "up-
date" versions were labeled as such with a sticker on the outside of the
packaging material. Consumers who already owned an earlier version
of the manufacturer's product were normally able to acquire updated
versions for about 25% of the original purchase price.40 2 While most
first and second-tier distributors observed this differentiation, at least
one second-tier distributor acquired software copies labeled "updates"
at the lower update price from a first-tier distributor, removed the la-
bel "update," and resold the copies as full versions priced somewhere
between the market price for updates and the market price for new
versions.40 3 When the manufacturer brought a lawsuit based on copy-
right infringement, the Munich District Court held that according to
the First Sale Doctrine the manufacturer's distribution rights became
exhausted when the manufacturer sold the software copies to the first-
tier distributors. Therefore, the first-tier distributors were able to re-
sell such copies without restrictions and consequently, the second-tier
distributor did not infringe the manufacturer's copyright. The Mu-
nich Court of Appeals affirmed this decision and dismissed the
software manufacturer's appeal in 1998.404
In 1999, the Court of Appeals in Frankfurt am Main came to the
same conclusion with respect to a lawsuit brought by Adobe Systems,
Inc. 40 5 The court held that once Adobe had sold software copies to a
distributor, Adobe's distribution rights became exhausted and the dis-
tributor's resale of such software copies to end-users did not constitute
copyright infringement.40 6 It was not infringement even if the distrib-
utor sold "update versions" as stand-alone products to end-users who
400. See 1993 OLGZ Daisseldorf, Betriebs-Berater Beilage, 13, 10.7, at 6.
401. See 1998 LG Mfinchen, CR, 141.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See 1998 OLG Mfinchen, CR, 265.
405. See 1998 OLGZ Frankfurt, CR, 7.
406. See id.
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had not previously acquired any Adobe software. 40 7 However, the
court did find a violation of German unfair competition laws because
one distributor had printed invalid Adobe registration numbers on
the updates, which the distributor sold as full versions. 40 8 End-users of
the Adobe software copies in question needed a license key from
Adobe for each software copy before they could install and use the
copy. Adobe gave out such license keys to end-users of its software
only against presentation of the Adobe registration number that came
with full products. Adobe printed such registration numbers only on
the packaging material of full software copies, not of update software
copies. End-users that had already acquired Adobe full copies held an
Adobe registration number and when they called Adobe to obtain a
license key to install an update, Adobe gave out a license key.40 9 End-
users that had never acquired a full copy with an registration number
but acquired an update version could not obtain a license key from
Adobe. When the distributor printed bogus Adobe registration num-
bers on update versions, the distributor tricked the end-users. This
was sufficient for the Frankfurt Court of Appeals to assume a violation
of unfair competition laws without further discussing the legality of
Adobe's registration system. 4 10
It is likely that the court assumed that the registration scheme as
such was justifiable to the extent that Adobe intended to prevent the
use and dissemination of illegally created copies. An acquirer of an
update version that was originally created and sold by Adobe or with
Adobe's consent would likely have been entitled to a license key from
Adobe, even if the end-user had never acquired a full version before.
If Adobe denied a license key to an acquirer of a legally distributed
update version merely because such acquirer had not bought an
Adobe product before, Adobe would be indirectly attempting to en-
force illegal resale restrictions. However, an end-user who lacks a
proper Adobe registration number issued by Adobe would have to
prove in a potentially time consuming procedure that her copy is not
an illegal copy before she can obtain the license key from Adobe to
use the copy. Because the distributor concealed this potential prob-
lem, the distributor violated unfair competition laws. If the distributor
had disclosed this problem with the sale of the update versions, the
distributor would probably have complied with unfair competition
407. See id. at 8, 9.
408. See id. at 10.
409. See id.
410. See id. at 11.
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laws and, under German law, Adobe would not have been able to en-
force different pricing of technically identical updates and full ver-
sions. Arguably, the distributor could even have demanded from
Adobe proper registration numbers for the resale of update versions
as full products to remove the resale obstacles. However, simply forg-
ing the registration numbers in order to avoid potentially invalid dis-
tribution restrictions is not an acceptable practice under the strict
German unfair competition laws.
(2) Original Equipment Manufacturer Versions Resold as Stand-
Alone Products
Software publishers have many means of attempting to capture
consumer surplus and multiple rents from their marketing activities.
One of the most common means has been considered-differential
pricing between "full" and "upgrade" versions of substantively identi-
cal software. Another frequently used technique is selling OEM ver-
sions411 of the software at a much lower price than stand-alone
versions. The only substantive difference between OEM and stand-
alone products (other then their license terms) is usually the lack of
attractive packaging and sometimes printed materials. 412 Conflicts be-
tween publishers and distributors over the practice of reselling copies
of OEM versions as if they were stand-alone products has also raised
First Sale Doctrine issues in Europe.
In 1995, Microsoft obtained an injunction based on copyright in-
fringement against an independent manufacturer of computer hard-
ware and reseller of hardware and software in Berlin.413 Microsoft had
granted duplication and distribution licenses to so-called "replicators"
in Europe. These replicators were, according to Microsoft's standard
distribution license agreements, permitted to create copies of the
Microsoft computer program Word for Windows and distribute such
copies to authorized second-tier distributors under two labels.4 14 Au-
thorized second-tier distributors could acquire Word either as a stand-
alone product or, for a considerably discounted price, as an OEM ver-
sion to be transferred only in connection with a new personal com-
411. An OEM version of software, it may be recalled, must, by its license terms, be sold
in conjunction with computer hardware. See supra note 12.
412. These may be available in electronic format on the software media, such as an
Adobe Acrobat file readable from the software CD-ROM.
413. See LG Berlin, 25.8.1995, File Nr. 5 U 8281/95 (unpub.).
414. See id.
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puter.41 5 By having the OEM versions transferred at a discount,
Microsoft intended to give an incentive to hardware manufacturers
(OEMs) to install Microsoft products on as many new personal com-
puters as possible to get consumers accustomed to the Microsoft prod-
ucts and increase market share. Technically, the two versions of Word
were identical. The accompanying user manuals were also practically
identical. The only noticeable difference between the stand-alone ver-
sion and the OEM version of Word concerned the packaging materi-
als.4 16 The OEM versions were packaged in rather plain materials
displaying a notice that the OEM versions were only for distribution
with a new personal computer. The Berlin retailer had purchased a
large number of OEM versions of Word from an authorized second-
tier distributor, whose identity was apparently not disclosed in the pro-
ceedings.417 The retailer then resold these OEM versions as stand-
alone products at a lower price than other retailers who had acquired
stand-alone versions at higher wholesale prices through the Microsoft
channels. 418
In court, the retailer argued that Microsoft's exclusive rights
under the German Copyright Act became exhausted when Microsoft's
replicator, with Microsoft's consent, sold the OEM versions to the au-
thorized second-tier distributor. 419 Thus, the retailer argued, accord-
ing to the First Sale Doctrine, the authorized second-tier distributor
had the right and ability to resell the Microsoft software to the re-
tailer.420 Microsoft, on the other hand, argued that it had never sold
any copies of its proprietary software. Instead, according to Microsoft,
it had only granted a limited distribution license permitting the sale of
its software in conjunction with a new personal computer. Microsoft
argued that even if one assumed a first sale, such first sale could only
cause an exhaustion of exclusive rights to the extent Microsoft
granted such rights to the first acquirer, i.e., the replicator. In other
words, under the First Sale Doctrine, a first purchaser might be able to
transfer to a second purchaser what the first purchaser acquired from
415. Microsoft's standard distribution agreement contained a clause according to
which "[the distributor] shall distribute and license Product(s) only with those Customer
Systems listed in Exhibit C for the particular Product(s) .... [Distributor] shall require its
distributors, dealers, and others in its distribution channels to comply with the foregoing."
See id.
416. See LG Berlin, 25.8.1995, File Nr. 5 U 8281/95 (unpub.).
417. German civil procedure law does not recognize the concept of "discovery."
418. See LG Berlin, 25.8.1995, File Nr. 5 U 8281/95 (unpub.).
419. See id.
420. See id.
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the copyright owner-but not more. Consequently, according to
Microsoft, the anonymous second-tier distributor was unable to trans-
fer to the retailer the right to resell Microsoft products without a new
personal computer, because the replicators and the first-tier distribu-
tors themselves were never authorized to do so. 421
In February 1996, the Berlin Court of Appeals sided with
Microsoft and affirmed the decision of the Berlin District Court.422
The court of appeals pointed out that according to section 32 of the
German Copyright Act 423 any copyright owner may generally limit the
scope of a grant of distribution rights. 4 24 Therefore, Microsoft was
able to limit the right to distribute its OEM versions to distribution
with new personal computers. Because Microsoft never disposed com-
pletely, but only to a limited extent, of its exclusive distribution rights
the court found that upon occurrence of the first sale, Microsoft's dis-
tribution rights were only exhausted to a limited extent. 42 5 Conse-
quently, under the First Sale Doctrine, when a Microsoft replicator
transferred a copy of Word as an OEM version to a second-tier distribu-
tor, Microsoft's exclusive rights to prohibit the distribution of its
software copy as an OEM version became exhausted. Therefore, the
second-tier distributor was permitted to resell the software copy to the
retailer as an OEM version and the retailer was permitted to resell the
software copy to consumers as an OEM version. However, according to
the Berlin Court of Appeals, because Microsoft never undertook or
consented to a sale of its OEM versions as stand-alone products,
Microsoft's right as the copyright owner to prohibit the distribution of
its OEM versions as stand-alone products did not become ex-
hausted.426 Thus, when the retailer resold the OEM versions as stand-
alone products, the retailer infringed Microsoft's distribution rights.
With respect to competition laws, the Berlin Court of Appeals
found that Microsoft's restraints were not automatically excused to
the extent Microsoft exercised its copyrights. 427 However, the court
did not find a violation of anti-competition laws. The general prohibi-
tion of resale restrictions in the German Act Against Restraints on
421. See id.
422. See KG, 1996 CR, 531.
423. Section 32 is entitled "Limitation of Rights of Use" and provides: "A right of use
may be limited with regard to territory, time, and scope."
424. See LG Berlin, 25.8.1995, File Nr. 5 U 8281/95 (unpub.).
425. See id.
426. See id.
427. See id.
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Trade4 28 did not apply in the case before the court, because the con-
duct in question qualified as bundling under section 18. According to
the new section 18, bundling can be prohibited by the German Fed-
eral Cartel Office in a specific case, but in the absence of such prohibi-
tion, bundling is not per se illegal under German antitrust law.4 29 In
June 1997, the Berlin Court of Appeals issued a permanent injunction
which affirmed and repeated its own reasoning used to grant the pre-
liminary injunction in Microsoft's favor.430
This permanent injunction was overturned by the Bundesgericht-
shof in July 2000.43 1 The Bundesgerichtshof agreed with Microsoft and
the Berlin Court of Appeals that a copyright owner can impose distri-
bution related restrictions and limitations on its distributors with ef-
fect erga omnes.432 If a distributor, such as a Microsoft "replicator,"
violates such restrictions when it creates and sells software copies, then
such infringing sale of a software copy will not qualify as a first sale
under the First Sale Doctrine. However, if a first distributor observes
the copyright owner's restriction and sells software copies in accor-
dance with such restrictions, then the copyright owner's distribution
rights are completely exhausted. Thus, because the replicators ob-
served Microsoft's restrictions and sold stand-alone versions and OEM
versions at different prices, a first sale for purposes of the First Sale
Doctrine occurred. Consequently, even the first-tier distributors which
first acquired the software copies from the replicators were, under the
First Sale Doctrine, permitted to resell the OEM versions without any
restrictions to second purchasers like the retailer that was sued by
Microsoft. Also, that retailer was permitted to resell the OEM versions
without a restriction.
The Bundesgerichtshof compromised between the statutory lan-
guage of the German Copyright Act and the EC Software Directive.
These laws simply provide that the first sale of a copy of a program by
the copyright holder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution
right of that copy. Like section 69c of the German Copyright Act, Arti-
428. See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen [Act Against Restraints of Compe-
tition] Fed. Gazette 1, 2546 (amended Aug. 26, 1998).
429. Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Koppelungsbindungen [Tying restrictions] HANDBUCH DES
KARTELLRECHTS [Handbook of Antitrust Law] 388-90 (Gerhard Wiedemann ed. 1999).
Under Article 81(1) (e), bundling is clearly illegal. However, the Berlin Court of Appeals
seemed to negate the applicability of Article 81, 82 EC Treaty because of an assumed lack
of European Common Market dimension and therefore, EC jurisdiction.
430. See KG, 1998 CR, 137.
431. See Bundesgerichtshof, 2000 CR, 651.
432. See id. at 652.
[Vol. 36
SOFTWARE TRANSFERS
cle 4(c) of the Software Directive provides that "[t]he first sale . . .
shall exhaust the distribution right . . . , with the exception of the
right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof."43-
These laws do not provide that the distribution rights shall be ex-
hausted only to the extent approved by the copyright owner. The
court gave a policy explanation for the different treatment of distribu-
tion restrictions on the first and second level.434 In the relationship
between the copyright owner and its first-tier distributors, the interests
of the copyright owner to control the manner of commercialization of
its works is paramount. 43 5 However, on the second level and lower
levels of trade, the public interest in simple rules on personal property
and an unrestricted stream of commerce outweighs the copyright
owner's interests. 43 6 The First Sale Doctrine is intended to protect the
public from invisible restraints on alienation. The Bundesgerichtshof ad-
ded that in a situation where the end-user of a copyrighted work
needs the copyright owner's permission to use such work, the copy-
right owner would still retain a substantial amount of control.43 7 How-
ever, given the fact that lawful acquirers of copies of Word are already
permitted by statute to upload the program without Microsoft's per-
mission, the Bundesgerichtshof noted only one option for Microsoft to
impose distribution restraints on lower levels of trade. That option
imposed a contractual obligation on each acquirer to require any sec-
ond purchasers to observe the OEM restriction. Since such a scheme
was not before the court, the court noted in this regard that Microsoft
must observe the limitations imposed by the German Standard Con-
tract Terms Act and anti-competition laws.4 38
The Bundesgerichtshof also dismissed Microsoft's assertion that the
retailer violated unfair competition laws by unlawfully interfering with
the contracts between Microsoft and the replicators, with the con-
tracts between the replicators and the first-tier distributors, or with the
contracts between the first-tier distributors and the second-tier distrib-
utors.439 In the absence of any specific mischief, it does not constitute
unfair competition to take advantage of someone else's breach of con-
tract under German law. 440
433. Software Directive Article 4(c).
434. See KG, 1996 CR, at 653.
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. See id. at 654.
438. See id. at 653.
439. See id.
440. See id. at 654.
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C. Summary
Under the EC Software Directive's First Sale Doctrine, as inter-
preted by German courts, a copyright owner's distribution rights to a
software copy terminate if and when the copyright owner permits a
perpetual transfer of the copy against payment of a lump sum. Any
contractual resale restrictions are generally unenforceable. Any lawful
acquirer is permitted to create an additional copy in order to use or
repair the software, e.g., by uploading the software into the RAM of a
computer. However, the First Sale Doctrine does not apply if a copy-
right owner grants a right to use a software copy only for a limited
period of time, or to the extent a copyright owner grants additional
rights such as commercialization rights or the right to create multiple
copies.
Thus, German courts interpreting the EC Software Directive have
persuasively discerned the assertion that a license agreement is not a
contract sui generis and does not, by its very presence, negate the First
Sale Doctrine. Rather, the intention behind the Doctrine was to en-
sure that the expectations of software purchasers were satisfied with-
out threatening to divest bona fide lessors of software of their control
over the disposition of the leased copy.
Notwithstanding the European foresight on this issue, the issue of
technological anti-circumvention measures remains in flux as much in
Europe as in the United States. Anti-circumvention measures have re-
cently become a legislative pet project there as well. On February 14,
2001, the European Parliament approved a new directive giving copy-
right owners the right to implement anti-circumvention measures. 441
While the directive will not pass until the Parliament and Council
agree on the final wording, the concern for the copyright owner's
right against piracy may also threaten traditional rights of a purchaser
in Europe. It will be interesting to learn whether the common prob-
lem will be addressed by differing solutions in the same manner as the
general application of the First Sale Doctrine.
441. See EU Copyright Law Nears Approval After Committee O, Reuters Newswire (Feb. 5,
2001); Comm'n of the Eur. Union, Communication From the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament Pursuant to the Second Subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty
Concerning the Common Position of the Council on the Adoption of a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Cop-
yright and Related Rights in the Information Society, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
corn.
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V. The Copyright Policy Approach in Application
In concluding, it may be helpful to apply this article's interpreta-
tion of the First Sale Doctrine to a variety of common scenarios for
illustrative purposes.
In the first scenario, perhaps the most common, a software pub-
lisher transfers a copy of its software to an acquirer according to an
agreement under the terms of which: (a) the acquirer is entitled to
keep a physical software copy permanently; (b) the manufacturer
grants to the acquirer a non-exclusive, nontransferable right to install
a copy of the software on one computer hard drive (or personal digi-
tal assistant memory chip, or household electronic device, etc.) and to
upload one copy into the RAM of one computer provided that not
more than one copy of the software may ever be in use at the same
time;442 and (c) the acquirer pays a certain standard license fee, either
in form of a lump sum payment or on credit in installments. This
transfer should be deemed to constitute a sale for purposes of the
First Sale Doctrine because the manufacturer transfers the software
copy permanently. Consequently, the nontransferability clause of the
agreement should be deemed null and void, and the acquirer may
resell or otherwise transfer the software copy to a second acquirer,
who would then become the lawful owner of the copy and, as such,
have the statutory right 443 use the software copy.
In a noteworthy and increasingly common variation on the first
scenario, all elements are identical to that scenario except the physi-
cality of the software copy. Instead, the publisher, distributor, or re-
tailer delivers the software copy to the acquirer over the Internet or a
network of some kind. In considering this scenario, the Librarian of
Congress has asserted that there is no "digital First Sale Doctrine. '444
Similarly, some commentators argue that a first purchaser of a
downloaded software copy cannot legally resell the copy because the
purchaser would have to make an additional-illegal-copy for pur-
poses of sending a copy to the second purchaser (unless the first pur-
chaser actually transferred the hard disk drive to the second) .445
442. Typically, in a standard license agreement, the software manufacturer would state
that it grants a non-exclusive, nontransferable license to use the software and to keep one
copy for archival purposes.
443. Under sections 109 and 117(a)(1) of the United States 1976 Copyright Act and
Articles 4 and 5 of the EC Software Directive as implemented into sections 69c and 69d of
the German Copyright Act.
444. 65 Fed. Reg. 35,673, 35,674 (June 5, 2000).
445. See Moritz & Hfitig, supra note 303, at 4; Loewenheim, supra note 303, § 69c Nr.
33, at 1104; Comm. of the Software & Info. Indus. Assoc. ("SIIA") (Aug. 4, 2000), filed with
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However if the first purchaser deletes the copy in the course of
transmission, no additional copy is made and there is no basis to claim
infringement. Even if the transmission itself does not delete the copy,
assuming that the first purchaser immediately deletes the software
copy that remains on its system after a successful transmission, the
creation of the additional copy should be permitted under the statu-
tory rules that allow the duplication of software for purposes of a law-
ful use and the fair use doctrine.446 Neither the first nor the second
purchaser derives any commercial or other value from the residual
copy of the software on the first purchaser's system if the copy is de-
leted immediately following the transfer.
Also, the presence or absence of a physical transfer medium is
irrelevant to the application of the First Sale Doctrine. The same pub-
lic policy considerations apply regardless of how the software is deliv-
ered to the purchaser; the essence of a software transfer is the transfer
of the software copy itself (i.e., the code) and the rights to use the
code. The value of the transfer media is nearly always either negligible
or incidental to the software purchase. Therefore, the First Sale Doc-
trine should be applied equally to this digital variation of the afore-
mentioned first scenario.
A second scenario is a license agreement providing for a number
of restrictions that may have an indirect impact on the resale of
software copies, e.g., a "CPU clause," an "authorized user" require-
ment, or a "concurrent user" limit. Such license agreements can be
identical to the license agreements described in the first scenario, but
the software publisher also inserts a clause into the agreement accord-
ing to which the acquirer may use the software copy only (i) on a
designated CPU, (ii) by authorized users (who could be named em-
ployees or abstract positions, e.g, head of engineering, vice president
product development, etc.), and/or (iii) by a limited number of users
at the same time. Such clauses typically attempt to regulate the permit-
ted uses of software copies in order to enable the software manufac-
turer to price its software in relation to the benefits that the acquirer
will likely be able to derive from the software.
Such clauses do not necessarily have to impair the public policy
behind the First Sale Doctrine. If the restrictions would "run with the
software copies" from a first acquirer to a secondary acquirer, they
the United States. Copyright Office and available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/re-
ports/studies/dmca/dmcastudy.ht nl.
446. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117(a) (1) (2000). See EC Software Directive Arts. 4, 5, as
implemented in German Copyright Act §§ 69c, 69d.
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would not seem to unduly affect the merchantability of the software
copies. Otherwise, the copyright owner would have to rely on contrac-
tual schemes and try to obligate first acquirers to obligate secondary
acquirers by way of contract as the Bundesgerichtshof suggests in the
OEM case discussed above. Either way, such restrictions may some-
what reduce the value of the software copy to the first acquirer, which
is taken into account by the copyright owner's pricing. Yet, the restric-
tions do not necessarily have to deprive the first acquirer of the possi-
bility of reselling the software. Therefore, the First Sale Doctrine does
not have to apply to this second scenario absent sales characteristics in
the transaction.
However, such restrictions could also be designed to circumvent
the First Sale Doctrine, for example, by tying the use of a software
copy to specifically named employees (as opposed to a certain posi-
tion), or to a CPU identified by a serial number (as opposed to per-
formance capacity). Obviously, a software purchaser will not
necessarily intend to transfer his employees or CPUs with its software
copies. Such clauses could therefore violate the First Sale Doctrine
and be void.44 7
A third common license model, called a "site license" or "enter-
prise license" follows the pattern of the first example above, but the
license agreement is designed not to sell one copy of the product to
be installed on a single computer or other equipment, but to author-
ize the software installation on a network server, to be deployed over a
local area network ("LAN") to a number of host computers operated
by a single company or organization. Although a site license usually
involves the sale of a single copy of software, the license agreement
447. German courts seem to differ on this point and find that under the German Stan-
dard Contract Terms Act, CPU clauses would generally be invalid if contained in a boiler-
plate clause. If, instead, the software manufacturer individually negotiates the CPU clause
with the first acquirer, e.g., by also offering the software copy for a higher fee without the
restriction, the clause could be valid and enforceable with respect to the first acquirer.
Nevertheless, the second acquirer would not be bound by the restriction, unless it also
contractually agrees on such a restriction with the first acquirer.
Although this approach currently lacks any statutory foundation in the United States,
it offers advantages that a simplistic rule forbidding CPU clauses lacks. The German ap-
proach addresses both the competition and purchaser protection functions of the First
Sale Doctrine. By requiring the licensor to offer viable alternatives to the CPU clause, the
approach avoids market distorting behavior and actually opens new market options for the
software. Equally, by requiring that the clause be negotiated, it protects consumers who
typically purchase software, expecting to "own" the copy and hence to retain the power to
resell it, without examining license provisions closely. It is therefore recommended that
the United States Congress consider adopting an exception to the First Sale Doctrine
modeled on the German rule.
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may additionally authorize the acquirer to make multiple copies of
the software and upload them to a predetermined number of other
computers connected to the LAN, or allow access by a predetermined
number of other computers to the copy residing on a hard disk drive
in the LAN server. In the former case, the purchaser makes multiple
copies that reside on the hard disk drives of each host computer; in
the latter, host computers connected to the LAN send a request to the
server to access the software, and the server uploads copies directly to
the host computers' RAM. In either case, the license agreement pro-
vides for multiple copies to be made for an equal number of users. 448
From the first example above, it should be obvious that the First
Sale Doctrine authorizes the purchaser of a site license to resell the
initial software copy received from the publisher. What is not so obvi-
ous is whether the Doctrine also authorizes the purchaser to transfer
the right to make additional copies. In this regard, it must be deter-
mined whether the pricing model resembles a sale or a "true" license
to commercialize intellectual property in a certain way involving the
exclusive rights that are not directly affected by the First Sale Doc-
trine. If the acquirer has to pay a pre-defined, additional lump sum
amount for every additional copy that the acquirer creates and uses
(e.g., $150 per extra copy), such an arrangement is economically
identical to a sale of such extra copies and should not be treated dif-
ferently for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine. It cannot be relevant
that the copyright owner in this scenario does not ship the additional
copies on carrier media without any significant value if all other terms
and conditions of the arrangement point to the concept of a tradi-
tional sale. Consequently, for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine, a
sale occurs when the first acquirer creates the copies with the permis-
sion of the copyright owner, and therefore, the first acquirer may re-
sell such copies at its discretion.
If, instead, the copyright owner permits the acquirer to make an
unlimited number of copies subject to the limitation that such copies
may only be created, stored and used at a certain location or in a
certain business unit, then the transaction is substantially different
from a sale because the number of sold items is not defined. Balanc-
ing the interests of the copyright owner with the interests of free com-
petition and end-user rights, it does not seem reasonable that the
acquirer of a site license could always transfer such license to another
person or entity. For example, if a copyright owner permits the owner
448. See also Professor Rice's excellent discussion of this issue and comparison to mo-
tion picture display licensing, supra note 9, at 180.
[Vol. 36
of a small retail store under a site license to create as many copies of a
bookkeeping program as the licensee wants, the copyright owner
would be deprived of its chances to efficiently commercialize its copy-
righted work. Therefore, if a person acquires a software copy for a
one-time payment a software copy, and the perpetual right to make an
unspecified number of additional copies, under the First Sale Doc-
trine such person can resell only the initial copy, not the right to
make copies.
Like a site license, a publishing license for copies to be owned
and distributed by the publisher can be, but does not have to be func-
tionally equivalent to the sale of a fixed number of copies. If the dis-
tributor acquires, by payment of a one-time sum, the perpetual right
to create and sell a certain number of copies of the software, then the
transaction qualifies as a sale and the First Sale Doctrine applies.449
However, if the distributor acquires the right to make copies by prom-
ising to pay certain royalties, or monthly lump sum fees for a certain
period of time, then the grant of an exclusive right is at the heart of
the transaction and the First Sale Doctrine will not apply when the
distributor actually creates the copies. However, once the distributor
transfers a copy to a reseller or an end-user for a lump-sum fee, such
transfer qualifies as a sale and occurs with the copyright holder's con-
sent. Therefore, the First Sale Doctrine applies after such sale of a
copy by the distributor occurs.
A slightly different variation on the fourth scenario is the license
providing for outsourced publishing services, in which the copyright
owner grants a software publisher the right to reproduce a fixed num-
ber of copies of the software, all of which are to be owned by the
copyright owner. This, too, is a "true license agreement" that is not
transferable under the First Sale Doctrine. Under the license agree-
ment, the publisher never owns the copies it creates; the First Sale
Doctrine does not apply, because the Doctrine only permits the trans-
fer of copies by their lawful owner.
The sixth scenario is a fixed term lease of a copy of software.
Here, a copyright owner transfers a copy of its software to an acquirer
according to an agreement under which the acquirer may use the
software copy for a (possibly renewable) fixed term against payment
of a one-time fee. The fixed term is substantially less than the useful
449. Cf Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine immunizes a manufacturing license from a
claim of patent infringement by virtue of its sales of manufactured chips to another party
against the wishes of the licensor).
Fall 2001 ] SOFTWARE TRANSFERS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
life of the software. If the agreement is renewable, then after the expi-
ration of the fixed term, the acquirer may renew the agreement for an
additional fee. As explained above, under this agreement the lessee
never becomes the lawful owner of the copy, and accordingly, the First
Sale Doctrine does not apply.450 However, if the copyright owner per-
mits the acquirer to use and keep the software copy for a period equal
to or exceeding the commercially useful life of the software, e.g., ten
years where the software in question has a realistic useful life of seven,
this transaction probably constitutes an attempt to avoid the First Sale
Doctrine, and should be treated as a sale subject to the Doctrine.
VI. Conclusion
Marshall McLuhan wrote: "The medium is the message. This is
merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any me-
dium ... result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs
by... any new technology. '" 451 The social or legal consequences of the
translation of the First Sale Doctrine to a new medium-computer
software-threatens to undermine the doctrine that preceded its own
application to software. This Article has argued that, in analyzing the
licensing of computer software, United States courts have exalted
form over substance in approaching the application of the First Sale
Doctrine to electronic media such as software. Instead of questioning
whether any given license agreement conveys title to a copy of
software, as courts traditionally have done for other sales of intellec-
tual property (such as movie reels, books, or phonographs), courts
since 1990 have analyzed the First Sale Doctrine as if the proper oppo-
sition were between a sale of a copy and a "license" of a copy.4 52
Under these decisions, a "license" was defined as an agreement sui
generis that can be identified from the label at the top of the agree-
ment or the choice of words used without reference to the substance
450. Under the German Standard Contract Terms Act, any boilerplate clauses would
be measured against the German Civil Code provisions on leases.
451. MARSHALL McLuIAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ch. 1 (1964).
452. It is interesting to note that this approach would be viable when analyzing
whether the First Sale Doctrine applies to a manufacturing or publishing license. When a
copyright owner conveys such a license, he may convey a copy of the software (to be de-
stroyed upon termination of the license), but the purpose of the agreement is neither to
sell nor to lease any particular copy. The license agreement is designed to transfer certain
production rights independently of any copy. In this case, the proper opposition is be-
tween a "sale of a copy" and a "license to publish." The First Sale Doctrine would not apply
to a license to publish, but it would apply to the sale of the copies after production.
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of the rights transferred, or, in one case, in which the licensor simply
evidences an intent to avoid the First Sale Doctrine.
This tautological approach undermines the public policy that mo-
tivated Congress to include the First Sale Doctrine in the 1976 Copy-
right Act. The problem stems from the failure of United States courts
to recognize that every transfer of computer software is accompanied
by a license of some kind. The proper focus is therefore upon the
terms, not the existence, of the license agreement. Specifically, United
States courts should follow the traditional practice under the First Sale
Doctrine for other types of media, of analyzing the terms of the li-
cense to determine whether title to the copy has passed to the licen-
see. In undertaking the same analysis, European courts have focused
on whether the terms of the license amount to a sale of a copy of the
software or a lease of the copy. United States courts have only done so
in the context of section 117 of the Copyright Act, and even in that
case the courts' analysis failed to comprehend the true nature of a
"license agreement." Yet, German courts and the Federal Circuit 453 do
agree in applying the protective measures to purchasers of sales-like
transfers of software copies, the former under section 117 of the Copy-
right Act, and the latter under comparable provisions of the EC
Software Directive and the First Sale Doctrine. German courts assume
a sale occurs when a perpetual transfer of a software copy is ex-
changed for a lump sum payment. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit deems a perpetual transfer and a lump
sum payment strong indications that a sale occurred, although it
would apparently not qualify a transfer as a sale if the acquirer's rights
to the software copy are significantly restricted under the transfer
agreement. As discussed above, it would be circular to negate a sale
whenever a copyright owner attempts to contractually exclude further
transfers because it is the very function of the First Sale Doctrine to
provide for transferability in certain situations despite the interests
and wishes of the copyright owner. Nevertheless, there are other con-
tractual restrictions that prevent qualifying a transaction as a sale-
most importantly a time limit on the right to use the software. If the
copyright owner makes software copies available only for a limited pe-
riod of time, German courts assume a lease and do not apply the First
Sale Doctrine. This approach captures the essential element of the
proper analysis of the First Sale Doctrine which is looking to the sub-
stance of the license to determine whether actual possession of a copy
453. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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of the software remains with the licensee for a period of time signifi-
cantly shorter than the commercially valuable duration of the
software.
The problems with allowing copyright owners to exempt the First
Sale Doctrine from computer software are manifold. Such a policy un-
dermines the Copyright Act's delicate balance between granting au-
thors (and here, programmers) adequate incentive to continue
creating, while making the fruits of their creation accessible in the
socially optimum amount. By allowing copyright owners to eschew ap-
plication of the First Sale Doctrine by using pro forma license terms,
courts have undermined the alienability of software copies and al-
lowed copyright owners to skew market forces and reap rewards un-
necessary to encourage their continued creation of intellectual
property. Moreover, because the use of profitable techniques in one
media typically spread to other media, the continued collusion of
courts in undermining the First Sale Doctrine threatens to render the
entire doctrine, as applied for 150 years to all types of copyrightable
intellectual property, legally nugatory.
Finally, the statutory language of section 109(a) does not support
the view that copyright owners are entitled to impose contractual or
technological restraints on resale of software copies under state law.
Although the application of state law is seemingly supported by the
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, the clear wording of fed-
eral law creates an "entitlement" in the copy owner to resell the copy
that should trump any contrary state commercial or contract law
under federal preemption principles. Such preemption is necessary to
protect the federal public policy of granting a legal monopoly that is
limited to rewarding copyright owners only as much as necessary to
encourage continued creation of protectable works.
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Addendum
After completion, yet prior to publication of this Article, the
United States Copyright Office published its final report pursuant to
its request for public comments regarding DMCA section 104, men-
tioned in Part I of this Article. The Office rejected public calls for a
"digital first sale doctrine." The rejection was apparently motivated by
the massive online copyright infringement to which the NapsteT454 case
brought widespread attention.455 While the factual issues of that or
similar cases cannot be discussed here, the authors believe that a digi-
tal version of the First Sale Doctrine is not necessary because section
109, as interpreted in this Article, adequately applies to online as well
as offline scenarios. The same rules govern purely electronic transfers
of software copies because the coincidental exchange of a tangible
carrier medium is irrelevant economically, and distinguishing be-
tween the two contexts is inconsistent with the public policy objectives
underlying the First Sale Doctrine.
Close upon the heels of the Copyright Office report, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California issued a deci-
sion strongly supporting the application of the First Sale Doctrine to
computer software and espousing many of the views taken in this Arti-
cle.456 Should the court's decision command respect at the appellate
level, the First Sale Doctrine may have a future in the Cyber Age after
all.
454. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
455. See U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998, § 104, at
http://loc.gov/copyright/reports/sec-104-report-vol-.pdf, at 97-101 (last visited Sept. 3,
2001).
456. See Softman Prods. Co., LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc., No. CV 00-04161 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 22, 2001) (order denying preliminary injunction).
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